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At the end of the twentieth century and the opening of the twenty-first, American 
life writing remains both an unsettled form and an unsettling practice. This study 
addresses six representative texts that suggest a critique of life writing as they deploy 
self-conscious fictionalization, experiment, and suspicion of their own strategies. Three 
of the works under analysis signal a noteworthy change in contemporary U.S. life 
writing. As they interrogate the conventions of memoir and biography, they begin to 
insist on notions of self, history, and agency at odds with the poststructuralisms that 
shape their approaches to representing selves and histories. These instances of vexed life 
writing, having recognized and engaged the constructedness of experience, memory, and 
self, nevertheless struggle to operate as nonfiction. 
 Dave Eggers’ A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, Edmund Morris’ 
Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan, and Maxine Hong Kingston’s The Fifth Book of 
Peace are symptomatic instances of panic in contemporary American life writing. In each 
of these memoirs, the life writer supplements ostensibly nonfiction narratives with 
  
metacommentary and fiction but posits neither the fantasy of an authoritative master 
narrative nor the jouissance of having abandoned the same. Obliged to what each 
memoirist identifies as his or her local responsibilities, these texts struggle toward 
representing freighted experiences.  
I read these texts as uneasy heirs to three predecessors that adopt parallel methods 
to represent lives but make distinct arguments about life writing. Eggers’ memoir echoes 
the form and epistemology of Mary McCarthy’s Memories of a Catholic Girlhood. 
Morris’ experimental presidential biography follows Gore Vidal’s Lincoln: A Novel. The 
Fifth Book of Peace counters Kingston’s own family memoir, China Men. As the 
contemporary examples of life writing adopt the postmodern forfeiture of stable 
representation, they do so under an anxiousness that McCarthy, Vidal, and the early 
Kingston evade. The presence of that worry in contemporary American life writing 
indicates the limits of this category of text and the native tension between postmodern 
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Introduction: Contemporary American Life Writing’s Critical Fictions 
 
In her memoir of being struck by lightning, A Match to the Heart, Gretel Ehrlich 
devotes a one-paragraph chapter to a figure for the unsettled meeting point of her 
experience, her text, and her readers:  
I dreamed that the shape of this book should be a convection cloud, a rising 
bubble swarming with up and down drafts of electricity, moisture, and air. Inside, 
the narrative would zigzag like lightning and the pages would be laid end to end 
to resemble a tree trunk, a channel down which fire suddenly flows. Once the 
book had been read, the top of the cloud would explode leaving the reader holding 
a burned shell. (161)  
The imagined book—a dreamed metaphor of life writing—rumbles and percolates until it 
immolates itself, depositing only remains before the reader, who is decidedly at risk. 
Ehrlich’s work meditates on the ephemeral nature of her shocked body, the physicality of 
her memories, and the difficulty of cohering both into memoir. The temporary, even 
restless states conveyed in the dream are symptoms of much life writing. Though the text 
adheres to the conventions of the recovery narrative, its tentativeness and its suspicion of 
permanence articulate questions about life writing as an authoritative version of things. A 
Match to the Heart opens in uncertain and ungrounded awakening as Ehrlich comes to 
after being struck—“Deep in an ocean. I am suspended motionless. The water is gray. 
That’s all there is, and before that?” (3)—and while the memoirist’s perception clarifies 
its command of her experiences, the ethereal first moments haunt what follows.  
Another memoirist bound to a damaged self suggests something of the 




bottom, “The Crack-Up,” F. Scott Fitzgerald offers the following aphorism: “Before I go 
on with this short history, let me make a general observation—the test of a first-rate 
intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still 
retain the ability to function” (69)1. As a therapeutic foundation for mastering “things that 
are hopeless,” Fitzgerald’s observation affords remarkable control to the human agent. I 
would like to suggest, however, that as an introductory note to an autobiographical essay, 
it hints at the autobiographical burden of contradiction and the life writer’s tendency to 
produce work that is the manifestation of that difference—complex and contradictory, 
resistant to the ordering power of story. Fitzgerald does not here propose a resolution of 
the “two opposed ideas” but instead the measured sustenance of their opposition. In fact, 
maintenance of interior antithetical pressures—the real and the remembered, experience 
and invention, perhaps—signifies the best sort of mind. By extension, autobiographical 
tidiness might very well indicate only artifice. 
One more telling moment from American autobiography. Ever attentive to the 
utility of public identity, Benjamin Franklin explains in his Autobiography, “In order to 
secure my Credit and Character as a Tradesman, I took care not only to be in Reality 
Industrious & frugal, but to avoid all Appearances to the Contrary” (73). This business of 
appearances will creep into his familiar “Project of arriving at moral Perfection” (90), and 
Franklin confides that there is virtue in seeming to have certain aspects of character:  
For something that pretended to be Reason was every now and then suggesting to 
me, that such extreme Nicety as I exacted of myself might be a kind of Foppery in 
Morals, which if it were known would make me ridiculous; that a perfect 
                                                 
1 I owe a debt to Stan Plumly, who reminded me of not only Fitzgerald’s observation but of its work as a 




Character might be attended with the Inconvenience of being envied and hated; 
and that a benevolent man should allow a few faults in himself, to keep his 
Friends in Countenance. (99)  
He ultimately admits that, having failed to achieve humility, he may yet enjoy its 
benefits: “I cannot boast of much Success in acquiring the Reality of this Virtue; but I had 
a good deal with regard to the Appearance of it” (102). That an eighteenth-century 
American autobiographer articulates degrees of distinction between a performed self and 
a performing subject is not particularly remarkable. It seems, if anything, typical; his 
sense of an autonomous self who manipulates his image is of course in keeping with 
Enlightenment liberal humanism. The significance of his admission for the next two 
centuries of American life writing ought to give us pause, though. Having signaled its 
author’s efficacy as a self-conscious performer, Franklin’s autobiography argues that this 
version of a life may only be another, rhetorically conscious effort for an audience. Its 
indirect critique of self-representation might inform our approach to not only his 
autobiography but to others as well—more to the point, Franklin’s advocacy for 
appearances suggests a reading guide for autobiographical practice. 
I introduce this study with brief notes on three exemplary autobiographical cases 
in the spirit of James Olney’s contention that the most compelling criticism of life writing 
is to be found in the work of its practitioners. In the life writer’s commonplace efforts to 
explain and situate his or her efforts, particularly by way of prefaces but hardly absent 
from the pages of the stories themselves, we encounter indications of the enterprise’s 
messy relationship with its subject matter. Memoir and autobiography, by definition 




deconstruction; biography’s efforts to craft a life share this tendency to meditate on its 
own practice. Olney claims that “It has long been my conviction that theory of life-
writing is best derived from major instances of the mode rather than from interchange 
with other critics. This judgment is generated neither by disrespect for such criticism nor 
by ignorance of it” (Memory and Narrative xiii). While a significant body of criticism 
informs my analysis, it takes for its foundations the rich reflection on autobiography, 
biography, and memoir suggested by examples of each.  
A class of what might best be called informed life writing, works that prominently 
respond to the limits of their own practices and interrogate conventional strategies of 
representation in nonfiction, offers a rich source for analysis of all life writing. These are 
what Leigh Gilmore calls “limit-cases,” on the peripheries of life writing, they “offer a 
means to think about the ways in which autobiography is partially structured through the 
proscriptions it places on self-representation” (131). They enact what Ruth Behar longs 
for when she testifies that “I think what we are seeing are efforts to map an intermediate 
space we can’t quite define yet, a borderland between passion and intellect, analysis and 
subjectivity, ethnography and autobiography, art and life” (174). As Franklin’s 
eighteenth-century autobiography makes clear, reflection on the practice is common in 
life writing. Certain instances, however, make possible an especially pronounced version 
of Olney’s preference for the criticisms of the critiqued. Jack Kerouac’s seventeen “true-
story novels,” which he regularly insists are authentic versions of experience, at times 
address their autobiographical function. Big Sur, his alcoholic’s book of failing to achieve 
sobriety, includes especially uneasy reflections on the operations of his nonfiction novels 




Duluoz2 is 26 years old and on the road all the time hitchhiking’ while there I am almost 
40 years old, bored and jaded in a roomette bunk crashin across that Salt Flat” (5). The 
autobiographical persona, constructed by Kerouac’s own authoritative efforts as a 
verifier, only does itself in, and so a transgressive life writer engages in a confessional 
critique of how his works are consumed as nonfiction: “I’m supposed to be the King of 
the Beatniks according to the newspapers, so but at the same time I’m sick and tired of all 
the endless enthusiasms of new young kids trying to know me and pour out all their lives 
into me so that I’ll jump up and down and say yes yes that’s right, which I can’t do 
anymore” (109). Read as the constitutive parts of an autobiographical catalogue, 
Kerouac’s novels, essays, and criticism demonstrate an anxiousness over the ability to 
turn memories into books and to control the operations of those works. 
Audre Lorde’s experiment in “biomythography,” Zami: A New Spelling of My 
Name, resists the fantasy of an entirely distinct autobiographer, instead slipping across a 
community of identities: “I have felt the age-old triangle of mother father and child, with 
the ‘I’ at its eternal core, elongate and flatten out into the elegantly strong triad of 
grandmother mother daughter, with the ‘I’ moving back and forth flowing in either or 
both directions as needed” (7). Philip Roth opens The Facts: A Novelist’s Autobiography 
with a letter to fictional Zuckerman. He explains that “every genuine imaginative event 
begins down there, with the facts, with the specific, and not with the philosophical, the 
ideological or the abstract. Yet, to my surprise, I now appear to  have gone about writing 
a book absolutely backward, taking what I have already imagined and, as it were, 
desiccating it, so as to restore my experience to the original prefictionalized factuality” 
(3). The letter asks Zuckerman to assess the autobiography, and Roth concludes The 
                                                 




Facts with the fictional character’s response: “Dear Roth, I’ve read the manuscript twice. 
Here is the candor you ask for: Don’t publish—you are far better off writing about me 
than ‘accurately’ reporting your own life […] on the evidence of what I’ve just read, I’d 
say you’re still as much in need of me as I of you” (161). Zuckerman’s critique of all that 
precedes it leaves life writing vulnerable, and that Roth situates the critique interior to a 
fictional character only bolsters the interrogation.  
This study addresses six representative texts, each of which turns to self-
conscious fictionalization, experiment, and suspicion in order to suggest a critique of life 
writing. My analysis’ three primary cases—Dave Eggers’, Edmund Morris’, and Maxine 
Hong Kingston’s important and symptomatic memoirs—respond to loss, fragment, and 
uncertainty with vexed nonfiction, in which the self-conscious critique that has perhaps 
always been a familiar tendency in life writing offers little comfort. Eggers’ A 
Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, Morris’ Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan, 
and Kingston’s The Fifth Book of Peace are representative instances of what I will argue 
is a significant worry in contemporary American life writing. In each of these texts, the 
life writer not only supplements ostensibly historical narratives with metacommentary 
and fiction but also leaves a text that posits neither the fantasy of an authoritative master 
narrative nor the jouissance of having abandoned the same. Obliged to what each 
memoirist identifies as his or her discrete responsibilities, these texts struggle toward 
representing freighted experiences. As they resist conventions of memoir and biography, 
while contributing to the catalogue of American life writing, they begin to insist on 
notions of self, history, and agency at odds with the poststructuralism that shapes their 




themselves, autobiographers are primed to recognize the constructed nature of the past, 
yet they need at the same time to believe that in writing about the past they are 
performing an act of recovery: narrative teleology models the trajectory of continuous 
identity, reporting the supreme fiction of memory as fact” (98). This study takes on cases 
of life writing that not only recognize but acknowledge and wrestle with that 
constructedness. It is one thing to understand that life writing depends on fiction and 
quite another to make that dependence part of the project. These works sustain a 
mitigated conviction that, even after the dismantling wrought by poststructuralist 
criticism, they can report experience and identity, that they are even responsible to their 
stories. Their conviction that the stakes of each memoir are high, tempered by their 
resistance to nonfiction’s foundational conventions, indicates a profound unease in 
contemporary life writing. 
 
The compulsive and substantial work invested in writing lives is not merely part 
of some native need to document them but is symptomatic of the inability to do so 
completely, accurately, and unproblematically. The declarations of the life writer and the 
very existence of a narration to represent a life indicate a belief in the text’s ability to 
exert control, and yet the point is often that control is not the point. As Joan Didion leads 
her reader through selected records of her experience in “On Keeping a Notebook,” she 
announces, “How it felt to me: that is getting closer to the truth about a notebook” (134). 
The gesture, faithful to Didion’s style, bears at least two telling lessons. First, it purchases 
authenticity because the author confesses that her account of what happened is the 




multivalence for Didion’s reports of what happened. Although she will later distinguish 
her notebook pieces from “the kind of notebook that is patently for public consumption, a 
structural conceit for binding together a series of graceful pensées,” and she will establish 
an objective—“Remember what it was to be me: that is always the point” (136)—the 
notice we have received informs the way we read her nonfiction. A straightforward claim 
about how things seem to those who record experience actually explains that this writing 
is anything but straightforward.  
Frank Conroy asks, “Is it the mindlessness of childhood that opens up the world?” 
and responds, “Today nothing happens in a gas station. I’m eager to leave, to get where 
I’m going, and the station, like some huge paper cutout, or a Hollywood set, is simply a 
façade. But at thirteen, sitting with my back against the wall, it was a marvelous place to 
be” (107). This reader is inclined to ask, then, how that “mindlessness” manages to 
record the details of youth for Stop-Time’s so thorough account decades later. Conroy’s 
memoir is, of course, by no means a lie, some obviously misleading version of things, but 
instead is the sort of record from memory that operates under memory’s direction. 
Conroy’s “faith in the firmness of time slips away gradually. I begin to believe that 
chronological time is an illusion and that some other principle organizes existence. My 
memories flash like clips from unrelated movies.” His uncertainty leads him to “almost 
gratefully accept the delusion that I’ve lived another life, remote from me now, and 
completely forgotten about it. Somewhere in the nooks and crannies of memory there are 
clues. As I chase them down a kind of understanding comes” (21). Life writing does not 
simply report—it constructs from recollection. Conroy’s navigation of those “nooks and 




Most of the familiar paradigms of biography, autobiography, and memoir fail to 
adequately contain their various specimens, and the familiar shortcomings of genre 
confuse as much as they clarify. Is biography no longer biography when its author admits 
that some content is imaginary? When should biography be thought of as autobiography? 
Are fictionalized memoirs life writing or novels? Whose answers to these questions 
matter? One might reasonably respond that there is a recognizable class of writing about 
real life, and that these anomalies are just experimental hangers on, perhaps interesting, 
but certainly marginal. However, in keeping with the truism, the odd example may be the 
most telling. And what these tell, their lesson on life writing, is that this is an unstable 
class of nonfiction in which categories like authenticity, honesty, memory, and even 
history are under constant pressure from the texts that conventionally bear those 
descriptors. Didion and Conroy suggest recognition of that pressure, and their 
engagement with life writing’s messiness seems only to bolster their efforts.  
Gilmore identifies the problem of category in life writing: “Constructing 
autobiography as a genre has depended, at least in part, on domesticating its specific 
weirdness. Its doubled nature [“outside both fiction and history’] confounds definition 
through preexisting generic categories, even as the judgment of its duplicity follows from 
those categories” (“The Mark of Autobiography” 6). Olney responds to this uncertainty 
with neologism: “periautography”—writing around the self—which affords “lack of 
generic rigor, its comfortably loose fit and generous adaptability” (xv). The strangeness 
of autobiography Gilmore detects also informs Paul de Man’s “Autobiography as 
Defacement,” which, as Linda Anderson observes, “proposes that autobiography is not a 




himself in the text, but what he is seeing in this self-reflexive or specular moment is a 
figure or a face called into being by the substitutive trope of prosopopeia, literally, the 
giving of a face, or personification” (12). This matters fundamentally to the study of 
autobiography in particular and life writing in general because “it reveals … that all 
knowledge, including self-knowledge, depends on figurative language or tropes” (12-13). 
Astonishingly, Jill Ker Conway, herself a celebrated memoirist, opens her study 
of autobiography, When Memory Speaks, by asking “Why is autobiography the most 
popular form of fiction for modern readers?” (3) (emphasis mine). The unsettled question 
of life writing’s relationship with fiction has been the fodder of autobiography criticism 
for decades. Timothy Dow Adams recently summed up the contemporary critical 
wisdom: “scholars working with [autobiography] have almost universally come to the 
realization that whatever else it is, autobiography is not simply nonfiction” (Light Writing 
and Life Writing xi). Adams’ observation takes its aim at first-person life writing, and we 
are wise to maintain distinction between writing about oneself and writing about others, 
yet this dethroning of nonfiction reflects the state of life writing’s many genres, nearly all 
of which have been subjected to a critique that refuses the false authority of nonfiction as 
the true account of some containable event.  
Georges Gusdorf’s 1956 “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography” by most 
accounts signals the founding of contemporary thought in life writing. He contends that 
“in autobiography the truth of facts is subordinate to the truth of man, for it is first of all 
the man who is in question” (43). As striking as this hierarchy is Gusdorf’s 




Moreover, it would seem that autobiography is not to be found outside of our 
cultural area; one would say that it expresses a concept peculiar to western man, a 
concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the universe and 
that he has communicated to men of other cultures; but those men will thereby 
have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not 
their own. (29)  
Unsurprisingly, theorists who follow Gusdorf’s turn from “the truth of facts” and his 
efforts to de-naturalize western autobiography raise just concerns over his colonial 
inclinations, as well as his notable omission of women and of all sorts of alternative 
strategies of self-representation. His essay nevertheless introduces principles that 
undercut naïve adherence to essentialist truth in life writing.  
Olney and others recognize the significance of this move and suggest that life 
writing is the site of an autobiographical or biographical act, in which the life writer 
fashions a self with the text. Olney says “it is through that act that the self and the life, 
complexity intertangled, take on a certain form, assumes a particular shape and image, 
and endlessly reflect that image back and forth between themselves as between two 
mirrors” (“Autobiography and the Cultural Moment” 22). Mary Evans is rightly 
suspicious of the practice of imagining order out of a disorderly life; she checks the 
ostensible authority of the autobiographical act:  
The form of auto/biography3 carries with it some considerable responsibility for 
allowing authors to convey the impression that lives are lived in orderly and 
coherent ways. Thus what has to be recognized in any account of auto/biography 
                                                 




is the collusion, whether conscious or not, between writers of auto/biography and 
the deep desire of late twentieth-century society for order and stability. (134)  
While insisting that life writing could be a vehicle for constructing a version of the self 
(Olney contends that life writing should be regarded as processual, a progressively 
constitutive operation), critics, particularly feminist theorists, note that the major forms of 
the mode, principally autobiography, sustain the primacy of a bourgeois humanist self, 
gathered too artificially by teleological narratives of education, improvement, and 
authority. In their remarkably thoroughgoing introduction to Women, Autobiography, 
Theory: A Reader, Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson survey the several feminist critiques 
of autobiography, following threads of transgressive feminist life writing, 
autogynography, materialist theories, postcolonialism, postmodernism, theories of 
subjectivity, psychoanalysis, Marxian and post-Marxist approaches, cultural studies, 
queer theories, and theories of performativity. The volume demonstrates the activist 
potential for critically constituted life writing in which transgressive practitioners at once 
sustain efforts to report on lives and interrogate faiths in referentiality. Fundamental to 
any critique of life writing’s claims to referentiality is Joan W. Scott’s “Experience,” in 
which she argues that “[s]ubjects are constituted discursively, experience is a linguistic 
event (it doesn’t happen outside established meanings), but neither is it confined to a 
fixed order of meaning” (66). Foreseeing the sort of work accomplished by the texts 
studied below, she “advocate[es] … a way of changing the focus and philosophy of our 
history, from one bent on naturalizing ‘experience’ through a belief in the unmediated 
relationship between words and things, to one that takes all categories of analysis as 




of the self’s ostensible stability in the text, arguing that “the desire to find a self in 
autobiography inevitably fails because of the impossibility of language to represent a 
whole” and that “[a] theory of the subject in autobiography must posit the existence of 
multiple and contradictory subjectivities as the effect of multiple discourses at a 
particular historical moment” (161). 
Eakin nicely summarizes the dynamically constructive work of life writing: 
“[a]utobiographical truth is not a fixed but an evolving content in an intricate process of 
self-discovery and self- creation, and, further … the self that is the center of all 
autobiographical narrative is necessarily a fictive structure” (3). In his discussion of the 
critical approaches that have attempted to take on life writing with a poststructuralist 
apparatus—literary-critical movements away from mimesis, critiques of the stable human 
self, and deflations of transcendental measures of literary goodness—Eakin observes that 
“[i]nterestingly, the existence of such theorizing has done nothing to inhibit the 
autobiographical pursuit; if anything, quite the reverse. The impulse to take the fiction of 
the self and its act as fact persists, a more than willing suspension of disbelief in which 
the behavior of writer and reader refuses to coincide with theory” (Fiction in 
Autobiography 26). There is a promising rationale for this phenomenon in Martin E. 
Gloege’s case for the distinction between modern and postmodern fragmentation:  
Although modernist and postmodern narratives share a formal concern with the 
fragmentation of the self, the rhetoric of such narratives changes radically after 
World War II. Modernist texts mourn the loss or fragmentation of the self; the 




fragmentation. But what modernist narrative mourned, postmodern narrative 
accepts, sometimes with resignation, sometimes with celebration. (59) 
This study investigates the effects of that acceptance of indeterminacy, contingency, and 
ambivalence. The critical response to life writing has yet to attend to the knowing 
practices of Eggers, Morris, and Kingston, who seem to have consumed the criticism and 
made it foundational for their own work, yet struggled with its consequences. Much 
energy has been devoted to demonstrating the slipperiness of nonfiction, and while the 
sort of engaged life writing under analysis here would seem to cooperate with that critical 
work, their uneasiness with some of its antifoundational measures makes clear that 
questions remain. Once life writers deploy the mechanisms that dismantle their practices, 
what strategies remain to tell a life? 
  
 Eggers chronicles the loss of parents and the adolescent turn of his subsequent 
experiences, regularly interrupting to insist that the reported episodes are both true and 
heartbreaking; Morris argues for a version of Ronald Reagan as performative gesture and 
metaphysically inscrutable subject; Kingston fashions a speech act toward peace and 
against imminent war. The affected sincerity of each—and the occasionally resultant 
sentimentality—declines to enter the free float of radical poststructuralism and holds to 
the conventional importance of the documentary, while recognizing the incompleteness 
of any straight story. All three supplement instances of life writing with overt critique of 
the practice and with sometimes defensive articulations of their approaches. This is 




their complicity with a practice they critique, manifest in all three as anxious unease, 
argues for concomitant analysis. 
While I hope to avoid the simplifying impulse of a false either/or, I read these 
three memoirs against the instructive context of predecessor texts that adopt similarly 
experimental methods to represent similar cases but make distinct arguments about the 
work of life writing. Mary McCarthy’s Memories of a Catholic Girlhood, Gore Vidal’s 
Lincoln: A Novel, and Kingston’s own China Men precede Eggers, Morris, and The Fifth 
Book of Peace respectively and in significant respects—they inform my reading of the 
contemporary memoirs, and they make clear the contingent authority available to life 
writing comfortable in its fictions. McCarthy’s memoir, like Eggers’, follows a young 
person’s experiences after the death of parents and supplements a primary narrative with 
commentary that at times wholly undermines the ostensible authenticity of the record. 
Vidal’s history is an investment in novelistic imagination to represent the life of a U.S. 
President at more than a century’s remove; where Morris will turn to experimentalism to 
fill in and flesh out a history, Vidal implies that serious authority is borne by fiction. It is 
perhaps odd to pair two of Kingston’s works against each other. Both follow her model of 
multiple ways of telling histories, eschewing the conventions of a univocal record. 
However, the confident and comforting resignation with which Kingston’s China Men 
articulates a complex representation of her family’s men fails to shape The Fifth Book of 
Peace; the latter cannot sustain the nonfiction episteme of Kingston’s earlier works.  
All six are works after loss and from the fragments of history, but the 
contemporary three struggle toward an ontological coherence that the former set largely 




A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, Dutch, and The Fifth Book of Peace insist, 
almost obsessively, certainly defensively, that the business of life writing is fraught. 
Memories of a Catholic Girlhood, Lincoln, and China Men articulate to varying degrees 
their conviction that texts come apart and their ways of telling are contingent. McCarthy 
and Kingston afford those sensibilities a prominent place in their works, while Vidal’s 
novel, by its nature as a fictional account of the Lincoln presidency, registers an argument 
against history as a transparent record bound to nonfiction’s stabilizing conventions. All 
three make the case that this is one of several ways to tell histories. A Staggering Work of 
Heartbreaking Genius, Dutch, and The Fifth Book of Peace lack the same assuredness 
because they do not finally accept the most radical contingencies of poststructuralism—
each not only believes in its stories, it openly insists that its frame is necessarily best. 
This belies the fear conveyed by all three, that readers will have no patience with a 
twenty-something orphan afraid of losing his community, that Reagan’s life will not be 
properly told, and that there will be unstoppable war. As a result, none purchases the 
potential satisfaction of memoir, or at least the satisfaction available to the three former 
texts under review in this study. Instead, each conveys its worries to the reader.  
This study’s first chapter, “‘The book is thereafter kind of uneven…’: The Limits 
of Metanonfiction,” engages in comparative analysis of McCarthy’s and Eggers’ works. 
Though the more than forty years between them contributes to their differences, they 
respond to memoir writing with a shared urge to speak as editors within their own texts. 
McCarthy’s collection of memoir and editorial comment admits paradox and makes the 
work of memory against actual experience a foundation of her stories. She confides early 




and that the absence of parents to shape the growth of memory by repeating stories of 
childhood has left her without a complete record of her youngest years. The coincidence 
of a primary narrative (most sections are reproduced from prior sources) and responsive 
interchapters destabilizes the book’s work as nonfiction. Eggers’ “Mistakes We Knew 
We Were Making: Notes, Corrections, Clarifications, Apologies, Addenda,” the upside-
down appendix of A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius identifies the work as an 
unwitting heir to McCarthy—a friend responds to Eggers’ description of the work-in-
progress, “Oh, right. Just like Mary McCarthy.” Eggers’ popular memoir is perhaps the 
most panicked of works under scrutiny in this study. After supplementing so much of the 
main text with comment on the work of life writing, “Mistakes…” offers overt defense—
sometimes in a paranoid style—against charges of an emptied and emptying postmodern 
aesthetic, imprecise accusations of irony, and those who would not “trust the hearts of 
your makers.” Eggers’ tone, in marked contrast to McCarthy’s, is kinetic, a hyper-self 
conscious rhetoric. McCarthy’s confidence in the work of storytelling, manifest in a 
textual structure that Eggers will echo, is abandoned in the contemporary memoir for the 
fever of telling. A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius is life writing in a moment 
with little faith in the ability to capture meaningful experience adequately. The turn of the 
century is Eggers’ time, and the saturation of reality television, the MTV aesthetic, and a 
thoroughgoing skepticism of fundamental narratives are the conditions that make possible 
Eggers work. While consuming the popular media produced under conditions that foster 
celebrity for the sake of celebrity and manufacture realities as cinema verite, Eggers 
compulsively reminds his readers that he does the best he can to convey the stories of his 




memoir’s title is resolutely not ironic, and its insistence begins to tell on the entire work’s 
panic. A compulsion to tell infects the entire work, so thoroughly that it accomplishes 
something like hyper-honesty, telling what happened and telling about how that telling is 
and is not being accomplished. 
  In the second chapter, “Lincoln and Dutch: Executive Fictions and American 
Biography,” I argue that Vidal and Morris turn from, even against, the dominant genre of 
U.S. presidential biography and, doing so, illuminate the fissures of conservative life 
writing. Vidal’s novel makes the case that conventionally historical biography does not 
sufficiently contain the meanings of this historical life. His Lincoln takes the form of 
imaginative fiction even as it holds to the presumable weight of reported history. Vidal 
confesses in an afterward, “I have done some moving around [however] I have not done 
it at all with the Presidents,” insistent that history can, at least in some controllable ways, 
be conveyed even while “moving around.” The law of the novel arrests a version of 
Lincoln and his moment, and the book never forgets that the U.S. Presidency is 
ultimately a performance with varying characterizations and machinations. Paradoxically, 
Edmund Morris, given unprecedented access to and authority from the White House of a 
living President, declines both (his own) scholarly conventions of presidential biography 
and the conservative literariness of Vidal’s, crafting instead a multivocal and multi-
generic pastiche of Reagan. Among the distinct devices of Dutch are its fictional narrator 
(called “Edmund Morris”), film-script chapters, pencil sketches, facsimiles of 
handwriting, radio scripts, ersatz journal entries, overwrought metaphors for the task of 
writing presidential biography, and hundreds of footnotes, whose archival work counters 




a life, that Reagan cannot be sufficiently captured by this or any other text but 
nevertheless engages in not only biography but a worrying contention that some 
meaningful structure conditions the relationship between biographer and subject. Morris 
feverishly rushes after as many means as possible and finally demonstrates that while the 
illusion of a coherent and complete version is untenable, he cannot abandon the project of 
arresting Reagan in life writing. The performances that shade Lincoln—Vidal’s President 
grows a beard not because it is in keeping with idealized agrarian character, or because an 
apocryphal young girl suggests he do so, but because pols recommend its effect—
prefigure the overdetermining work of Reagan’s careers as actor and politician. The first 
postmodern president gets his postmodern biography4, but Morris panics, adopting a 
hypersensitive posture in tortured worries over the work of being fair, of the biographer’s 
ethics, and of the challenge of containing “airhead”—and multiply signifying—Reagan. 
Morris figures the loss that informs his book as the disappearance of a fictional son, 
Gavin, driven to the Weather Underground by Reagan’s National Guard action in 
Berkeley. The move to embody absence with an imaginary lost son operates as the 
book’s second most telling moment, eclipsed by the overwrought confession in its last 
pages that the fictional narrator had been rescued years earlier by the teenage lifeguard 
Reagan. 
Finally, Maxine Hong Kingston’s life writing, some of the practice’s most 
sophisticated work, is the subject of the last chapter, “‘Things that fiction can’t solve 
must be worked out in real life’: Maxine Hong Kingston’s Obliged Nonfictions.” The 
Kingston of China Men tells her father that he’ll just have to correct her if she gets parts 
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of his life wrong, but warns him that she controls this telling. The Kingston of The Fifth 
Book of Peace, whose father dies immediately before the book’s opening moments, never 
settles its articulated battle between fiction and nonfiction and worries over the ways to 
report war in order to make peace. This is a compelling book, and its collective work is 
striking, but the tone of its last note betrays its faith in the need to accomplish a 
containable end: “Children, everybody, here’s what to do during war: In a time of 
destruction, create something. A poem. A parade. A friendship. A community. A place 
that is the commons. A school. A vow. A moral principle. One peaceful moment” (402). 
China Men ends not in appeal but with forfeiture of authorial control in the face of stories 
her book cannot contain. In The Fifth Book of Peace Kingston’s anxiety about the success 
of her writing workshops for war and anti-war veterans rests uneasily after the 
concluding move of China Men, to “watch the young men who listen.” At the beginning 
of her account of the workshops, she says, “[t]hings that fiction can’t solve must be 
worked out in life.” Social justice, now tasked with making peace amid wars, therefore 
demands that she leave behind the fiction, which, she paradoxically explains earlier, 
“cares for others.” That dictum follows the book’s middle section, the recreation of a 
fiction (Wittman Ah Sing, antihero of Tripmaster Monkey, and his family in Hawai’i, in 
exile from the warring U.S. mainland) lost in the fire that burned Kingston’s Oakland 
home. Clarified distinctions between the natures and operations of fiction and “writing 
diarylike” abandon the epistemology that founds China Men.  
The Kingston of China Men at times offers some priority to fiction (“On 
Discovery,” the story of Tang Ao, emasculated by Gold Mountain America) or nonfiction 




century), but its narrator never explains her theoretical posture, never offers a defense to 
the reader. One might say the stakes are high for a community moving inevitably to war, 
as the U.S. was while The Fifth Book of Peace was composed, that war footing demanded 
a less nuanced book, but China Men’s profound telling seems bolstered by its lack of 
articulated defenses. Its Kingston offers many ways of knowing the past and eschews any 
move to privilege a master version. At no moment does Kingston instruct her readers 
overtly. The Fifth Book of Peace marks a new moment in Kingston’s long-form 
nonfiction. The newest book is symptomatic of real panic. This study will contend that 
Kingston writing about war during war is a different Kingston than the author of the 
retrospective China Men. Both works accomplish their implied goals of unsettling the art 
of history and waging against war with the notion of written and writing community. The 
burden of the latter, though, is a struggle for an author looking to prevent killing. 
Morris, Eggers, and the turn-of-the-century Kingston each betray local sources of 
worry that push against the consolations to which their memoirs might cling. McCarthy, 
Vidal, and the earlier Kingston produce life writing that generally evades their heirs’ 
anxieties, yet the contemporary works illuminate and, in a sense, tell on their 
predecessors, because they bring to the surface the uncertainties and the messiness of 
telling lives, of fashioning representations of experience, and of satisfying obligations to 
the subjects they tell. What Eggers, Morris, and Kingston illuminate for us is the trouble 
life writing faces as it accommodates the deconstruction of its faiths. All three, obliged to 
their stories and to their attendant responsibilities, attempt to reconcile life writing with 






Chapter 1: “The book is thereafter kind of uneven…”: The Limits of 
Metanonfiction 
 
The front matter of memoirs is a site of protection, elaboration, context, and, in 
many cases, ontological pronouncement. Prefaces, introductions, notes to the reader, 
acknowledgements, and dedications afford the memoirist a detached moment to 
announce that names have been changed, memories supplemented, and kinds of truths 
enlisted. These paratextual frames make possible a sort of secondary nonfiction, prior to 
the memoir itself. After explaining in her preface to Slouching Towards Bethlehem, “I am 
not sure what more I could tell you about these stories,” Joan Didion offers this 
concluding wisdom: “That is one last thing to remember: writers are always selling 
somebody out” (xv, xvi) The subsequent essays, we are to understand, are symptomatic of 
that notice. Sometimes these mediating passages announce autobiographical purposes, as 
when newsman Daniel Schorr introduces his Staying Tuned in grand terms: “I knew the 
memoir had to be written. For one thing, to help people remember an era fast 
disappearing from view in the miasma of ever new sensations […] I feel a little like the 
recording secretary for my generation” (xi). In other cases, they establish a sort of 
contract between memoir and reader, as in Ernest Hemingway’s suggestive note to A 
Moveable Feast: “If the reader prefers, this book may be regarded as fiction. But there is 
always the chance that such a book of fiction may throw some light on what has been 
written as fact.” These are often the venue for guiding metaphor; Bobbie Ann Mason’s 
Clear Springs borrows from her grandmother’s process of baking cookies, which must 
“come in order” before being eaten; “‘Coming in order’—an apt phrase for writing a 




beginning his memoir of jazzman Buddy Bolden, an experiment in memory, poetry, and 
fiction, Michael Ondaatje reproduces a sonograph, “pictures of dolphin sounds made by a 
machine that is more sensitive than the human ear.” The last line before beginning his 
Coming Through Slaughter, which juxtaposes ways of communication, is Ondaatje’s 
explanation that “[n]o one knows how a dolphin makes both whistles and echolocation 
clicks simultaneously.” Audre Lorde’s biomythography, Zami: A New Spelling of My 
Name, includes a prologue in which Lorde introduces the work’s movement across 
women’s selves: “I have felt the age-old triangle of mother father and child, with the ‘I’ 
at its eternal core, elongate and flatten out into the elegantly strong triad of grandmother 
mother daughter, with the ‘I’ moving back and forth flowing in either or both directions 
as needed. Woman forever. My body, a living representation of other life older longer 
wiser” (7). Sometimes these notes defend against either/or readings for historical 
verifiability. Tobias Wolff’s This Boy’s Life, for example, “is a book of memory, and 
memory has its own story to tell.” Gore Vidal opens Palimpsest knowingly: “A Tissue of 
Lies? Could there be a more persuasively apt title for a memoir?” (3). He explains, “I’ve 
taken the memoir route on the ground that even an idling memory is apt to get right what 
matters most” (5). Even ostensibly fictional biographies explain in their prefaces. 
William Styron’s Confessions of Nat Turner admits, “in those areas where there is little 
knowledge in regard to Nat, his early life, and the motivations for the revolt (and such 
knowledge is lacking most of the time), I have allowed myself the utmost freedom of 
imagination in reconstructing events—yet within the bounds of what meager 




Blonde “is a radically distilled ‘life’ in the form of fiction, and, for all its length, 
synecdoche is the principle of appreciation.” 
This cursory survey of biographical framing begins to indicate the significantly 
varying ways life writers approach their practice and, notably, the ways they announce 
their approaches. These frames suggest the prevalence of a compulsion to acknowledge 
the uneasy relationship between life writing and the lives ostensibly written about. And 
yet even the candor of these examples leaves their authors invested in some faith that a 
life can be represented well; these memoirists and biographers continue with their 
projects, implying the authority of the forthcoming record, one version of things, one 
collection of memories. What follows in this chapter is an analysis of two memoirs that 
sustain their paratextual work throughout the text. These are cases of life writing at once 
aware of the fictiveness of memory and memoir yet nevertheless dedicated to an 
autobiographical practice. Both encourage skepticism of nonfiction’s authority as they 
remain complicit with much of its foundations.  
 
Remembering Memory: Mary McCarthy on Mary McCarthy on Mary McCarthy 
In the first moments of her Memories of a Catholic Girlhood, Mary McCarthy 
complains that, among those who have read installments of her episodic memoirs in The 
New Yorker and Harper’s Bazaar between 1944 and 1953, “[t]he assumption that I have 
‘made them up’ is surprisingly prevalent.” She surmises that her readers’ doubt has 
something to do with what we expect of novelists: “Can it be that the public takes for 
granted that anything written by a professional writer is eo ipso untrue? The professional 




is mechanically chidden by his parents even when he protests that this time he is telling 
the truth” (3). Readers have insisted that, among other unlikelihoods, Irish Catholic 
McCarthy could not possibly have had a Jewish grandmother and that her Dickensian 
guardian, Uncle Myers, was more terrible than any real person. Impatient with these 
allegedly bad readings, she introduces this collection of autobiographical fragments with 
a reasonable enough contention: Memories of a Catholic Girlhood is memoir, an instance 
of the sort of nonfiction writing every bit as available to the novelist as anyone else. 
McCarthy’s assertive, even condescending tone would found her collection on one side of 
a naïve border between fiction and nonfiction, were it not almost immediately followed 
by this admission: “Then there are cases where I am not sure myself whether I am 
making something up.” These are not “stories,” she insists—“Many a time, in the course 
of doing these memoirs, I have wished that I were writing fiction” (3)—yet the form of 
McCarthy’s Memories of a Catholic Girlhood will undermine this distinction. By the 
third paragraph of the book’s preface, “To the Reader,” McCarthy makes uncritical 
reading of her memoir nearly impossible and begins to agitate the very business of 
writing autobiographically. She concedes that because she “cannot recall whole passages 
of dialogue that took place years ago,” “the conversations, as given, are mostly fictional” 
(4). Readers have been asked to contend with, even resolve her assertions that this is not 
fiction, that some details are fictionalized, and that some aspects “seem to me now 
extremely doubtful” (4). 
McCarthy’s movement between correcting mistaken readers and confessing 
memory’s uncertainty introduces a special case of life writing, in which a memoirist not 




which she engages. Memories of a Catholic Girlhood collects eight brief memoirs, seven 
reproduced from earlier versions, and the contemporary memoirist pairs all but the last 
narrative with an italicized reflection in which she addresses instances of fictionalization 
and reflects on a younger version of herself reporting the experiences of an even younger 
version of herself. This conflation of memory and critique illustrates and amplifies an 
inescapable fictiveness extant in all memoir. Between Memories of a Catholic Girlhood’s 
memoir and its reflection on the same, neither gains primacy over the other. McCarthy 
exemplifies Paul John Eakin’s observation that  
[a]dventurous twentieth-century autobiographers […] no longer believe that 
autobiography can offer a faithful and unmediated reconstruction of a historically 
verifiable past; instead, it expresses the play of the autobiographical act itself, in 
which the materials of the past are shaped by memory and imagination to serve 
the needs of present consciousness. (Fictions in Autobiography 5) 
McCarthy’s memoir, by suturing a remembered girlhood with an effort to explain the 
mechanisms of writing those memories, suggests an informed autobiographical act, aware 
of its own constructive work. 
A foundational scene informs the text’s attention to imagination, its urge to 
correct and explain, and the memoirist’s sense of her unfixed self. On the morning of her 
first Communion, McCarthy absentmindedly drinks water, violating the proscription 
“that the Host be received fasting, on the penalty of mortal sin” (19). Tormented over her 
mistake and uncertain about the proper course, she cannot decide between the 
disappointment of announcing to her family that she must put off the rite and committing 




outward holiness and inward horror” (20), she learns that hers is a commonplace mistake, 
yet the worry of having so fundamentally compromised her religious practice contributes 
to a lifelong sense of a split and unstable self. She reflects on the ongoing significance of 
her awakening: 
I knew myself, how I was and would be forever, such dry self-knowledge is 
terrible. Every subsequent moral crisis of my life, moreover, has had precisely the 
pattern of this struggle over the first Communion, I have battled, usually without 
avail, against a temptation to do something which only I knew was bad, being 
swept by a need to preserve outward appearances and to live up to other people’s 
expectations of me. (20-21) 
This convenient (and familiar) division between interior knowledge and exterior gesture, 
ostensibly sustained throughout the memoirist’s life, is dismantled by Memories of a 
Catholic Girlhood. By attempting to pull back the curtain on the process of making 
narrative of memory, she accomplishes something other than correction; she 
demonstrates the futility of ever capturing “how I was and would be forever” and the 
pervasiveness of imagination in life writing. As soon as the reader engages with this 
text’s admission that some of its narratives are insufficient, or even fictionalized, he or 
she cannot continue to look for an authoritative account. Eakin argues that, as we move 
between McCarthy’s memoirs and attendant interchapters, “we must discard any notion 
of the juxtaposition of story and commentary as representing a simple opposition between 
fiction and fact, since fiction can have for the author, as it does here, the status of 
remembered fact (remembering something that is not true—a frequent refrain in 




offers no unassailable reason to accept the italicized comments any more willingly than 
we believe the preceding sections. At first, the formal cues—italics, direct address to the 
reader, confession—seem to situate authenticity in the supplementary chapters, yet those 
same chapters, having undercut the authority of an earlier McCarthy, contend by 
extension that the contemporary collector-reviser of these memoirs is equally subject to 
suspicion. The blur and conflict between those narratives infects the entire work. The 
interchapters, even though they occasionally correct, more often contextualize and 
explain, sustaining the preceding versions of experience. McCarthy’s text is a telling 
instance of life writing as productive mediation between experience, memory, and 
whatever sense of a coherent self memoir affords its practitioners. The work’s 
paradoxical move—its ultimate refusal to select between the account of a correcting 
author in the book’s narrative present and that of a fictionalizing prior memoirist—makes 
it an illuminating instance of attempting to lay bare the operations of life writing. In her 
interchapter comment on an account of a priest’s arguments against atheism, she says, 
“even though I wrote this myself, I smile in startled recognition as I read it” (124). Even 
if only a gesture, this shock gets at the ability of storytelling to overwhelm memory; the 
mediating account—the story—stimulates the sensation of remembered experience as 
effectively as any primary documentary clue.  
In keeping with the self McCarthy conveys, the text’s interchapters take part in an 
informed dialogic construction of a Catholic Girlhood. Memories of a Catholic Girlhood 
is a patchwork account of McCarthy’s parents’ marriage, their nearly simultaneous deaths 
during the 1918 influenza epidemic, orphaned Mary’s miserable period in the household 




school and subsequent atheism, the familiar horrors of adolescents among cruel peers,  
adolescent reflection on a Protestant grandfather’s soul, sketches of a misfit teacher and 
Mary’s strange efforts to befriend her, a fairly raucous teenage trip to visit school friends 
in Wyoming, and finally, the pained story of her grandmother’s decline into old age. The 
text is a composite of a number of pieces published—with varying generic descriptions—
over several years in different venues5. In no way does it follow the conventions of the 
reflective memoirist, settled in during old age to consider her experiences in order to 
produce a cohesive record. Instead, because of its confluence of fiction and recollection it 
is a polyvocal resistance to the concept of life writing as a means to document simply. 
The presence of extended, and not merely corrective, memoir in the interchapters 
is most notable early in “To the Reader,” which actually deploys (even if well into the 
section) the most conventional of autobiographical openings, “I was born…” (8). In 
italics, what began as an address to the reader goes on to narrate a version of the 
memoirist’s experiences and to fashion portraits of her parents. Italics, in other words, do 
not mean that the autobiographical act is deferred while McCarthy supplements and 
corrects. As an ambivalent exchange between several versions of events—of her memoirs 
of losing faith while attending a Sacred Heart school, she says, “[t]his story is so true to 
our convent life that I find it almost impossible to sort out the guessed at and the half-
remembered from the undeniably real” (124)—the gathered memoirs implicitly make 
Eakin’s case “that autobiographical truth is not a fixed but an evolving content in an 
intricate process of self-discovery and self-creation, and, further, that the self that is the 
center of all autobiographical narrative is necessarily a fictive structure” (Fictions in 
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Autobiography 3). McCarthy serves as an archetypal case of autobiographical production, 
capable of illustrating the ways narratives imagine versions of experience.  
Of “The Blackguard,” a reflection on the uncertain theological state of 
McCarthy’s protestant (and therefore, to the girl’s mind, iconoclast) grandfather and on 
her affinity with the rebellious Byron, the memoirist says “[t]his account is highly 
fictionalized” (97). Yet a few lines later we read “the story is true in substance, but all the 
details have been invented or guessed at” (97). How does “highly fictionalized” settle 
with “true in substance”? What of the chapter is “substance”? Clearly, this is a matter of 
following the convention of the “spirit” of the story, rendered with fiction, yet consistent 
with some accurate core narrative. The significance of this comment is that it casts 
suspicion and makes McCarthy, in a sense, hyper-honest. It is not that these claims are 
mutually exclusive—to the contrary, they point to the co-constructedness of fiction and 
memoir. In the chapter, a devout Mary worries over her grandfather’s soul, having heard 
a sermon, delivered by a visiting missionary priest, in which the fate of baptized 
Protestants is addressed. Nuns and priests consult the theological literature and determine 
that if Grandfather Preston remains ignorant of Catholic faith, he will avoid damnation. 
Soon after her campaign to mute her faith while in his presence, she enjoys “the happiest 
day of [her] life” as a teacher interrupts McCarthy’s daydream: “You’re just like Lord 
Byron, brilliant but unsound.” Mary enjoys “glances of wonder, awe, and 
congratulations, as though I had suddenly been struck by a remarkable disease, or been 
canonized, or transfigured” (94). In the following italicized comment, we learn that her 
grandfather was no churchgoer at all and so not likely to be damned for Protestantism, 




Precisely how these episodes are “highly fictionalized” is not catalogued, and so what 
appears to be a fairly substantive claim, even if countered by “true in substance,” 
introduces not corrections, but supplemental memoir, details that elaborate the preceding 
narrative. Even after promising major distinctions, McCarthy’s autobiography declines to 
adequately respond to these perceived inconsistencies between memoir and 
interchapter—in fact, its effort points in an entirely different direction. The italicized 
notes are not authoritative corrections to an imperfect text but are instead participants in a 
multivocal, multivalent monument to memory. It serves us well to remember that the 
section of the work identified as the most accurate—“Yellowstone Park,” which 
McCarthy notes “is completely true” (192)—won an O. Henry prize for fiction (Adams 
Telling Lies… 89). 
Declining—for the moment—to ascribe an explanation to her paternal 
grandmother’s distant behavior, McCarthy makes an odd observation: “Luckily, I am 
writing a memoir and not a work of fiction, and therefore I do not have to account for my 
grandmother’s unpleasing character and look for the Oedipal fixation or the traumatic 
experience which would give her that clinical authenticity that is nowadays so desirable 
in portraiture” (33). She will, in fact, suggest several theories to explain her character in 
the memoir’s last chapter. Enunciated effort to avoid a psychoanalytic reading seems 
unusual only in its too clear distinction between fiction and nonfiction in a work that does 
not trust that border. Memories of a Catholic Girlhood unsubtly implies that the 
distinction is not very useful in the end. In fact, McCarthy’s strong insistence that writing 
what one remembers cannot always be writing what actually happened renders her 




memoirs ultimately turns against that reluctance is representative of its sophistication as 
life writing. 
 
 “Mendacity in the blood” 
As a teenager, Mary persuades her grandparents to permit a trip to Montana with 
school friends only on the grounds that a side excursion to Yellowstone Park would be 
educative; granted their approval, she instead spends the trip suffering through the 
education of learning to drink moonshine. Worried over her grandfather’s inevitable 
questions about Yellowstone, she confides, “I felt I owed my grandparents the courtesy 
of a well-put together and decently documented lie” (188). Duplicity bears exchange 
value; some payment for the license to travel with friends might be earned by a good 
story. In “To the Reader,” she aligns her fiction-making with her father: “My father was a 
romancer, and most of my memories of him are colored, I fear, by an untruthfulness that I 
must have caught from him, like one of the colds that ran round the family. While my 
[maternal] grandfather Preston was preternaturally honest, there was mendacity, 
somewhere, in the McCarthy blood. Many of my most cherished ideas about my father 
have turned out to be false” (11). This suggestion of lying “in the blood”—physiological 
metaphor—associates fiction with the cause of her father’s demise, infectious disease. 
This paternal connection effects an explanation, but it also authorizes the practice of 
making things up by naturalizing a family trait. Mary’s father is a conflicted persona, and 
his romantic paternalism prefigures the sort of imaginative work in which the memoirist 
will later engage. McCarthy’s apparent “mendacity” only sustains his grand character. It 




naturalizes McCarthy’s storytelling, but it also unsubtly informs our skepticism of the 
memoirist’s tale. An anecdote about her father is amended with a thoroughgoing 
admission for any memoirist, “I have no idea whether this story is true or not” (14). In 
“To the Reader,” he is “a recklessly extravagant man, who lay in bed planning treats and 
surprises” (10). His exaggerated persona is sustained when the narrator “remember[s] his 
coming home one night with his arms full of red roses for my mother, and my mother’s 
crying out, ‘Oh, Roy!’ reproachfully because there was no food for dinner. Or did 
someone tell me this story?” (10).  
The appeal to what she will call “the habit of writing fiction” certainly informs 
her addendum to the memoir of losing her parents and the orphans’ introduction to their 
unbearable guardians, “Yonder Peasant, Who Is He?”. She begins, “There are several 
dubious points in this memoir,” and catalogues uncertainties about the family’s train ride 
between Seattle and Minneapolis during the influenza epidemic, their arrival at her 
grandparents, and her introduction to Uncle Myers (47-49). What is most notable is her 
meditation on the motive for altering parts of the story:  
The reader will wonder what made me change this story to something decidedly 
inferior, even from a literary point of view—far too sentimental, it even sounds 
improbable. I forget now, but I think the reason must have been that I did not 
want to ‘go into’ my guardians as individuals here; that was another story, which 
was to be told in the next chapter. ‘Yonder Peasant,’ unlike the chapters that 
follow, is not really concerned with individuals. It is, primarily, an angry 




breathless, voluble speech on the subject of human indifference […] a kind of 
allegory or broad social satire on the theme of wealth and poverty. (49) 
This assigned hierarchical value is an unsatisfactory summary of the relationship between 
versions. The primary distinction between the version articulated in “Yonder Peasant” 
and that of the following explanation seems to be that Uncle Myers was presented to the 
McCarthy children earlier than initially reported and that during that first meeting he 
“evinced a great deal of paternal good humor, taking my brothers, one by one, on his lap 
and fondling them.” Yet Mary “remember[s] the queer ebb of feeling inside me when I 
saw I was going to be left out. He did not like me” (48-49). Uncle Myers and Aunt 
Margaret are contemptuous in both chapter and interchapter, literary inferiority 
notwithstanding. In the latter, McCarthy speculates that her guardians embezzled the 
children’s support, and Margaret’s stern demeanor is evident immediately upon Mary’s 
arrival in her home: “one day I was there, and the next thing I knew, Aunt Margaret was 
punishing me for having spoiled the wallpaper in my room” (49). The claim to metaphor 
and satire is accurate but superfluous. Both accounts of the McCarthy children’s story, 
shaped by memory and arranged by fiction, register “an angry indictment of […] human 
indifference.” McCarthy has “made a good story” from memory, and sustained the effect 
of experience. 
 The McCarthy children, newly dependent on harsh guardians, are not told of their 
parents’ death. Instead, among “a scandal of the gravest character, a coming and going of 
priests and undertakers and coffins,” they are offered the lie of comfort: “Mama and 
Daddy, they assured us, had gone to get well in the hospital” (36). The absence of both 




tears or tantrums, we came to know that they were dead” (37). Their foundational sense 
of family is, therefore, born of a lie. 
McCarthy in some ways preempts distinction between the honest and the 
dishonest by unsettling the very status of truthfulness in her work. The orphan Mary, if 
not a liar, certainly devotes herself to autobiographical performance, playing varying 
versions of herself. These episodes enact a symbiosis with the text’s implicit argument 
that memoir is a practice of imagination and production in which experiences available 
only through individual memory and collaborative reporting exist secondarily to those 
media. Just as Mary crafts her identities for guardians, teachers, and peers, life writing 
produces its selves. McCarthy’s approach to publishing these memoirs, which offer 
multiple Marys, has origins in the experience she reports. These performances regularly 
subsume their performer. In a representative case, she decides to turn atheist and 
inadvertently accomplishes the change by merely announcing her loss of faith. As an 
eleven-year old seventh grade girl in “C’est le Premier Pas Qui Coûte,” “[i]t was the idea 
of being noticed that consumed all my attention,” she writes (107). And so, as part of her 
project to “get myself recognized at whatever price,” after the school’s piano professor 
does not grant her notoriety by way of fantasized elopement,  
The decision to lose my faith followed swiftly on this disappointment […] the 
whole momentous project simply jumped at me, ready-made, out of one of 
Madame MacIllvra’s discourses. I had decided to do it before I knew what it was, 
when it was merely an interweaving of words, lose-your-faith, like a ladder made 





The responses of priests enlisted to win back her willfully lost faith are so disappointingly 
inadequate, she “seemed to have divided into two people, one slyly watching as the priest 
sank back into the armchair, the other anxious and aghast” (118). Having accomplished 
her atheism, she crafts “a pious effigy of myself” and plans “to pretend to be converted in 
the night, by a dream” (123). This performativity echoes her efforts to hide Catholicism 
to afford grandfather’s salvation. “I resolved to dismantle at once the little altar in my 
bedroom at home, to leave off grace before meals, elaborate fasting, and all ostentatious 
practices of devotion, lest the light of my example shine upon him too powerfully and 
burn him with sufficient knowledge to a crisp” (91). We also get a sense of adolescent 
Mary’s Catholicism in these autobiographical stagings. As she reflects on the efficacy of 
the Act of Contrition, by which baptized Christians purchase redemption in their last 
moments, she shares “the only one of all the confessions I made that I can remember 
almost verbatim,” having looked up “‘breast’ in the big school dictionary” (100). 
McCarthy’s girlhood Catholicism is always susceptible to the agency of the gesture. She 
says, “as a child I thought you would have to start saying the Act itself as rapidly as 
possible if you were hit, say, by an automobile while in a state of mortal sin. Great stress 
was laid on the prescribed forms by the priests and nuns who taught us” (98). As the adult 
memoirist understands, the most lasting confession, the most promising escape from 
damnation, is emphatically scripted.  
McCarthy’s memoir of high school, in which she and a small cohort of high 
school classmates decide to become the disciples of an unlikely Latin teacher, continues 
her investment in performance. Miss Gowrie’s distant persona—her “first concern was to 




day, but she rose to the painful occasion with a sort of pathetic, sporting determination, 
like a trout jumping to the cruel hook” (152)—seems only to bolster Mary’s 
determination to establish comradeship with her. In this case, “It was the whim of oddity, 
doubtless, that first decided me to ‘like’ Miss Gowrie. And the other class stars, who 
happened that year to be taking Latin, quickly fell in with that notion” (153). She 
observes that her “discovery of Miss Gowrie was disclosing, unbeknownst to me, certain 
strange landscapes in myself” (154), in this case a shared affinity for classical Caesar, yet 
the episode illustrates the clearest sort of effort to perform herself into a sustainable 
persona. McCarthy’s “whims” that “decide [her] to” adopt a belief and play a role 
demonstrate an embrace of the fiction. This mutability is founded in an ostensible agency 
over who Mary will be, and it is consistent with her autobiographical practice. 
Timothy Dow Adams interprets McCarthy’s work as “bad confession,” because 
she enacts the ritual without its guilty binary between penitent and confessor. She is 
“without genuine sorrow” (Telling Lies 97). The aim of her work is not to cleave fiction 
and not fiction into bins labeled honest and dishonest or, crudely, right and wrong, but 
instead to present both as constituent parts of a remembered and remembering self. Those 
performances become an element of her identity—they are not subject to indictment—
and, by extension, so do the “fictions” of her memoirs. They are, in fact, entirely 
consistent with the book’s model. 
 Leigh Gilmore suggests that McCarthy’s two forms of autobiographical practice, 





One the one hand, [McCarthy] claims her account is the truth because it really 
happened. On the other, the fictions she creates to cover the gaps in history and 
memory have come to fit so neatly into her narrative that they attain the status of 
remembered fact. That is, the ability to ascertain the precise line marked by 
“more…than I know” has receded beyond her capacity to distinguish between the 
fiction in the text she has come to know—that is remember and believe—as fact 
and fact itself. (“Policing Truth…” 69) 
While a collapse of fiction and fact fundamentally shapes the text, I would suggest that 
McCarthy’s “capacity to distinguish between” the two is finally secondary to her choice 
to collect and publish both in the same work and to produce an unresolved version of that 
collapse. And in that admixture of experience and imagination, McCarthy’s book is an 
instructive case of life writing. 
The striking absence of a final italicized chapter guarantees the unresolved status 
of this text. Memories of a Catholic Girlhood ultimately accepts its own contingency and 
allows the narrating author to close the story without the corrective editing of what might 
be thought of as the “real” Mary, an implied author. This is not capitulation on the part of 
the latter, a surrender to the superior narrative of the former. Instead, it is a suture of the 
two Marys. The work of the interchapter narrator has been too thoroughgoing; our faith 
in the authenticity of the story is by now too compromised to read “Ask Me No 
Questions,” the collection’s closing memoir, uncritically. At the same moment, though, 
we notice the presence of her absence; structurally, she haunts the plain-text narrative. 
When we read the unsettling account of her grandmother’s botched plastic surgery and 




read as efforts to control appearance), we recognize the presence of the autobiographer 
who, in concert with the inescapable grandmother, catalogues the varied ways to present 
one’s image to the world and the inability to successfully control a coherent image, even 
as efforts to do so are accelerated by either plastic surgery or the autobiographical act. 
Young adult Mary begins to gather that adopting identities does not afford her the ability 
to observe and comprehend each of them as discrete parts of a stable self. Eakin wonders 
if she “recognize[s] that to write a life is in effect to embrace a strategy for translating the 
incommunicable self into a communicable substance, incommunicable because not 
finally knowable” (Fictions in Autobiography 55). As her grandmother forgets the word 
for mirror, McCarthy’s text recognizes the impossibility of comprehending oneself with 
clarity, in other words, the inability of the autobiographical form to be a simple mirror. 
Yet this is no flaw. The scene is enriched by the controlling aspect of Memories of 
a Catholic Girlhood: its author implies her acknowledgement of the contingency of 
memory and the mediating effect of narrative. Because she is a novelist and a storyteller, 
she takes on the problem of narrative representation of experience alongside a 
simultaneous attempt to tell what things happened to her in her youth. And the completed 
text presents engaged life writing that calls transparency into question, but still reflects on 
the author’s lived experience. McCarthy’s memoir does especially important work 
because this paradox of the real and the narrated is not part of the subtextual matter but is 
brought up to the surface of the work and deployed in the narrative. We are left with a 
memoirist whose memoir deftly operates between the necessary fiction of the novelist’s 






“To the Reader” concludes in McCarthy’s address to correspondents who have 
condemned her apostasy, as well as her reflections on those priests and nuns who write 
thoughtful and empathetic letters. She explains her sense of religiosity with remarkably 
confident abandon: 
…as a lapsed Catholic, I do not trouble myself about the possibility that God may 
exist after all […] For myself, I prefer not to play it safe, and I shall never send 
for a priest or recite an Act of Contrition in my last moments. I do not mind if I 
lose my soul for all eternity. If the kind of God exists who would damn me for not 
working out a deal with him, then that is unfortunate. I should not care to spend 
eternity in the company of such a person. (27) 
I am particularly taken with Mary McCarthy’s tone. The autobiographer’s assertiveness 
throughout her memoirs betrays a confidence that begins to fuse the contingent narrators 
of the text as it accepts the impossibility of any single coalescent self. That is, while 
Memories of a Catholic Girlhood never unequivocally suggests that a best, truest, and 
consistent narrative of this childhood is tenable, its secondary narrator (that of the 
interchapters) adopts confidence to correct the misunderstanding of ostensibly naïve 
readers and supplies answers (even if speculative) with easy authority.  It is one thing to 
admit the influence of memory and imagination on nonfiction writing; it is entirely 
another to do so with the sort of command that begins to initiate a subject made from the 
intersection of the actual and the imagined. Perhaps the most striking instance of 
McCarthy’s dismissive confidence follows her rearranged chronology of escapades in 




‘storytelling;’ I arranged actual events so as to make ‘a good story’ out of them. It is hard 
to overcome this temptation if you are in the habit of writing fiction; one does it almost 
automatically” (165). This of course undercuts the claim noted above, in which she 
makes plain the unproblematic ability of novelists to tell the truth; however, this is an 
aggressive acknowledgement of fiction. 
While McCarthy’s complicit critique of autobiographical conventions is startling 
in its break with convention, insofar as it makes claims to objective remembering suspect 
and articulates its own interrogation of autobiographical practices, Memories of a 
Catholic Girlhood disdains excitability. There is little scandal, finally, in this self-critical 
symptom of life writing; if anything, McCarthy nearly dismisses the rebelliousness of her 
work: she almost sighs over tedious readers confused over the accuracy of her pieces. 
Inferring from the work’s introductory frustrations, we imagine an exasperated McCarthy 
explaining that of course some of this is invented—it probably should be noted that the 
work implies resistance to the sort of analysis at hand in this study, having set forth its 
own critique. That voice has to do with the authority purchased by a kind of secondary 
retrospect, looking back on looking back and authorizing uncertain memory and 
sustaining the juxtaposition of fiction and nonfiction as a barely latent argument that this 
admixture affords the soundest approach to life writing. In 1957, as the memoirist returns 
to uncollected episodes and lashes them together with explanatory and ostensibly 
corrective supplement, the coexistence of memory and fiction makes possible a critically 
reflective instance of life writing capable of informing the way we read all life writing. 
Memories of a Catholic Girlhood asserts the contingency of autobiographical writing 




McCarthy’s memoir an ideal case by which we might theorize an approach to other 
instances of life writing. 
 
“Trust the motives and hearts of your makers of things” 
Among the works we might read by way of Memories of a Catholic Girlhood, 
none is more susceptible than Dave Eggers’ memoir. In the opening of “Mistakes We 
Knew We Were Making: Notes, Corrections, Clarifications, Apologies, Addenda,” the 
upside-down appendix to A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, Eggers admits an 
anxious genealogy between his text and McCarthy’s:  
A version of [the appendix] was nearly complete, when its author made the 
mistake of telling a writer friend about it, with, let’s admit, a certain smugness. I 
was, I figured, the first to think of adding a corrective appendix to a nonfiction 
work, one meant to illuminate the many factual and temporal fudgings necessary 
to keep this, or really any, work of nonfiction, from dragging around in arcane 
and endless explanations of who was exactly where, and when, etc. […] But upon 
telling this writer-friend about the idea, she said, while looking much too 
ravishing over an open candle and with wet hair, “Oh, right, like Mary 
McCarthy.” (5)   
Surprised, Eggers confesses that Memories of a Catholic Girlhood is “a book about 
which I was of course unaware because I am a moron” (5). The likeness is enumerated: 
“Each corrective chapter, the writer-friend pointed out, began with something like: Well, 




Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius and McCarthy’s experiment: “this was exactly 
my goal in adding the appendix in the first place: it afforded the opportunity to be 
completely factual about things that in the narrative had to be compressed or altered 
slightly so the book could continue apace” (6). However, the comparison is inauspicious, 
because “after reading McCarthy’s perfect execution of the idea, I abandoned my own 
appendix, not wanting to invest too much in a notion already used” (6). The appendix, 
indeed absent from the hardcover edition, reappears (with the above indictment of its 
unoriginality) and accompanies the paperback. It operates as McCarthy’s interjections do, 
supplementing the telling towards a more thorough version; Eggers articulates the 
motivation for selected changes, engages in supplementary memoir, and posits his own 
literary criticism. However, there are meaningful distinctions between McCarthy’s efforts 
to command her primary memoirs and Eggers’ feverish metanonfiction. In those 
differences, we are able to apprehend a contemporary worry over life writing as a 
communicative literature. Eggers’ memoir is very much an heir to McCarthy’s, and yet 
the contemporary text, a manic experiment in writing about memoir within memoir, 
cannot sustain McCarthy’s command of life writing as the admixture of memory and 
invention. As A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius enthusiastically dismisses the 
possibility that all it tells is the way things were, it endlessly insists on the accuracy of its 
record. Eggers’ memoir demonstrates a frantic need to tell. 
A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius is Eggers’ memoir of losing both 
parents to cancer within weeks of one another, becoming his adolescent brother’s 
guardian, leaving suburban Chicago, and living in Berkeley and San Francisco during the 




experiences with Toph, the eight-year old brother for whom he is responsible, are 
inescapably adolescent), and among a group of Midwestern expatriates in the Bay area, 
he desires both what he calls a “lattice” of bonded friends and family and an audience to 
whom he can confide his story. 
The catalogue of Eggers’ many formal eccentricities indicates the plurality of the 
memoir, constituting a sort of life writing heteroglossia. A Heartbreaking Work of 
Staggering Genius includes, in addition to the ostensibly primary story, a meta-memoir of 
formal interruptions. Much of this work takes place outside the text proper, emphasizing 
a sort of formal explosiveness by which Eggers moves even further than McCarthy from 
the imaginary monolith of textual containment. Eggers’ epigraph, “THIS WAS 
UNCALLED FOR” announces a vexed memoir. A photograph of the author flanked by 
two dogs and a bird is captioned “…[the author and his brother] have no pets.” We are 
offered a page of six numbered “Rules and Suggestions for Enjoyment of This Book,” in 
which we are regularly advised that “There is no overwhelming need” or “overarching 
need to read” much of the book, that we “can also skip” everything after “page 123 or so, 
which is a nice length, a nice novella sort of length” because “[t]he book thereafter is 
kind of uneven.”6 
Following the preface, Eggers includes a detailed thematic table of contents that 
consists of shorthand phrases that vaguely allude to narrated experiences. The last 
paratextual element before the conventional narrative begins is a lengthy and 
misleadingly titled “Acknowledgements” that includes an extended outline of “the major 
themes of this book” (including “The Knowingness About the Book’s Self-
                                                 




Consciousness Aspect” and the outline as a sort of topical flow-chart “graph form”), a 
budget for the book’s production, and an “Incomplete Guide to Symbols and Metaphors.” 
Reminiscent of McCarthy’s response to critics from within the memoir, Eggers opens his 
preface, “For all the author’s bluster elsewhere, this is not, actually, a work of pure 
nonfiction. Many parts have been fictionalized in varying degrees, for various purposes.” 
But that seemingly straightforward admission opens a preface that meanders across a 
number of reflections on revisions and lying and ends with a non sequitur series of 
rejected epigraphs (including Toph’s candidate: “Ooh, look at me, I’m Dave, I’m writing 
a book! With all my thoughts in it! La la la!”). The preface to the paperback edition turns 
on itself and instead of asserting a corrective version in which a hierarchy of more-
authentic narratives is established becomes a reflection on the necessity of lies and the 
operation of fiction in memoir. Eggers explains,  
All the individual words and sentences have been run through a conveyor, 
manufactured like so: 1) they are remembered; 2) they are written; 3) they are 
rewritten, to sound more accurate; 4) they are edited to fit within the narrative 
(though keeping with their essential truth); 5) they are rewritten again, to spare the 
author and the other characters the shame of sounding as inarticulate as they 
invariably do, or would, if their sentences, almost invariably begun with the word 
“Dude”—as in, for example, “Dude, she died”—were merely transcribed. It 
should be noted, however, that what’s remarkable is that the book’s most surreal 
dialogue […] is that which is most true to life. (ix) 
Eggers attempts to override this uneasy collaboration between fiction and nonfiction: “if 




should have done, and what authors and readers have been doing since the beginning of 
time: PRETEND IT’S FICTION.” 
Beyond those markers of resistance to the illusion of autobiography’s generic 
closure, there are direct challenges to the conventions of life-writing within the primary 
narrative. Toph observes, in diction hyperbolically beyond his years, “You’re completely 
paralyzed with guilt about relating all this in the first place… you also know that Mom 
and Dad would hate it, would crucify you—” (115). John, the drug addict friend, revolts, 
“Screw it, I’m not going to be a fucking anecdote in your stupid book… Find someone 
else to be symbolic of, you know, youth wasted or whatever” (272-273). Also within his 
paratext, Eggers pointedly announces that “the lives of people in their early twenties…are 
very difficult to make interesting.” Quite significantly, one of the most popular 
contemporary memoirists, with tongue-through-cheek, confides that “there are perhaps 
too many memoir-sorts of books being written at this juncture, and that such books, about 
real things and real people, as opposed to kind-of made up things and people, are 
inherently vile and corrupt and corrupt and wrong and evil and bad, but…that we could 
all do worse, as readers and writers.” He admits that his approach to guardianship of his 
younger brother is “a campaign of distraction and revisionist theory” (88). 
 
Writing for Community: “The Lattice” 
The paperback’s appendix appears “about eight brutal and then exhilarating and 
then more-brutal than-before months after the book was originally published” (6), the 
brutality, we read, having something to do with both the book’s relative success and the 




But why, then, have we changed most of the names in the book? Because I’ve lost 
my taste for this sort of courage. I thought it was courageous to write about these 
things, and I thought it was equally courageous for my friends and I to use our 
names and phone numbers, and to allow our exploits and sexploits to be recounted 
in print for the consumption of our parents and aunts and nephews. But now, 
when so many have asked for name-changes, and so many have been shocked by 
who/how many have seen all these words, I’ve decided to let most of the 
people—save the primary characters—breathe easier and live freer, by allowing 
them to slip backing into semi-fictional personae. It is not my right to tell anyone 
else’s story, and they don’t owe me the favor of allowing me to do so. (12) 
Eggers’ principle of forfeiting ownership of other’s stories, symptomatic in its 
exhaustion, turns from his memoir’s primary drive, to narrate his experiences with 
exceeding abandon. This loss of courage and recognition of an ethics of life writing, 
however, does not do much to dampen the text’s hyperactivity. Eggers fights in frantic 
ways with which Memories of a Catholic Girlhood does not worry. The narrative of his 
mother’s stomach cancer is among the memoir’s earliest resistances to complacent 
memoir: “They took my mother’s stomach out about six months ago. At that point, there 
wasn’t a lot left to remove—they had already taken out [I would use the medical terms 
here if I knew them] the rest of it about a year before. Then they tied the [something] to 
the [something], hoped that they had removed the offending portion, and set her on a 
schedule of chemotherapy” (3-4). Bracketed absences signal the limitations of nonfiction 
as clearly as possible, and they arrest the primary text in its first moments; this aporia 




The memoir attempts a long-form conversation between Eggers, his siblings, his 
friends, and his readers. And although its earnest sense of community is regularly 
undercut by knowingness, Eggers, perhaps severing an epistemological bond with 
McCarthy, sustains throughout the work a frantic longing to tell, and to have heard, his 
story. In Memories of a Catholic Girlhood, McCarthy defends the place of fiction in her 
autobiographical work; Eggers nearly pleads with an audience to bodily absorb the story. 
His memoir closes in a fevered and tortured appeal to connect:  
Don’t you know that I am connected to you? Don’t you know that I’m trying to 
pump blood to you, that this is for you, that I hate you people, so many of you 
motherfuckers—When you sleep I want you never to wake up, so many of you I 
want you to just fucking sleep it away because I only want you to run under with 
me on this sand like Indians, if you’re going to fucking sleep all day fuck you 
motherfuckers oh when you’re all sleeping so many sleeping I am somewhere on 
some stupid rickety scaffolding and I’m trying to get your stupid fucking attention 
I’ve been trying to show you this, just been trying to show you this […] I am 
willing and I’ll stand before you and I’ll raise my arms and give you my chest and 
throat and wait… (437) 
I will address the appendix’s defense of his aggression below, but the piercing request for 
physical meeting between story and reader concludes the memoirist’s hyperbolic plea for 
community. 
His story of the work’s title—in the “Acknowledgements”—illustrates the 




Yes, it caught your eye. First you took it at face value, and picked it up 
immediately. “This is just the sort of book for which I have been looking!” Many 
of you, particularly those among you who seek out the maudlin and melodramatic, 
were struck by the “Heartbreaking” part. Others thought the “Staggering Genius” 
element seemed like a pretty good recommendation. But then you thought, Hey, 
can these two elements work together? Or might they be like peanut butter and 
chocolate, plaid and paisley—never to peacefully coexist? Like, if this book is, 
indeed, heartbreaking, then why spoil the mood with the puffery? Or, if the title is 
some elaborate joke, then why make an attempt at sentiment? Which is to say 
nothing of the faux (real? No, you beg, please no) boastfulness of the whole title 
put together. 
Antic speculation easily marks Eggers’ resistance to the “puffery” risked by much of the 
memoir’s playfulness, but this note to the reader, particularly given its conversational 
pitch, signals a more important effort to be at once knowing and deflated. Moments later, 
we read that  
On a different note, the author feels obligated to acknowledge that yes, the 
success of a memoir—of any book, really—has a lot to do with how appealing its 
narrator is. To address this, the author offers the following: 
a) That he is like you. 
b) That, like you, he falls asleep shortly after he becomes drunk. 




d) That he sometimes falls asleep when he is drunk having sex without 
condoms. 
e) That he never gave his parents a proper burial 
f) That he never finished college 
g) That he expects to die young 
The list goes on, and its effect continues the memoirist’s work toward fashioning an 
unromantic self while unashamedly asking that readers take him in as the work’s 
critically aware author. The narrator Eggers’ ambition as a sophisticated (and thorough) 
memoirist engenders restless life writing. 
The lattice, he explains, “is the connective tissue. The lattice is everyone else, the 
lattice is my people, collective youth, people like me, hearts ripe, brains aglow” (211). 
This Utopian bond between the memoirist and his communities is sustained, but subject 
to critique. In a fictionalized interview with a casting director for the MTV series, The 
Real World, he pleads, “please let me show this to millions. Let me be the lattice, the 
center of the lattice. Let me be the conduit. There are all these hearts, and mine is 
strong…” (237). The interviewer asks, “And that will heal you?” to which an over-the-
top Eggers responds “Yes! Yes! Yes! Yes!” The appeal for collectivity may be at the 
foundations of Eggers’ work, but its manifestation’s hyperbole signals the memoirist’s 
knowing. 
In his “Acknowledgements,” among the catalogue of the book’s rejected titles: 
“Memories of a Catholic Boyhood (also taken, more or less).” The others documented are 




Astounding Work of Courage and Strength (Stephen Ambrose would have cause for 
action) […] and Old and Black in America (risqué, some say).” Eggers tells us that of 
these titles, he “preferred the last one, alluding as it does to both aging and an American 
sort of otherness.” This absurd non-referentiality follows the author’s “acknowledg[ment] 
that because this book is occasionally haha, you are permitted to dismiss it. The author 
wishes to acknowledge your problems with the title. He too has reservations.”  Having 
articulated his own resistance to both the seriousness of writing about his experiences in 
the wake of his parents’ deaths (by way of the text’s giddy play) and the work’s hyper-
self consciousness (“While the author is self-conscious about being self-referential, he is 
also knowing about that self-conscious self-referentiality”), Eggers enlists the reader in 
his critique. The work’s introductory mechanisms—which begin, if not in the very title, 
then on the copyright page—attempt to make the reader an accomplice. He continues the 
note on “self-conscious self-referentiality”: 
Further, he is fully cognizant, way ahead of you, in terms of knowing about and 
fully admitting the gimmickry inherent in all this, and will preempt your claim of 
the book’s irrelevance due to said gimmickry by saying that the gimmickry is 
simply a device, a defense, to obscure the black, blinding, murderous rage at the 
core of this whole story, which is both too black and too blinding to look at—
avert… your… eyes!—but nevertheless useful, at least to the author, even in 
caricatured or condensed form, because telling as many people about it helps, he 





This appeal to win the reader, while an unresolved business, informs Eggers’ kinetic pace 
and the memoir’s unending supplement to its core story. After explaining that “Random 
House is owned in toto by an absolutely huge German company called Bertelsman A.G., 
which owns too many things to count or track,” and enumerating the author’s height, 
weight, eye color, and other physical traits, the copyright page includes this telling play 
on legal conventions in publishing:  
NOTE: This is a work of fiction, only in that in many cases, the author could not 
remember the exact words said by certain people, and exact descriptions of 
certain things, so had to fill in gaps as best he could. Otherwise, all characters and 
incidents and dialogue are real, are not products of the author’s imagination, 
because at the time of this writing, the author had no imagination whatsoever for 
those sorts of things, and could not conceive of making up a story or characters—
it felt like driving a car in a clown suit—especially when there was so much to say 
about his own, true, sorry and inspirational story, the actual people that he has 
known, and of course the many twists and turns of his own thrilling and complex 
mind. Any resemblance to persons living or dead should be plainly apparent to 
them and those who know them, especially if the author has been kind enough to 
have provided their real names and, in some cases, their phone numbers. All 
events described herein actually happened, though on occasion the author has 





As this easily overlooked passage7 demonstrates, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering 
Genius swims in Eggers’ attentive playfulness. His appeal to truthfulness is never 
abandoned, and the pathos of the Eggers’ family story purchases notable seriousness, 
even if “sorry and inspirational” are partially emptied by the book’s multivalence. 
Eggers’ memoir opens in an excess that announces its restlessness. 
The appendix’s analogous copyright page—“The author wishes to reserve the 
right to use spaces like this, and to work within them, for no other reason than it 
entertains him and small coterie of readers. It does not mean that anything ironic is 
happening. It does not mean that someone is being pomo or meta or cute”—initiates a 
story of the story, in which Eggers fills in details and occasionally corrects the memoir, 
but devotes himself to supplementing the motive for writing: “We share things for the 
obvious reasons: it makes us feel un-alone, it spreads the weight over a larger area, it 
holds the possibility of making our share lighter” (10). This memoir’s resistance to the 
conventions of memoir cannot leave behind its insistence on meaningful telling among 
what it regards as a sustaining human community. Eggers’ work worries in fits over its 
dependence on that supportive reader. In his appendix, he confesses that he “expected the 
worst from the book’s readers, I expected claws and blood and teeth. The book ends with 
a plea for those who would tear into me to just go ahead and do it, because I wanted it to 
happen, finally. But then a weird thing happened: People were kind” (20).  He refines the 
“lattice,” now informed by an audience’s unexpected sympathies: “The warmth of other 
people, their electricity, then the direction of that energy somewhere, if need be” (29). A 
                                                 
7 The copyright page mimics conventions carefully; the minutiae of copyright and bibliographic data are 




Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius, in its juxtaposed resistance to complacent life 
writing and appeal to sentimentality, hopes to be as knowing as memoir will allow. 
Each of Eggers’ moves puts his work at risk of complaints about playfulness for 
the sake of playfulness, another in the too-large catalogue of postmodern jeu. Yet nearly 
every interrogation of nonfiction’s authority as such is tempered by his insistence on the 
story’s plain affect. In his furious (and perhaps timely) response to the misapplication of 
the label, “ironic,” he notes:  
…there were those who felt that the front matter was (and is) pomo garbage, and 
that, as a result, the entire story is being told with a tongue in its author’s cheek, a 
wink toward the skybox—these people saying, in essence, Good God, why 
couldn’t he simply have left the story, as poignant as it is, be? So. This book 
cannot win. For some, at least. And when this book is not winning, attached to it 
are labels: Post this, meta that. Here’s a notion: These are the sorts of prefixes 
used by those without opinions. In place of saying simply, ‘I liked it’ or ‘I did not 
like it’ they attempt to fence its impact by affixing to it these meaningless 
stickers. Oh, we should free ourselves from these terms, used only to make 
confusing something that we already understand. Because honestly: everyone who 
actually reads this dumb book, or any dumb book, will understand it. So I beg of 
you: PEOPLE, PLEASE: TRUST THE MOTIVES AND HEARTS OF YOUR 
MAKERS OF THINGS.” (34)  
The romantically simplifying tendencies of these admonitions are recognized easily 
enough, but it matters that our playful life writer not only plays with his representation 




a serious effort at telling as much as he can—above and beyond truisms about the 
authenticity of imagination, A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius argues for hope 
against meaninglessness. Eggers’ “something that we already understand” is more easily 
understood when our narrator undermines his own form and reminds us how we might 
best understand memory’s products. 
Of course, the wholeness of the work is in a way maddening, since the interior 
obsessions and compulsions of Eggers’ reported experience—including the experience of 
the autobiographical act—risks its appeal to readers not especially interested in the 
representational problems of life writing. Admittedly, there seems to be no shortage of 
readers put off by this autobiography’s precocity. Yet all of this work is more than 
literary gamesmanship, more than meta. Eggers’ interruptions and self-reflexivity are 
internal monologues of conflict, multiplicity, contradiction, and—paradoxically—a sort 
of coherence. 
 
 Representativeness and the Bourgeois Everyday 
That Eggers includes an imagined interview in which he auditions for The Real 
World is indicative of the memoir’s registers of its moment. Before the interviewer 
breaks out of character, asking, “so tell me something: This isn’t really a transcript of the 
interview, is it? […] This is a device, this interview style. Manufactured and fake […] It’s 
a good device, though. Kind of a catchall for a bunch of anecdotes that would be too 
awkward to force together otherwise” (196-7), Eggers describes a bourgeois suburban 
childhood. He offers a strategic formula for the bland: “children in public schools are 




unfavorable attention […] We all gravitated to the middle” (186). That effort at middle-
class invisibility becomes an analysis of the community from which Eggers comes, 
including the Chicago suburbs of the 80s and the San Francisco Bay area of the 90s. The 
latter is “built with putty and pipe cleaners, rubber cement and colored construction 
paper. It’s the work of fairies, elves, happy children with new crayons” (296). He 
explains to the imagined interviewer: “I think what my town, and your show, reflect so 
wonderfully is that the main by-product of the comfort and prosperity I’m describing is a 
sort of pure, insinuating solipsism, … in the absence of struggle against anything in the 
way of a common enemy—whether that’s poverty, Communists, whatever” (200-1). 
From this allegedly empty safety, “the cultural output of this time will [be] a lot of 
talking, whole movies full of talking, talking about talking, ruminating about talking 
about wondering, about our place, our wants and obligations—the blathering of the belle 
époque, you know. Environmentally reinforced solipsism” (202). This memoir, of course, 
perpetuates that model, but its search for meaningful community begins to tack away 
from this (however problematically) indicted solipsism.   
When John, after whom Eggers often looks, makes one of several suicide 
attempts, Eggers confesses that he needs “the recognition of the value of [a friend’s 
attempted suicide] as both life experience and also as fodder for experimental short story 
or passage in novel, not to mention more reason to feel experientially superior to others 
one’s age” (270). John, who we are told is both suicidal and drug-addicted, diagnoses the 
autobiographer’s need to invent: “You grew up … without danger, and now you have to 
seek it out, manufacture it, or, worse, use the misfortunes of friends and acquaintances to 




their arms and legs, position them, dress them, make them talk— ” (424). John’s 
understanding certainly leaves behind Eggers’ loss of both parents, yet it does begin to 
outline an ethnographic analysis of the memoir as a record of response to banal middle-
class experience. Eggers’s narratives survey a decidedly protected series of experiences. 
His family’s home, an artifact of suburban passivity, is described as a museum to the 
bland. Video games, lowbrow television, and the Eggers’ father’s jokiness are its 
entertainments. Remnants of the production of Ordinary People and the antics of 
neighbor Mr. T are Eggers’ childhood excitements. In his San Francisco, any venture is 
tenable, and risk seems limited to imagined episodes. Eggers hyperbolic descriptions of 
Frisbee throwing with Toph—superhuman balletic spectacles—get at the safety of their 
days. 
Dave and his siblings are, for several years, unable to locate their parents’ 
remains. Both had unexpectedly donated their bodies to research, and as a result of the 
children’s placeless moves between rented homes, no research hospital had been able to 
deliver them. On what he describes as an “archaeological bender,” a homecoming trip to 
Lake Forest, Eggers almost inadvertently collects his mother’s “cremains” after a funeral 
home worker looking for the recipient’s contact information, finds them on a shelf. 
Eggers’ painfully unconfident choice is to throw the remains into Lake Michigan. In 
order to do so, he transports the small box of ashes on the floorboard of a rented car, and 
his paranoid monologue indicates the memoir’s uneasy response to death: “My sick head 
makes me see the face on the box. My sick head wants to make this worse. My head 
wants this to be scary and unbearable. I try to fight back, to know that this is normal, all 




project: “…look what I’m doing, with my tape recorder and notebook, and here at the 
beach, with this box—calculating, manipulative, cold, exploitive. Fuck it” (395). And, 
once the dispersal of remains begins to go badly—ashes do not neatly float over the water 
but insinuate themselves in Eggers’ clothes, on the rocks—self-indictment nearly 
overwhelms the scene: 
How lame this is, how small, terrible. Or maybe it is beautiful. I can’t decide if 
what I am doing is beautiful and noble and right, or small and disgusting. I want 
to be doing something beautiful, but am afraid that this is too small, too small, 
that this gesture, this end is too small—Is this white trash? That’s what it is! We 
were always so oddly white-trashy for our town, with our gruesome problems, 
and our ugly used cars, our Pintos and Malibus and Camaros, and our ‘70s 
wallpaper and plaid couches and acne and state schools—and now this tossing of 
cremains from a gold tin box into a lake? Oh this is so plain, disgraceful, 
pathetic— 
Or beautiful and loving and glorious! Yes, beautiful and loving and 
glorious! (399) 
This tormented ambivalence over responding to death refuses ritual closure, and death 
infects much of the memoir. A friend’s father immolates himself, startling the Lake 
Forest quiet. Eggers describes the scene in adolescent dialogue, reporting a boyhood 
friend’s explanation that “Ricky’s dad doused himself with gasoline and lit a match and 
then ran around the yard on fire, and then stopped running and then died right there, in 
front of the house” (195). A publicist for Might, the magazine Eggers and his friends 




 Might’s guiding motive is to play the ironic jokester. An issue’s cover story, “The 
Future: Is It Coming?” goofs off in deadpan: “It’s fun to wonder about the kinds of things 
that will happen in the future. Who will do what? What will happen? Those are big 
questions that are really hard to think about…” (282). Might attempts a hoaxed celebrity 
death, at once “serving a higher purpose, that of satirizing the media’s interest in celebrity 
death, parodying their eulogies” (314) and demonstrating the impossibility of controlling 
even staged death. Adam Rich, erstwhile child star of the sitcom Eight is Enough, agrees 
to take part in the hoax, but because the magazine attempts to foist their faked sourcing 
on The National Enquirer, and because they fax a news release to other publications’ 
reporters, the exercise fails and the party, attended by Rich is painfully awkward. 
The memoir’s unresolved response to regular death informs Eggers’ worry. In the 
funeral home where he locates his mother’s long-neglected ashes, Eggers rails against the 
materiality of the body: 
I will not be buried, I assure myself. I will disappear. Or maybe by the time I die, 
there will be machines, utilizing advanced laser technology and fiber optics, that 
will evaporate people shortly after they pass away, without actually burning them. 
Experts in the operation of they machine will enter shortly after a death, assemble 
the machine—it’ll be highly portable—and with the pull of a few levers, the 
person will disappear, instantaneously. There will be none of the interment, no 
carrying bodies around, inspecting them, embalming them, dressing them up, 
buying holes in the ground for them, this building elaborate boxes for them, boxes 




Alternatively, a hyperkinetic memoir attempts a disembodied immortality. Eggers 
suggests a “Memoir as Self-Destruction Aspect” in his front matter and appendix, and it 
is clear that the resultant text causes trouble for Eggers, yet the memoir finally suggests 
life writing’s productive work as a version of the author.  
 
Conclusion: Orphan Autobiographers 
Here, the most experimental postmodern life-writing rejects mimetic 
representation of experience, and Eggers most definitely destabilizes his version of 
things, but he does ultimately offer a whole, if incoherent, testament to his faith in “what 
happened.” This doesn’t mean we have to accept his unbelievable claim, offered under 
the Acknowledgements’ “C) The Painfully, Endlessly Self-Conscious Book Aspect,” that 
“the author doesn’t have the energy or, more important, skill, to fib about this being 
anything other than him telling you about things, and is not a good enough liar to do it in 
any competently sublimated narrative way.” But instead, we recognize his playful 
approach to transparent representation and realize that this memoir’s most pervasive 
authenticity is its hyperactive desire to establish a tenable way to tell what happened to 
his family. 
We might entertain a lengthy discussion of ontological difference between 
multiply located subjects—a Lacanian hierarchy of subjects that are effects of the 
existence of the text: the writer in the present, the writer who composed the book in the 
past, and the writer who lived the experiences that make up the book’s content. That split 
subjectivity and the inability of the controlling author to ever give to the reader an 




seem limited by that condition. That is, while the project of life writing is presumably an 
effort to document univocally a whole, even if complex subject, these two examples 
demonstrate and even thrive on the shortcomings of that model. Eggers and McCarthy 
interrogate those multiple subject positions as they push against each other and the 
authority of at least one of the authors (the straight narrator of McCarthy’s plain-text 
chapters and of the first third of A Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius). By 
offering multiple and conflicting versions of experience, they produce life writing that 
openly admits its inability to suture the various subjects together in an uncritical and 
artificial whole. And that inability brings about not only carnivalesque multiplicity, but 
no little tension. The many Daves and Marys do not necessarily regard their shared 
responsibility as the cooperative accumulation of an authoritative record. Eggers’ many 
textual interruptions create dissonance, and the implicit authority of the McCarthy who 
revisits the spurious narrative of her younger self is in a sometimes antagonistic (even if 
apologetic) business. However, the complex honesty of both texts is demonstrated by the 
inclusion of the to-be-corrected text, sous rature. Ultimately, the strength of this sort of 
life writing comes from its unresolved narratives, from the inability of corrective 
commentary to overwrite completely the constructedness of constructed memories it 
ostensibly seeks to revise. Between fact and fiction, informed life writing admits its 
imperfection, instead of futilely trying to ignore it. 
Lest we find ourselves out of the mystification of archaeological objectivity and 
in a morass of imagination without any author in lived experience, we should remember 
that both Eggers and McCarthy regularly insist that their records are honest. As life 




mimesis, McCarthy and Eggers attempt to narrate their lives in fairly humanist manner. It 
is overwhelmingly evident that both Memories of a Catholic Girlhood and A 
Heartbreaking Work of Staggering Genius are testaments to life writing’s ambitious 
objective in the face of the postmodern condition: sustaining the notion that any text 
reports remembered experience as an authoritative version. The paradox of humanism 
stowed away in twentieth-century textual playfulness illuminates, of course, the familiar 
shortcomings of broad historical and critical categories, but the basic faith that both 
pieces accord to the lives they represent holds at bay sweeping claims about the absolute 
loss of referential nonfiction. These works are very much the product of writers who 
recognize the impossibilities of discourse that captures and represents transparently, but 
they are also seriously invested in a sort of accuracy, honesty, and completeness. The 
result is an informed monument that recognizes the impossibility of nonfiction but still 
hopes to tell the whole story. This paradox asks that we do more than reevaluate the 
possibility of accurate representation—it effectively theorizes the project of life writing. 
Hardly the venue for absolute, confident, and objective narration at the end of a coherent 
life; this is instead a means by which the memoirist creates a text that is contingent, 
opaque, and dynamic. Regarding those traits as shortcomings helps us little beyond 
efforts to construct yet another tentative version, for the corrected text can never be any 
less contingent, opaque, and dynamic, so long as it consists of the same mediating 
representation of human experience. McCarthy’s and Eggers’ weird autobiographies are 
finally as instructive as they are representative—they draw the omissions and 




reconcile the productive tension between the pressure of memory’s history and the 
inevitability of biography’s fiction. 
The memoirs of a mid-twentieth century novelist’s Catholic girlhood seem an 
unlikely candidate to pair with the Tristram Shandy excitability of Eggers’ postmodern 
narrative of life in the middle-class suburbia and San Francisco bay-area sensibility of the 
1980s and 1990s. The former’s classical narrative of education and rebellion is 
archetypal. The latter’s willful inattention to any past longer than twenty years conveys 
almost no long-term historical consciousness and absolutely revels in the self-absorption 
of MTV culture. These two orphan autobiographers experience dissimilar early lives, at 
the very least signaled by the distinct American cultures of their moments. However, the 
conflicted work of life writing directs both pieces so similarly that each compels us to 
theorize much more generally than individual readings of these discrete lives. Both raise 
what are indisputably deconstructive questions about the ability of texts to represent 
experience and perhaps even about the object of life writing. Both trouble the stability of 
the identity ostensibly at the center of the narration. Both are at play among the centuries-
old challenges of the autobiographical form. Finally, and most importantly, instead of 
lamenting the inability of life writing to tell an authentic story, they both address that 
phenomenon and actually employ it to produce memoirs. The form of each resists the 
prescriptive and descriptive containments of genre. 
Both of this study’s memoirists place substantial emphasis on collaborative fact-
checking and narration; that is, the memory of others is part of the text’s structure. 
McCarthy goes so far as to discuss the necessity of communal history-making among 




regularly alludes to conversations with her brother in which she asks him to validate 
stories. McCarthy admits,  
One great handicap to this task of recalling has been the fact of being an orphan. 
The chain of recollection—the collective memory of a family—has been broken. 
It is our parents, normally, who not only teach us our family history but who set 
us straight on our own childhood recollections, telling us that this cannot have 
happened the way we think it did an that that, on the other hand, did occur, just as 
we remember it, in such and such a summer when So-and-So was our nurse. (5)  
Eakin notes that this “illuminates the problematical relationship to truth that links all of 
the various Marys past and present in the narrative: lying becomes a sign of her orphan 
condition, the making of fictions a function of her loss” (39). The result of those absent 
editors is both a willingness to admit the interventions of fictionalizing memory and the 
need for corroboration on the part of siblings and other family members. However, the 
supplementary work of collaboration hardly fosters a more stable authenticity.  
Eggers’ relationship with the lives he tells proves less straightforward. The means 
by which the narrative is picked apart are the subjects whose stories are taken from them. 
In his preface, Eggers calls this “people break[ing] out of their narrative time-space 
continuum to cloyingly talk about the book itself.” Toph takes on the exaggerated and 
obviously fictional voice of a tenacious critic and explains the suspect accuracy of a 
passage: “it was almost as if it was too much to happen in one day, as if a number of days 
had been spliced together to quickly paint a picture of an entire period of time, to create a 
whole-seeming idea of how we are living, without having to stoop (or rise) to actually 




World contends, “This is a device, this interview style. Manufactured and fake” (197). 
These characters, in the hands of the life writer, correct the insufficient narrator. The 
writing Eggers exerts final control over these figures, yet his method demands attention 
to the fact that his record is susceptible to indictment, if not immediate revision. And as 
monuments to lost parents these autobiographies do some biographical work—they 
engender a family. 
Eggers and McCarthy understand that their texts are not supposed to be 
transparent records, but simply to abandon the life in the text in the wash of 
constructedness misses the brilliant work between allegiance to the individual’s story and 
postmodern resistance to that story evident in both. The reader finds a significant 
dialectic in these texts: the impossibility of just simply telling what happened only partly 
suspends a compulsive drive to tell. This is not a question of varying degrees of truth. 
Frankly, both autobiographers know better than to believe that any life writing will 
realize the fantasy of objective authenticity. Instead, these two understand the ways in 
which the work of life writing, turned upon itself, works to realize a sort of therapeutic 
(and functional) return of lost parents. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson point to the 
significance of Eggers’ implicit message, “[t]he apparent lack of contrivance in most 
memoirs…is implied to be a deeper kind of contrivance” (7). These texts indulge the 
desire to make that contrivance transparent. They contribute to what Adams calls 
“metaphorically authentic” and “narrative rather than historical truth” (Telling Lies…9-
10, 12). 
For all their shared theorization, the difference between McCarthy’s and Eggers’ 




storytelling in the nonfiction—its uncorrected conclusion marks that confidence well 
enough. Memories of a Catholic Girlhood contends that memory is all the memoirist 
finally owns, and that its complex product accomplishes a satisfactory text. Eggers, 
however, of a different moment, amends and overrides because his work refuses a 
complacent conclusion. Its worry is an articulation of the memoirist’s uncertainty in a 
time of mass-manufactured “reality” genres, during which not even actual death 
purchases authority in the nonfiction record. His heartbreaking work supplements, 
corrects, overwhelms itself in an uneasy effort to write a life with precisely the sort of 

























Chapter 2: Lincoln and Dutch: Executive Fictions and American Biography 
 
“All biography is, in effect, a reprojection into words, into a literary or kind of 
semiscientific and historical form, of the inert materials, reassembled, so to speak, 
through the mind of the historian or the biographer. His becomes the informing 
mind. He can only lay bare the facts as he has understood them, in a continuous 
and inquiring narrative.” Leon Edel, Writing Lives: Principia Biographica 
 
“Contrary to legend, he was a first-rate actor, and before the war he starred in 
first-rate movies. When asked for the thousandth time how an actor could be 
president, he said, most sensibly, ‘I don’t see how anyone who is not an actor 
could get through this job’.” Gore Vidal, Palimpsest 
 
The Imagination of Form 
In August 2003, the online magazine Salon published an account of Vivian 
Gornick’s public confession, during a reading at Goucher College, that her memoirs were 
at least partly fictionalized. Gornick’s response, published eleven days later, includes the 
following insight:  
To state the case briefly: memoirs belong to the category of literature, not of 
journalism. It is a misunderstanding to read a memoir as though the writer owes 
the reader the same record of literal accuracy that is owed in newspaper reporting 
or in literary journalism. What the memoirist owes the reader is the ability to 
persuade that the narrator is trying as honestly as possible, to get to the bottom of 
the experience at hand.  
This promise of an honesty that is somehow more literature than journalism probably 
would not have satisfied those at Gornick’s lecture, who were, according to Salon’s Terry 
Greene Sterling, entirely uncomfortable with her unrehearsed reaction. Sterling, a 
Goucher MFA student, reports they were “miserable” and “stunned.” Life writing, these 
readers have been led to believe, in the face of so much evidence to the contrary, should 




sometimes accomplishes more (or less) than that standard very clearly upset her 
audience’s expectations. Sterling assures us that the MFA faculty at Goucher and 
Gornick’s audience included several accomplished figures—“some of the best writers in 
the East Coast”—so dismissing their unease as naïveté seems neither fair nor productive.  
The trouble of course is that life writing’s truths do not come easily, and so 
fleeting distinctions between Gornick’s “trying as honestly as possible” and the Goucher 
audience’s expectations are not very useful. The relationship between memoirs and 
authenticity resists easy formulas—we are perhaps likely to forgive minor liberties taken 
with actual experience, but we imagine that the spirit of the larger work is honest to 
something, that is, its aim is not to mislead the reader but instead to tell the best story of 
what happened. Third-person life-writing, the work with which the life of another is told, 
doubles the challenge of fashioning some adherence to “what happened” because the 
luxury of owning one’s own story vanishes and is replaced by the responsibility of 
vigilance to another’s. Edward Mendelson notes the relative scarcity of studies of 
biography compared to those of autobiography and explains that  
far more theoretical energy is being expended on the problem of self-presentation 
than on the problem of presenting another self. So literary biography has been left 
to make do with a more or less undefined and unconscious theory—one too 
confused to withstand much scrutiny—based loosely on the analogy between the 
internal workings of interpreted self and the internal workings of an interpreted 
poem. (21)  
It is not too reckless to contend that this paradigm can be ascertained more broadly; 




explain their data as a means to solving the “problem” of the subject. Mendelson follows 
David Ellis’ less satisfactory naturalizing theory: “If there are certain rules or conventions 
in writing lives which most biographers follow more or less instinctively, how would it 
help if they were led to reflect more about what they were doing?” He immediately and 
dismissively answers his own question: “How biographies work, the habits of enquiry 
and explanation which so largely determine their form, can seem irrelevant when the 
publication figures over so many decades (and centuries) demonstrate so resoundingly 
that they do” (4). Ellis sees a native tendency to intuit a boundary between fiction and 
biography: “That so much biography is necessarily conjectural, and that its form is—with 
equal necessity—always more or less literary, confirm for [some critics] the 
insignificance of the separation between writing lives and writing novels. Yet readers 
seem to recognize the difference, and so do many writers” (15). There is too little critical 
work in this explanation, though. Is it possible that the form of the novel and the fact of 
the biography are so distinct? 
Do biographers “owe the reader the same record of literal accuracy that is owed in 
newspaper reporting or in literary journalism”? “A writer of lives is allowed the 
imagination of form but not of fact.” This, the third of twenty aphorisms that constitute 
Leon Edel’s “Introduction, In the Form of a Manifesto” to his Writing Lives, demands a 
certain adherence to the verifiable. Those who make another self into a text may create 
the literature but not the content of history. This admonishment is in keeping with the 
major premises of conventional life writing: biography is a craft, and it is also a 
document. Perhaps uncritical readers of biography concern themselves less with the 




happened and how those happenings are interpreted and reported. He dictates that the 
latter is up for grabs, while the former is decidedly not. The biographer’s product may be 
borne of some creative work, while the life’s experience that provides a foundation for 
that product cannot be imagined. This sense, that the art is in the writing, and not in the 
history, informs the formula of excision presidential biographer Edmund Morris 
advocates in 1986: “…the art of biography […] is to extract the essential from the 
unessential, so that truth shines forth. What is all art, indeed, but a refinement of the ore 
of life?” (“The Art of Biography” 29). Here is biography as archaeology, in which the 
technician provides a way to view what is obscured by the “unessential.” Edel’s 
inviolable law, though, is to keep imagination on the correct side of the balance—only 
making literature from what one knows is factual.  
Edel’s eighteenth aphorism relaxes biographical anxiety by turning from 
proscription to promise: “The biographer truly succeeds if a distinct literary form can be 
found for the particular life.” This is axiomatic: books are capable of appropriately 
representing lives, and some degree of appropriateness can be measured. Nevertheless, 
some difficult questions hover. While it is entirely unlikely that Edel believes in a clear 
line between one sort of biography as an empirically verifiable artifact of a life and 
another sort of biography as a product of the vagaries of art, his separation of fact and 
form argues for some distinction between fact and fiction. 
While Edel’s notion of “imagination,” when applied to the record of facts, implies 
clearly enough something like fiction, there is reason to push against the word. 
“Imagination of form” certainly means more than simply “making things up”; it indicates 




calendar’s contents. At the core of imaginative form in life writing, narrative storytelling 
renders the matter of a life into a text. We also presume to be able to locate some artistic 
sensibility in Edel’s imaginative form. He is straightforward about his distaste for editors 
of compendia who fail to recognize that “[b]iography is not an engagement book. It 
imitates life in the way of the novelist; neither the work of fact nor the work of fiction can 
afford to present the reader with chaos and clutter. In the quest for a continuous and 
flowing story, the anarchy of the archive needs to be thoroughly and completely 
mastered” (104-105). And he asserts clearly that “fact” is insufficient: “If biographers are 
destined to be obsessed with ‘fact’ they also need to remind themselves of what 
Coleridge said—‘how mean a thing a mere fact is except as seen in the light of some 
comprehensive truth.’ The biographer’s moral oath has been to seek out comprehensive 
truth; beguilement into irrelevant byways must be resisted” (110). This life writer’s guide 
intimates romantic Truth, requiring attention to the rightness of form, and wariness of the 
temptation to be careless with a life and its history.  
Each standard-bearing word—truth, form, and history—leaves biographers with 
serious work to do. Truth’s native and notorious flirtation with ambivalence and 
ambiguity, form’s dependence on some recognizable connection between art and 
knowing, and history’s profoundly contested record aren’t easily settled problems. Edel 
comforts against those worries, though; his “new biography has learned what the old 
could never understand: that we are self-contradicting and ambivalent, that life is neither 
as consistent nor as intellectual as biography would have it be, and that when we come as 
close as possible to character and personality and to the nature of temperament and 




strangely dismissive of “the old,” Edel’s psychoanalytic paradigm would have 
biographers take on the myth that structures the subject and discern that structure by way 
of narrative interpretation of all the scraps, the letters, the matter that, in his model, 
clutters the biographer’s table. 
Edel’s “new biography” is worth consideration not only as an exploration of the 
question of imagination and truth in biography, not only as a key to unlock Edel’s own 
practice, and not only as a method for writing real lives. It informs the following analysis 
because while it offers an astute thesis on the nature of fiction in life writing—that 
biography is an artful form, not simply a matter of presenting the facts, but that it had 
better not make up those facts—his foundational manifesto at once succeeds and fails. 
Biography worth our reading recognizes the challenge of representing lives and history, 
but litmus tests for the presence of “imagination” in “fact” offer too little promise. The 
trouble between form and history, remedied too easily with the either/or binary of Edel’s 
third aphorism, meets the optimism of his eighteenth in Edmund Morris’ life of Actor-
President Ronald Reagan, Dutch: A Memoir of Ronald Reagan. Imagination of form and 
imagination of fact collide in Dutch, and the fires lit by the resultant sparks consumed the 
public discussion of the book. Morris, whose serial biography of Theodore Roosevelt 
grounds him as an eminent, if conventional, presidential biographer, simultaneously 
adopts and violates Edel’s premises; the result purchases a contextual, contingent 
authority as Morris develops an imaginative form for the life of a contemporary public 
subject. Reagan, whose overdetermined personae—structured by Hollywood and 
Washington mythologies—is the quintessential collusion of performance and history, 




readers of all biography, because it understands and deploys life writing’s most 
inescapable conditions: first, that the strictest nonfiction is finally not the only tenable 
way to approach a life; second, that history is an uncertain and unwinnable battle fought 
among competing narratives; and third, that the best biographer understands that, among 
the excess of information that accretes around any life, the unstable and fragmentary 
nature of life writing offers a promising locus of innovation. Dutch breaks with many 
conventions, not least of which is Edel’s prohibition against imaginative facts, but its 
form’s imagination makes the most authentic book of “Ronald Reagan,” and its 
dedication to unearthing a figure Morris regards paradoxical domesticates the memoir’s 
rebelliousness. Dutch cannot fully accept its experiment’s wager, that its Reagan is too 
diffuse, too mediated to be subject to a unified account of a life. Morris’ nonfiction is 
certainly committed to experimental and postmodern principles, yet too insistent on an 
affective faith in its subject’s representability. He engages in knowing playfulness, but 
devotes himself to an unlocking (Mendelson’s model of the life as an interpretable poem, 
perhaps) that betrays worry.  
Reading Dutch, a restless text uncomfortable with generic boundaries, as a not 
entirely successful foil to an historical novel hardly seems intuitive, but I want to suggest 
that abandoning biography’s conventional obligations to accuracy might make available 
to Morris the sort of epistemological argument inherent in the form of Dutch. Gore 
Vidal’s Lincoln: A Novel, while a decidedly conservative adherent to its generic status, 
makes a case for presidential biography as literary interrogation. Edel insists that “[i]n a 
novel, the novelist knows everything about the hero or heroine. His [sic] characters are 




Biographers never do” (15). Vidal and Morris each dismantle this simplifying principle, 
but the latter refuses to abandon what Edel calls “analy[sis of] his materials to discover 
certain keys to the deeper truths of his subject” (29). 
The American president provides more than enough challenge for would-be 
biographers in need of a story. Edel winces at the magnitude of the archive:  
We now build entire libraries to house the papers of our presidents; and thanks to 
the existence of carbon paper and photocopying we have in these libraries copies 
of letters, millions of them, which in other eras would be dispersed all over the 
world and in the possession only of the recipients. And I speak of even a later 
moment, when we possess not only the papers of the president but tape recordings 
of his speeches, kinescopes, movies—and all the records of public relations by 
which what we call the presidential “image” is created and recreated. And that is 
not all. (95) 
He goes on to complicate that superfluity of Presidential data by reminding us of “the art 
of making everything seem public while the truth remains private” (96), but the historical 
deluge that rushes up at the mention of “Washington,” “Jefferson,” “Jackson,” “Lincoln,” 
“Teddy,” “FDR,” “JFK,” “Reagan,” “Clinton,” and, for the moment, “Dubya” risks 
drowning any fair aspiring biographer. Bill Clinton’s 883-page memoir seems about 
right. Even the “everyday” subject, who has managed to occupy the work of life writers, 
and the recovered figures, who should have been there all along, provide every bit as 
much indeterminacy, every bit as much pressure against the line between history and 
fiction as any U.S. president. Yet there is an opposite challenge in those cases. We know 




races ahead of his European explorer, and the obscure outsider artist, few of whom 
maintained much of an archive. We know too much about the president, because, more 
than most subjects of American life writing, that figure carries the weight of historical 
signification. This is not an argument for the historical primacy of George Washington 
and his heirs—it is inescapably important to understand that the previously unheard-of 
local subjects influence and are influenced by history; they tell tales of a moment, too. 
Instead, I am insisting that it is difficult not to acknowledge the fact that, for good and for 
ill, the U.S. hangs its history on the faces of its presidents. Even when the president is 
less familiar than Lincoln, Jefferson, Washington, either Roosevelt, the release of 
archival matter—as in the case of David McCullough’s John Adams—stimulates enough 
reconsideration to make that president another candidate for a national mall monument. 
One volume among Vidal’s series of historical fiction, Lincoln is a novel’s 
version of the sixteenth president, and a record of the American Civil War and its 
uncertain puppet masters. Vidal’s Lincoln, a human character but a national actor, 
operates like a balance tasked with accommodating and negotiating the weight of a 
nation’s literally warring identities. Upon notice of Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, a 
confidant observes of Lincoln, “[i]t was if his old friend had ceased entirely to exist as a 
human being and in his place there was now, suddenly incarnate, an entire and undivided 
nation” (636). Lincoln’s personal secretary John Hay perceives a less pacific metonymy 
as the president delivers an address later that evening: “Hay suddenly saw Lincoln as a 
sort of human lightning conductor, absorbing all the fire from Heaven for all of them” 
(637). Surely one of the office’s most mythic selves, Lincoln arrives at Vidal’s text with 




moving into the interiority of Lincoln and his familiars, Vidal makes of the old president 
a character, not merely an amalgam of the Lincoln catalogue. Like Morris, Vidal insists 
that his subject comes from history; his afterward asserts, “[a]ll of the principal characters 
really existed, and they said and did pretty much what I have them saying and doing…” 
and that “[a]s for Lincoln and the other historical figures, I have reconstructed them from 
letters, journals, newspapers, diaries, etc. Occasionally, I have done some moving around 
… I have not done this sort of thing often. I have not done it at all with the Presidents.” 
Even without the authority secured by footnotes, Vidal ostensibly finds the right 
imagination of form without imagination of fact—the novel’s promise of narrative 
control, subjective perspective, and a beginning and end make an otherwise hyper-
signifying president, overwhelmed with ages of legend-making, containable with the 
fiction of order. By way of Vidal’s biographical act, Lincoln is at least as representable or 
manageable as any absent figure can be, at least as true as any absent self can be.  
Vidal’s book’s entertains metabiographical questions much less often than 
Morris’, but the reader finds moments in which a winking novelist reflects on the nature 
of his project. John Hay and fellow secretary to Lincoln John Nicolay, who would 
ultimately complete their ten-volume Abraham Lincoln: A History, voice the challenge 
that Vidal takes on: 
Hay and Nicolay had each had, on his own, the idea of writing a biography of 
Lincoln. Lately, they had been discussing such a book as a joint effort.  
 Nicolay shut his desk. “Upon the two of us, John, must fall the noble task 
of telling the world who Abraham Lincoln really was. This means that we are 




 “But, Nico, do we know who he really was—or is?” 
 “We know what we know, which is a good deal, I think.” 
“I wonder,” said Hay. “The Tycoon is a mysterious man; and highly 
secret.” 
“That’s because he’s smarter than anybody else. Nothing mysterious about 
that.” (455-456) 
Vidal’s regular shift in perspective preempts reductive efforts to identify Hay as an alter 
ego (though his literary aspirations lightly hint at identification). Nevertheless the 
“Tycoon’s” future biographers are faced with something not unlike Vidal’s conundrum. 
What can be told? What must be left out? (in a ten-volume life, clearly not much). And 
how could any writer possibly cut through the “mystery” to the self? Vidal offers more 
than dedication to objectivity, a not very useful standard. Lincoln’s dramatizing narrative 
of historical figures is no less close to its subjects than presidential biography that 
purports to avoid fiction’s mediation. Vidal’s novel does not abandon the possibility that 
Lincoln’s life can be reported, but its application of a fictional form to do so plants 
questions about the limitations of nonfiction biography. That is to say, while Lincoln is 
hardly a postmodern work, its willingness to favor the novel as the means to a life posits 
an epistemological contention at odds with “traditional” biography: knowledge of an 
historical life may be seriously conveyed without pretensions to the “objective” record. 
That, as Ellis points out, the form of the biography is often the form of the novel, only 
offers so much; Vidal’s version of Lincoln, having left behind the fantasy of presidential 




McCullough’s John Adams, makes possible speculative representation that is anathema to 
the sort of biography both Ellis and Edel ostensibly advocate. 
 Lincoln’s president performs and, at least in the view of Hay (who learns to read 
Lincoln’s gestures and mannerisms as often ironic performances for unwitting audiences 
of statesmen), suggests a biographical project. Beyond Hay’s overt discussion with 
Nicolay, he recognizes that the president is capable of deploying varying already-written 
versions of himself. The elder Lincoln son Robert reports to Hay his embarrassment over 
the president’s unrefined manner, but Vidal’s Lincoln rarely if ever seems bound to some 
natural self. As a novel’s character, he becomes an agent for his own mutable identities, 
each bound to his conviction that the nation’s union is a constant condition. Nicolay, for 
instance, observes the president’s mobile heritage, observing that he “has more states of 
origin than there are stars on the flag” (146). Vidal’s Lincoln often seems to disappear 
into reverie, and to Hay, “He seemed to be staring at that wall of marble in his mind from 
which he read his finished texts,” perfectly aware of his identity as an enduring historical 
character, subject to a catalogue of representation (357). More than a knowing wink, the 
biography-as-novel here reminds the reader that its hyperbolic subject, rendered 
discernible by means of the novel’s tropes, escapes efforts to be commanded by a 
domesticating text. It is not that Lincoln is a too-grand figure who transcends the 
biographical enterprise; rather, Vidal’s form illustrates the fantastic work of the fiction. 
Four years of Lincoln’s life serve as an organizing principle for the novel, whose scope 
includes the Civil War, the political logic of Secretary of State William Seward, 
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, the Maryland Blairs, scheming congressmen, 




the families of these figures, fetid backwater Washington itself, conspiracies to 
assassinate Lincoln, and even federal monetary policy. Only the novel could arrange 
those these threads, fashioning a narrative logic of history grounded in the mediating 
records. That our narratives of Lincoln allow traversal across personae—rural “scrub,” 
rail-splitting worker, folk lawyer, honest father, abolitionist, patient strategist, self-
deprecating wit—makes possible the implicit argument of Vidal’s novel, that knowing a 
biography’s subject means recognizing that biography’s limits, bound by the biographer’s 
perspective. 
Lincoln brings rail-splitting, honesty, emancipation, the Civil War, and stovepipe 
hats to the life-writer’s desk. Reagan brings California, cowboys, and, most significant, 
professional performance. Not only a president. An actor whose roles typify American 
sentimentalism. W.J.T. Mitchell outlines the play in which Reagan is situated: “The fact 
that Ronald Reagan began his career as an actor and has continually exploited the 
symbolic, theatrical character of the presidency only makes the links between 
aesthetic/semiotic and political forms of representation more unavoidable” (12). Or, 
Reagan signifies multiple signification—of an actor’s characters and a president’s nation. 
Lincoln’s death, in the balcony of the theatre, at the hands of an actor, perhaps an 
overwrought and overdetermining presage, nevertheless initiates a thematic line all the 
way across a century, from Ford’s Theatre to Warner Studio to the White House. Vidal’s 
Lincoln understands the fundamental connection between presidential politics and 
performance: 
Even [Secretary of State William] Seward had difficulty separating the practical if 




had so carefully constructed before and during the convention at Chicago: Honest 
Abe, the Rail-Splitter, born in a manger—or, rather, log cabin… Thanks to the 
telegraph and the modernization of the daguerreotype, Lincoln’s managers had 
been able to impress an indelible image on the country’s consciousness. Even the 
famous beard that Lincoln had grown on the train from Springfield to Washington 
had been a deliberate calculation and not, as Lincoln had said so sweetly if 
disingenuously at the time, the result of a letter from a little girl who liked 
whiskers. Actually, the letter had come from a number of influential New York 
Republicans who thought that a beard might give him dignity, something that they 
had found dangerously wanting in the quaint Western teller of funny and not-so-
funny stories. So Lincoln had grown the beard. (232-233) 
In “The West Wing of Oz,” Joan Didion suggests that, at least in Reagan’s case, 
this performativity is an eminently manageable phenomenon: “Defined as ‘president,’ or 
even as ‘governor,’ Reagan did indeed appear to have some flat sides, some missing 
pieces. Defined as ‘actor,’ however, he was from the beginning to the end of his public 
life entirely consistent, a knowable and in fact quite predictable quantity” (Political 
Fictions 169). A sound interpretive formula, in other words, is born of the fact that 
Reagan, unlike Lincoln, actually was an actor. Lincoln’s beard may be compelling, and 
very likely astute political theatre, but Reagan’s jellybeans only highlight the artifice. 
That distinction informs Morris’ approach. 
Morris’ form is a polyphony of biographical strategies. Each supplements and 




fictional character in his “memoir” of Reagan. In the Modern Library’s Publisher’s Note 
for Dutch, he reflects on the challenge: 
Reagan considers his life (quite wrongly) to have been unremarkable. He gives 
nothing of himself in private, believing that he has no self to give. Any orthodox 
quest for the real “Dutch,” then, is bound to be an exercise in frustration. Hence 
the dullness of so many of the books written about him, their inability to capture 
his peculiar magic. Since Reagan has been primarily a phenomenon of the 
American imagination—a mythical apotheosis of the best and worst in us—he can 
be re-created only by an extension of biographical technique. (vii) 
Hoping to convey that “peculiar magic”—a phrase whose adoration, stashed away in an a 
introductory publisher’s note to what Morris’ critics indicted as an attack on Reagan, is 
telling—the author invents an “Edmund Morris” whose experiences parallel and 
sometimes intersect those of his subject. Both spend boyhoods in northern Illinois; both 
attend Eureka College; both work in Hollywood; both serve in the military during the 
second World War. They meet casually a number of times before Morris begins work on 
Dutch, and Morris invents a correspondence in which he and a boyhood cohort wonder 
and chat about “Dutch” Reagan. We are assured that the “facts” of the presidential life 
are rigorously researched and documentable. If anything, then, Morris’ is presumably a 
sin of literariness and addition, not revision. No local lie is told, really; no detail of the 
subject’s life is imagined, except for the framing fiction, an imaginary character to 
narrate Reagan, “[m]ost public yet most private of men, [who] does not welcome undue 
familiarity with his past” (xxi). As readers, we are ostensibly to bear in mind that the eyes 




The first indication that Morris’ book takes on more than the telling of the 
subject’s life, that it expresses the biographer’s questions about narrating lives, appears as 
he wanders around the Ronald Reagan Birthplace Museum with its founder and owner, 
Paul Nicely. Morris confesses, “I wish I had a camcorder […] to follow you around” 
(14). Dutch’s most striking trope presents scenes from the life as film scripts, complete 
with set design, shooting directions, musical score selections and characterization, editing 
preferences, and emotive direction for each character. Immediately after Morris wishes 
aloud that he had the ability to film his perambulations with Nicely, the prose form shifts: 
“RONALD REAGAN BIRTHPLACE—AFTERNOON.” A script and scene description 
follows: 
[…] CAMERA PANS around front bedroom of Birthplace, overlooking Main 
Street. It HOLDS on a short, broad, cross-patched oak bed with heavily lathed 
and fluted posts. To one side stands a little wooden table and porcelain lamp. Two 
sickly religious prints hang on the wall. 
NARRATOR: In this bed, at 4:16 A.M. on February 6, 1911, Ronald Wilson 
Reagan was born, feet first, after twenty-four hours’ labor. Even in the womb, it 
seems, he plotted his entrance with dramatic effect. He weighed ten pounds. 
Perhaps it was this amplitude of flesh, and the durchkomponierte quality of his 
crying, that made Jack Reagan compare him to a “Dutchman.” For the next 
twenty-six years, the boy would be known as “Dutch”—and “Dutch” he has 
remained to all who knew him in his Midwestern days. 




Should the second of his wives be watching this documentary, she will be 
interested to know that at the moment of his birth, Mars was in 4° Capricorn 
conjunction, the Ascendant in the First House, the Sun was in 16° of Aquarius in 
the Second House, trine the Midheaven, and square the Moon in Taurus at the end 
of the Fourth House. 
During the last sentence, a long, pianissimo D-natural is heard on violins: the 
first notes of the sunrise sequence from Haydn’s Creation. It increases in volume 
and begins to mount the scale as CAMERA begins a SLOW ZOOM toward the 
bedroom’s west-facing window. Dutch’s cot stands beneath it. 
NARRATOR: Was he already myopic, as he kicked in this cot and tried to focus 
on these luminous rectangles? Was his first field of vision similar to his last: a 
foreground buttressed with familiar shapes, each small, female, strong-jawed, 
authoritative— 
NELLE REAGAN: (firmly) Ronald! 
MARGARET CLEAVER: (austerely) Dutch! 
JANE WYMAN: (impatiently) Ronnie! 
NANCY REAGAN: (snappishly) Ronnie! 
NARRATOR: —a middle distance wavering with taller, blurrier figures— 
MAUREEN REAGAN: (plaintively) Dad? 
MICHAEL REAGAN: (plaintively) Dad? 
PATTI DAVIS: (plaintively) Dad? 




NARRATOR: —and, in farthest perspective, where the land rises to meet the sky, 
and intense concentration of light, a hint of towers and rooftops, a Shining… 
Now his voice, too, is overwhelmed as the fanfare reaches its climax. CAMERA 
PASSES prismatically through the window, and Main Street, sunk in shadow, 
opens up below. (14-15).  
Disrupting narrative coherence at once establishes authority, by opening up the array of 
representative strategies, and interrogates that authority, by declining to resolve tension 
between those strategies. The more ways Morris creates Reagan, the more thorough his 
story, we might imagine. We might also notice the absence of a monolithic form’s 
stabilizing effect. More notably, Morris’ approach parodies precisely the sort of script 
from which his subject takes his cues. 
The fantasy script unsettles the complacency of representation in life writing. The 
scene’s images remain captured in print, yet they prophesy a performance. Biography’s 
sense that prose narrative captures the experiences and idealized “essence” of some life is 
checked here; Morris reminds the reader that the biopic exists, and that its generic 
relationship with book-form biography raises questions of visual representation, aural 
representation (here, the Haydn symphony, as well as the voices of characters), mimesis, 
and temporality. Wisely, though, the device does not incite a war between image and text. 
While it is not difficult to imagine competition between representation’s forms—epic 
paragone, the unwinnable contest between words and images—Dutch does not force an 
impossible false choice between the two but instead incorporates several ways of 
knowing into a bricolage of life writing. Even if the film script remains arrested as text, 




mark its difference. After prompting readerly disorientation, suggesting consideration and 
negotiation of the formal assumptions of written biography, the presence of the script 
simply juxtaposes options. Morris imagines, literally, the alternative control over story 
offered by a movie’s script, and he signals the need for several means of storytelling. In 
the context of Dutch’s experiments, imaginary scripts contribute to a polyvocal whole. 
And of course this move emphasizes early on the cinematic persona of Morris’ 
subject: “Even in the womb, it seems, he plotted his entrance with dramatic effect.” We 
begin to see the ways Dutch looks to satisfy Edel’s hope for connection between form 
and subject. Possibly, the logic of that aesthetic-historical bond, carried to its conclusion, 
would demand that the life of Reagan (or at least a major part of it) take the form of a 
film. Yet the reach granted Morris by a seven-hundred page book, a reach that includes 
nearly the whole chronology of Reagan’s life, calls for some larger literary structure that 
evokes the transformations of identity that a life entails. The filmed life of the film actor 
would be as incomplete and contingent as an uncritical book-form biography. Perhaps the 
Republican National Committee’s rejection of the CBS miniseries The Reagans was just 
in its criticism of inaccuracy, even if for all the wrong, grossly reductive reasons.8 
All of the narrativized shooting direction pulls back the curtains that would 
obscure the mechanisms of life writing, and attention to the camera’s movements and 
                                                 
8 Chairman Ed Gillespie’s letter to CBS (published at the now defunct 
“www.supportreagan.com,” suggested, "[i]f your series contains omissions, 
exaggerations, distortions or scenes that are fiction masquerading as fact, the 
American people may come away with a misunderstanding of the Reagans and 
the Reagan Administrations … the program is a fictional portrayal of the Reagans 
and the Reagan Presidency, and they should not consider it to be historically 




perspective deconstructs the artifice of biography, even if with fairly heavy hands. This is 
not to say that Morris and the camera are analogous operators; in fact, we are more likely 
to imagine identification between him and the speaking narrator. Yet the camera acts as 
the site of recording, imagined into existence by Morris’ observation, “I wish I had a 
camcorder.” The biographer’s imagination, the camera’s eye, the score’s dynamics, the 
script’s direction, and the characters’ attempts to name Reagan into being all warn against 
the temptation to read biography uncritically.  
Morris, whose imagined alter ego is for some time employed as a Hollywood 
script doctor, returns to this method often. A summary of his subject’s hometown is 
introduced with another film cue: “Were I to script a documentary called, say, The 
Ronald Reagan Story…”. Plans for that film follow in regular prose form and, after he 
explains, “I’d have Dutch read from his own autobiography,” the script begins (33). 
“Two epiphanies” from Reagan’s adolescence, his first moments listening to a radio and 
his response to finding his alcoholic father passed out face down in the snow, “cry out for 
video treatment” (37). As a sort of visual intermission between scenes, Morris includes a 
detailed sketch of “Ronald Reagan’s boyhood home, 816 South Hennepin Avenue, 
Dixon,” the site of his father’s overdetermined “dark form half hidden in the snow” (38).9 
In the midst of textual representation of an imagined script for an imagined film, a hand-
drawn image enlists another means of representation as both a carnivalesque filling-in 
and a self-conscious critique of staid presidential biography, a genre in which pencil 
sketches are less than authoritative historical data. The juxtaposition is further 
emphasized by the caption, “Again we see the little Dixon house with snow banked about 
                                                 
9 Reagan, as it happens, seems to have conflated his memory of his father in the snow with scenes from 




it,” language borrowed from the script’s setting notes. Clearly, no means of 
representation wins much authority amid this narrative noise. 
“Down the Divide: Four Short Scenarios,” a chapter in four scenes presented as 
film scripts, illuminates Reagan’s almost-fatal 1947 acute viral pneumonia, the failures of 
his uneasy marriage to Jane Wyman, his cooperative testimony at HUAC (as well as his 
secret contributions as an FBI informant, “T-10”), and his destructive separation from 
Wyman. The chapter begins with self-conscious attention to the problems of cinematic 
narration, particularly in Hollywood film:  
It is one of Hollywood’s most hackneyed narrative tricks: the dissolve from day 
into night. Then a hazy montage of images, double-exposed upon the feverish, 
tossing body of our hero. But what if the dissolve is real, the images true, our hero 
the man, not the actor? What if the screenwriter charged with rendering such a 
scenario tells it as Reagan has told it in memoirs and monologues, even to the 
extent of plagiarizing Reaganesque figures of speech? “Hazy montage,” for 
example. And “cocooned in blankets.” And “down the divide.” Would that make 
it authentic as well as cinematic, a suspenseful episode of The Ronald Reagan 
Story? (249)  
The “hackneyed” expressions of subjects become knowingly deployed hackneyed scenes 
here. As that complicity between Reagan, Hollywood formula, and Dutch is named, 
though, Morris gestures an evasion of total responsibility: 
Any director wishing to shoot the following material should apply to Reagan’s 
lawyers for permission, since these are his memories, not mine. All I have done is 




details from other sources. I recommend black-and-white photography with soft-
focus effects in Part I (‘Fever’), deep-field detail of domestic objects in Part II 
(‘Silence’), a grainy newsreel look to Part III (‘Testimony’), and handheld, 
documentary-style tracking shots in Part IV (‘But Mary Doesn’t Love John’). 
(250) 
Morris converts his authorial agency to “suggestions” and “recommendations,” playfully 
forfeiting control. Uncertain authority is derived from “his memories,” given their 
tentative origins in the subject’s “memoirs and monologues.” Our Reagan, as we see 
here, autobiographically adopts the Hollywood discourse, and Morris disavows it as he 
co-opts the same. Again, the life writer, charged with organizing a life into a readable 
structure, deploys an unconventional tactic. The effect is that the reader might fairly ask 
why Morris doesn’t simply quote those memoirs and monologues in prose narrative, why 
he turns them into the guidelines for a film. The answer, of course, is that the interior 
motivations, explanations, and meanings of biography’s subjects, no matter how 
temptingly close, cannot ever be more knowable than the means by which they are 
conveyed, a phenomenon Dutch deconstructs. The effect of form, here, is a critique of the 
subject as an authority. These are Reagan’s memories made suspect by Morris’ frame. 
“Down the Divide” captures both the primacy of the subject’s language, the limited 
authority of the biographer’s interlocutory status, and the imperative to consider more 
than one imperfect way to represent an historical person. 
Morris deploys a number of images, including renderings of locations, 
photographs of scenes and characters (familiar enough data for nonfiction), facsimiles of 




the book, miniature yin-yang symbols between each subsection (these appear every page 
or so), and even the cartoon image of a “Simian philosopher” (offering, “whoever wants 
the answer must come to me”) on which Reagan had once penned a prediction: “I want to 
be the biggest man in the world” (269). Again, the incompleteness of narrative prose 
comes under vexing interrogation. The representational contributions of these images do 
more than supplement narrative prose—they begin to imply a complicit critique of life 
writing’s methods. Each bolsters the effort to narrate the subject’s life, while at the same 
time each highlights the instability of that narration—fragments are sutured together to 
approximate a unified life-story, but their disjointedness only sustains the fragmentation 
of the subject. 
All this jeu does not simply discount the notion of nonfiction’s operations, 
though. Many conversations between the biographer, his subject, and others are conveyed 
by way of ostensibly unedited transcripts of tape recordings. These function as both 
descriptive and prescriptive artifacts. Their documentary value originates in the former 
and their aesthetic imagination in the latter. Dropping the presumed mediation of an 
interlocutor busy re-arranging data into a narrative, Morris substitutes with the mediation 
of potential theatre—these sections intimate performance and all the work accomplished 
by his fantasy film scripts. Importantly, they also invoke documentary history, 
presumably as clean records of the past. Morris’ inclusion of his and his subject’s 
frequent use of a hesitant “uh” is particularly important for the illusion of immediacy. 
Within the context of Dutch, so invested in a bricolage of documentary and narrative 
strategy, their formal presentation belies authorial distance.  




EM Uh, you did, once, but— 
RR  (disappointed) Well— 
EM (weakly) I’m pleased to hear it again! (111) 
This exchange promises the performance of a storytelling scene as it narrates the past. 
Both the character cues and the subject of Reagan as a (repetitive) storyteller who values 
an interested audience (but not enough to provide original material) highlight the 
biographical work of these “scripts;” they function as another representation of the actor-
president. Others find themselves participating in Morris’ cinéma vérité, too. In an 
interview transcript, Nancy Reagan offers her fairly vindictive version of her husband’s 
marriage to Jane Wyman: “Ronnie, of course, didn’t… uh… want to marry, he was too… 
much too young, he was, uh, just playing around. So she sent him a suicide note and 
swallowed a whole, uh, lot of pills, and got herself taken to the hospital” (162).  
Finally, some records of experience come by way of journal entries, implying the 
immediacy of observation without the problems introduced by long-term memory. 
Several of the entries are necessarily fictional, though, and that detail troubles the 
authority of those that appear authentic. Morris includes several entries from the 
president’s diaries in the chapter, “Album Leaves, 1987-1988,” which takes the form of 
collected fragments in chronological order but without any transition other than their 
short titles. These seem to afford some historical reliability in the midst of the structural 
tension created by the chapter’s form. They also testify to the unease surrounding Reagan 
and his White House in the doldrums of his presidency, including his clumsy and telling 
response to the Iran-Contra affair, his prostate surgery and subsequent denial (Morris 




instead a “few cancer cells”), his troubling central staff changes, his aging, his 
unforgivably ignorant response to the onset of AIDS, his wife’s breast cancer, and his 
odd and frighteningly regular allusion to Armageddon. Sourcing so much angst from 
unpolished notes and diaries emphasizes and relies on the fragmentary nature of those 
documents; this chapter becomes a whirlwind of anxious data, an analogy for the 
turbulence of the moment.  
The fact that Morris’ own diaries are at times those of the fictional narrator checks 
the reader’s inclination to read journal entries as windows on what happened. Because the 
imagination of form resonates throughout the entire work, what is ostensibly the 
historical record operates within its proper context of multivalent histories. Dutch’s 
structure fosters the comfort of readers, lulling us into its own history, in which several 
artifices tell a complete story. When Morris introduces a detail and assures the reader that 
it is taken from the president’s diary, that authority purchases some readerly faith, but the 
antithetical use of the author’s “War Diary,” – Dutch’s author was one year old and living 
in east Africa when the U.S. entered World War II – prohibits complacent reading. In 
other words, a form dedicated to both history and imagination stifles the presumed 
authority of either. 
   The Modern Library preface to Dutch advises Morris’ readers to keep in mind a 
stated allegiance to accuracy and authenticity: 
All that Dutch asks of a first-time reader is that he or she be willing to accept, in 
its early pages, the presence of a fictional narrator. Every biographical fact is 
recorded, every one of Ronald Reagan’s words and thoughts and acts, are all the 




(deliberately varied throughout the book, to emphasize the fragmentary nature of 
Reagan’s career) go beyond those of orthodox nonfiction. Yet close analysis of 
the notes will show that even the most apparently imaginary episodes are nothing 
more than imaginative in execution. They merely tell the truth in ways altogether 
new. (xii) 
Edel’s “imagination of form” becomes the Modern Library’s “imaginative execution.” 
That parenthetical aside, an interpretation of “deliberate variation” as an effort to 
thematize Morris’ formal play, needs much more attention, not merely because it could 
fill in literary-critical blanks, but, more important, because it promises that the form of 
biography can radically adapt to fit the “nature” of its many subjects. This, again, is 
Edel’s eighteenth aphorism. The limits of language, we are being assured, can be 
mitigated by the metonymy of form. The implicit question, of course, asks whose 
biography wouldn’t benefit by an array of unorthodox literary methods. When pressed, it 
is difficult to imagine an “orthodox” life. 
Dutch might be approached as an unlikely heir to Michael Herr’s Vietnam 
masterpiece Dispatches, in which Herr often names the trouble native to telling history. 
Looking at a map in his story’s opening moments, he reflects, “[w]e knew that the uses of 
most information were flexible, different pieces of ground told different stories to 
different people” (3). His explanation of the journalist’s task might helpfully inform our 
reading of life writing:  
Conventional journalism could no more reveal this war than conventional 
firepower could win it, all it could do was take the most profound event of the 




obvious, undeniable history and making it into a secret history. And the very best 
correspondents knew even more than that. (218)  
Conventional biography, if such a thing exists, faced with Edmund Morris’ work, might 
take Herr to heart. McCullough’s generally straightforward work admits its author in 
much subtler ways than Morris’ memoir. He makes a story out of Adams’ interior: “And 
in this bleakest of hours, heading for Cambridge, and on to Philadelphia, Adams saw his 
way clearer and with greater resolve than ever in his life” (29). With or without an 
explanatory footnote (and this observation is without), this move into the consciousness 
of the subject violates the strictest notion of nonfiction. McCullough, whose biography 
proves most certainly conventional, moves into his Adams’ head more than once. He will 
later assert that he “was perfectly honest with himself” (47), an interior event hardly 
available to the author several centuries after the moment of the subjective condition 
described. John Adams is an undeniably strong work, and I do not mean to imply that its 
author is in bad faith. Quite the contrary, these moves into narrative fiction (or to put it in 
a manner more likely to be acceptable to McCullough, narrative interpretation) increase 
the biography’s success.  
Instead of the futile struggle to arrest every detail of a life’s facts in a linear and 
stable narrative, Dutch presents the stories of a life. The autobiographical novel, the 
fictional memoir, and the roman á clef are probably the most familiar generic expressions 
of life writing’s weird middle ground. The critique embedded in Morris’ book deserves 
attention, though, not just because it knowingly and publicly introduces fiction to 
biography, but because it knowingly and publicly introduces fiction into an “authorized” 




founded on the conflicted pairing of Romantic Individual and Hollywood Performer. This 
biographer is enthralled of both; his knowing memoir is obliged to the fluidity of the 
latter as it believes in the persistence of the former. 
 
Playing President, Playing the Fool 
Because Morris’ unusual biography reflects and emphasizes the ways all 
biography represents, it is also a meditation on presidential biography as both symptom 
and diagnosis of the larger story. Presidents, in Malcolm Cowley’s dichotomy of public 
lives, are “representative” of an age, and not “merely typical” (207). Given the many 
ways “Reagan” can function as a container of representative material—performing 
patriot, heroic face of “morning in America,” an idealized metonymy for the United 
States, shortsighted warrior whose presidency signifies the nadir of progressive American 
politics—Dutch’s form is ideal. The story of an actor-president is archetypal for subjects 
of presidential biography, because Reagan occupies and performs multiple roles. Didion 
fills in the trope of presidency-as-Hollywood vehicle, countering Dinesh D’Souza’s 
efforts at a grandiose Reagan, by reducing the entire presidency to a series of archetypal 
American stories: “This was a president who understood viscerally […] that what makes 
a successful motion picture is exactly a foolish enterprise, a lonely quest, a lost cause, a 
fight against the odds: undertaken, against the best advice of those who say it cannot be 
done, by someone America can root for. Cut. Print” (Political Fictions 118). Vidal is in 
on Reagan’s game: “Contrary to legend, he was a first-rate actor, and before the war he 




president, he said, most sensibly, ‘I don’t see how anyone who is not an actor could get 
through this job’” (Palimpsest 292) 
Presidents offer good insight into biography and history because, as much as any 
other subject of life writing, these are momentary symptoms of a nation’s sense of self. 
Even if only fifty-one percent of the nation’s Electoral College determines which of two 
or three candidates will accomplish that identity work, the presidential persona operates 
as a national signifier. Hardly romantic synecdoche to resolve multivalent American 
cultures, these do register as containable micro-figures of U.S. identity, whose narratives 
are both producer and product of popular culture, political struggle, class ideology, and 
market formulae (easily demonstrated by the representational logic of any presidential 
campaign). Morris explains, “[p]residents, whatever their political symbolism, represent 
the national character of their era, and if we do not understand our leaders as people, we 
can never understand ourselves as Americans” (xxvi). Though this definition of the 
president’s cultural work leaves much unanswered and oversimplifies “the national 
character,” it does begin to theorize the presidency as a more than politically 
representative function. As subjects of biography, these are multiply representative 
figures. At the very least, they carry more than their own lives. 
Heir to and master of the office’s performativity, Reagan moves about on his 
handlers’ stage. As Morris’ Colin Powell points out, while Reagan poses for cameras 
during his last moments in the White House, he plays his role as president—he is an 
actor: “Here we were, his senior staffers, all of us who directed him and scripted him and 
made him up and gave him his cues. And here were the cameramen, the sound guys, the 




was Ronald Reagan shooting his last take” (652). The nation becomes a sound stage, as 
well, much to the disadvantage of those who did not do well by the studio player’s 
biggest performance. Significantly, Morris confides that by this point Reagan had already 
taken his leave of the oval office; he returned at the behest of a staff that “brought him 
back … to pretend a little for the record” (651). The analogy is of course tiresome, and it 
is even dangerous, but it is Reagan’s. 
Morris’ subject experiences early connections to the stage—both parents are 
amateur actors. Jack and Nelle Reagan “were evidently Tampico’s reigning theatrical 
couple when the tiny town was at its population peak of 1,276 souls” (19). Performance 
shapes Morris’ Reagan throughout his life, but one figurative expression of Reagan on 
stage anchors Dutch’s story: Morris’ Reagan leitmotiv, der Reine Tor, the pure fool of the 
Parzival myth. Morris imagines his subject as an archetypal Innocent Fool. “Parzival. 
Perceval. Pierce-vale—‘the way of dedication, of the Heart,’ John Matthews writes in 
The Grail. All his life, Ronald Reagan has ridden a long road dissolving, at the limit of 
sight, into something scintillant yet ethereal. His vagueness about that vision is the 
typical mythopoesis of Fools or mystics” (26). If Reagan ever lacks intellectual rigor, and 
it is abundantly clear that he at least occasionally seems to, Morris fashions that 
shortcoming into the operatic—this is mythic incompetence, indeed a nearly messianic 
role. The narrative effort to turn Reagan into myth—or, more accurate, to use myth to 
read Reagan—bolsters the import of his acting career for his identity (or lack thereof). 





Morris addresses the question of the actor’s off-screen identity, and the analysis 
leaves his acting Reagan without much stability of self: 
…the what-am-I-doing-here look. I have seen that same look on the faces of many 
screen actors between takes. It betrays their chronic loss of identity, re-
emphasized every time the rush of Light and Speed and Action is “cut” from 
them. The spots snap off, the reels stop rolling. For an hour or an afternoon your 
poor player has to suffer the ordinary light of day, and the strains of unscripted 
dialogue. He does so with a sense of unreality, because to the actor, only artifice 
is actual. (209)  
While not exactly a romantic excuse for his subject, Morris’ der Reine Tor motif argues 
that the stage frames Reagan and, significantly, that he is not the agent of his place in 
history. Foolish, yes, but grandly so. Here, the implied performance of an identity, an 
after-the-text reification of the imaginary role, allows Morris more ambivalence, as his 
subject is both the half-noble Innocent Fool and the actor who exerts some degree of 
momentary agency over any given role. Ronald Reagan National Airport and The Ronald 
Wilson Reagan Building do not begin to contain that complexity.  
In addition to accounts of Reagan’s theatrical and cinematic roles—“Thyris” in a 
Eureka College production of Edna St. Vincent Millay’s Aria da Capo, “Andy McCaine” 
in Inside Story (a film about a radio man who solves a gangland mystery, renamed Love 
is on the Air), any number of soldier-pilot-spies in any number of Warner Brothers World 
War II propaganda vehicles, and “Drake McHugh” in Kings Row (certainly his most 




Reagan on stage, by way of its playful use of scripts and set designs, and with its several 
cast lists from Reagan’s many performances, it keeps him there. 
Screen actors are adept at moving from one production to another—sometimes 
between different productions shot simultaneously on neighboring sound stages. 
Hence, I suppose, the fabled shortness of Dutch’s later attention span, which an 
exasperated aide would compare to that of a fruit fly. Both the fable and the simile 
strike me as unjust: he was generally a serious, even dogged study. Yet Ronald 
Reagan remained all his life an actor, a man of exits and entrances. (181) 
 
The Doppelgängers’ Debts 
To those readers who will seize on [Reagan’s apparently poor short term memory] 
as evidence of incipient dementia in the White House, I reply: You do not 
understand that actors remember forward, not backward. Yesterday’s take is in 
the can; today is already rolling: tomorrow’s lines must be got by heart. Writers 
are different. Their stock in trade is past experience (particularly past rejections!), 
and their whole instinct is to turn it to literary account—make art out of life, as 
the cliché goes. (181) 
The contract offered to readers of Morris’ book requires that we accept that those who 
elect to write the story of another person’s experiences are not external arrangers of facts 
but come under the influence of that other person’s life. This phenomenon of dialogic, 
possibly sometimes dialectical, life writing makes possible a mutual identification, in 




would be more accurate to think of both as subjects authored in the text. I do not mean, in 
the manner of the most radical poststructuralisms, that the text precedes the living 
Edmund Morris or Ronald Reagan—and yet the point is not that the text is a precise 
representation of either, dependent on the precedence of some true self. Rather, Dutch 
constructs, represents, and conveys two subjects named Edmund Morris and Ronald 
Reagan. While Dutch’s narrator can observe, “Something about [Reagan’s] intent 
stillness suggested that he had already forgotten who I was, if indeed he ever knew” 
(543), the reader is often reminded not to neglect Morris. Reagan believes, at least for the 
moment, that he can afford to forget his biographer. He should not and we cannot. The 
biographer, in other words, comes to be at least in part defined by his or her composition 
of a life, and Dutch signifies that definition.  
Dutch’s Publisher’s Note, perhaps borrowing a metaphor from Morris, offers its 
readers a prefatory observation about what may be the most perplexing condition of life-
writing: “After years of interviews and close scrutiny of diaries, letters, and old 
photographs, all biographers become doppelgängers of their subjects, vicariously living 
the very lives they tell” (vii). This theoretical introduction to Morris’ biography of 
Ronald Reagan seems simple enough—biographer Stephen B. Oates, reflecting on the 
role of the form as history, has put the familiar need for “compassion and empathy” 
between subject and biographer quaintly: “It is an effort to experience another human 
being, by seeing the world from his view, feeling his feelings, and thinking his thoughts. 
To be properly empathetic, the biographer must be prepared to walk many a lonely mile 
in his subject’s footsteps” (12-13). But the Modern Library’s hyper-empathetic model 




First, we have been notified by the publisher that “[t]he author himself had 
assured Random House in the fall of 1985 that he was a writer, not an ideologue. ‘I want 
to make literature out of Ronald Reagan,’ he said” (v-vi) (emphasis mine). This authorial 
detail asks the reader to accept the premise that literature and ideology are not at all co-
constructive, or that they are at least distinct products, and that the biographer can 
maintain the difference. It is reasonable to ask how a President’s doppelgänger, the 
oppositional phantom twin of a politician, could not be an ideologue. We are not bound 
to believe that all literature is merely an ideological vehicle to ask how any presidential 
biographer can simply drop the ideologue’s mantle (or, in some cases, his or her badge) 
and move around freely in the aesthetic wilderness. Morris will be ideologically 
informed, even without writing an agitprop book.  
Second, the conventional role of the biographer has, even if naïvely, been 
perceived as that of interlocutor or intermediary between life and reader; the biographer 
constructs a way to cross back and forth between the lived past and the reader’s present, 
and the writer’s task is not to self-indulgently compose his own secondary, mirrored life. 
The function of the Doppelgänger, however, is not necessarily to translate for those who 
seek to understand the primary identity. Neither is a mediator; neither has primacy. Here, 
of course, the doppelgänger writes its own memoirs in which its partner’s story is 
included, a circuitous means to biography, Morris’ forking path. 
Third, the distinction between the ostensible subjectivity of the subject and 
objectivity of the biographer is supposed to be the foundation of historical nonfiction. 
Imagining the experience of a life removed from its subject and located in the imagined 




does away with the chimera of objectivity entirely. This is Morris reflecting on the 
experiences Reagan had from Morris’ partly imagined perspective, a literary trope but the 
historian’s poison. This model is the biographer’s fantasy, in which Morris fashions a 
double subjectivity for himself in order to “live alongside” Reagan, all the while 
maintaining a discrete subjectivity for himself in the real world. 
The Modern Library (and the Morris of the Publisher’s Note, it turns out) seems 
to have gotten it wrong. It has done so by virtue of the fact that Morris generally gets the 
project itself right. This introductory note strives to excuse Morris’ weird method by 
arguing that the biographical subject is the stable figure who is able to take on an 
ephemeral twin. Instead, Dutch, in its willingness to be part literary experiment, part 
presidential biography, argues for the collage of subjectivity that populates much life 
writing, and it highlights the agency of the third-person biographer facing the task of 
translating a life into a book. This book, not simply about the apparent inscrutability of 
Reagan, turns to the perplexing task of the biographical endeavor and the odd persona of 
the biographer. In folk tradition, contact with one’s own doppelgänger functions as a 
death omen. Here, neither author nor subject will die, nor will he have total control over 
the other. 
Biography as the cooperation of doppelgängers, even if an imperfect model, 
answers more completely than Morris’ own metaphor for his uneasy pairing with Dutch: 
Memory. Desire. What is this mysterious yearning of biographer for subject, so 
akin to a coup de foudre in its insistence? Yet so fundamentally different from 
love in its detachment? Dutch has intrigued me, on and off, most of my life, but 




our aloof intimacy, we are two bodies from remote systems, one a mere chip of 
rock, one huge—history cannot deny Ronald Reagan’s mass! —asteroids whose 
trajectories briefly interlocked. Yet still I feel that gravitational drag, the product 
as much of disproportion as convergence. Before we recede to our respective 
darkness, I must allow these floating fragments, these dusts of myself, to sparkle 
in his waning light. (xxix-xxx) 
The grandiosity of the conceit, begun at the Prologue’s conclusion, and repeated 
intermittently throughout Dutch, registers the cold of masses in space and the 
inevitability of decaying orbits, but its theorization of the biographer-subject relation 
inadequately accounts for the work of the biographical enterprise. Its essentializing 
romanticism, however, infects the promise of Morris’ experiment. Dutch is ultimately 
obliged to arrest his multivalent Reagan, a president whose ostensible indeterminacy does 
not—as it presumably should not—evade the responsibility of his actions. This is the 
inescapable worry of the project, that Morris’ text offers a multiply-knowable and 
paradoxical subject, yet its compulsion to judge a real politics ground that biographical 
playfulness. Morris occasionally recognizes that people pay for der Reine Tor’s works. 
This biographer regularly frets about his presumed need for distance. In his early 
chapter, “The Land of Lost Things,” his name for “that vast yet well-stocked territory 
roamed by historians, biographers, and other refugees from reality” (8-9), he excuses and 
dismisses his own past: “I am attempting, you see, to get myself out of his biographical 
way, before it develops its own improbable, burgeoning momentum” (9). Much later, he 




as his book progresses, he often crosses the lines separating him from Reagan. Feeling 
anxious for his President, he actually attempts to intercede with prayer:  
Less willingly then [at Bergen-Belsen] than now [with colon cancer], he had 
subjected himself to emergency treatment—allowed “physicians of memory” to 
do what they would with him for the general good. For that agony, and for the 
agony beyond agony of Elie Weisel, and whatever pain Dutch was suffering now, 
and for the general good, I prayed until the church’s heat became unbearable. 
(539) 
Morris even throws a party for the Reagans on the anniversary of their first meeting. 
Asking Nancy Reagan for some minutiae from that 1949 moment, he goofily jokes, 
“Great! Now we can make this evening tax-deductible” (629). In a fit of stargazing, 
Morris will surrender his authorial advantage a million-fold to a Reagan he imagines in 
the heavens. Through a friend’s back-porch telescope, he scans the visible cosmos and 
identifies bodies and configurations “symbolic of” phases in Reagan’s life (246-247). The 
uncanny connection mapped between amateur astronomer and “Star Power” actor-
president risks a trite metaphor of biographer and subject—Morris wonders whether it is 
“astrological foolishness,” and we are tempted to nod. 
Morris surfaces self-consciously on the first page. While biographers’ reflections 
on life writing regularly occupy their books’ introductory moments, this prologue means 
“Edmund Morris” every bit as much as it means Ronald Reagan. In its first scene, the 
narrator reflects on providing Reagan with a material cue—in this case, a photograph of 
an oak tree underneath which a teenage Dutch took breaks from his Lowell Park, Illinois 




not welcome undue familiarity with his past” and had flashed “blue anger in his eyes” 
when Morris suddenly “boasted that I had tracked down his first fiancée” (xxi). The 
writer establishes, at the book’s very first moment, that there is an unsettled relationship 
between his project and his subject: “Perhaps his youthful readings in Calvin Coolidge 
taught him not to encourage interlocutors. It only winds them up for twenty minutes more. 
Even as a teenager, he had taken no personal interest in people. They were, and remained, 
a faceless audience to his perpetual performance” (xxii). In his Reagan’s mind, every 
moment’s performance stabilizes an identity; “undue familiarity” with the documents of 
personal history troubles that actor’s power over the consuming audience. Someone is 
trying to peek around behind his proscenium and upsets the sheen of solipsism. An 
asocial Reagan enjoys the protections afforded by absentmindedness and Star Wars SDI 
fantasy. Unwilling to settle at the feet of his subject, not having fallen in love, as Edel 
reminds us biographers so often will, Morris refuses the role of audience without agency. 
He situates himself opposite his Reagan, and asks the reader to begin with that tense 
uncertainty. Morris aggressively enters and contributes to the movie perpetually 
projecting in Reagan’s mind. There, he contributes a legend to the personal canon:  
That hard, splendid body, those bruising arms and knees, the prickle of wet wool 
are so manifest that I can feel them—as one skinny-dipper did on August 2, 1928, 
in the nocturnal rescue that gave “Dutch” Reagan his first newspaper headline. 
PULLED FROM THE JAWS OF DEATH. A sudden empathy with the drowning 
boy (who gave his name as James Raider) makes me want to retch, as if the Rock 
River’s brackish waters are in my nose and throat, and my consciousness, too, 




Six hundred and seventy pages later, in the book’s last lines, we will learn that the 
rescued “James Raider” is, unsurprisingly, “Edmund Morris,” who “felt bound to testify, 
in prose if not speech, that I owed these last seven decades to Dutch” (672). A lifetime 
after providing the future President with his public premiere, our author has come full 
circle and returned the favor of rescue. Thankfully, Dutch takes that many pages before it 
so handily (and heavy-handedly) codifies the obligations of the biographer to the legacy 
of the told life. Each re-births the other: Morris from the suffocating brackish river and 
Reagan from presidential over-signification. This version of the actor-president’s life 
recognizes and capitalizes on the inescapable conditions that structure efforts to turn his 
experience into a book.  
Yet this rescue is imaginary. Morris’ contribution to the Reagan story is 
allegory—a story to explain what structures life writing. Morris’ trope, an invented 
version of himself, whose fictional experience can lend shape to the presumably lived 
experiences of Ronald Reagan, allows an artful confession of life writing’s fundamental 
condition: objectivity isn’t really the point at all. The point of Dutch is that the best 
record of Reagan’s life admits that there is uncertainty, indeterminacy, ambivalence, and 
performance. All of this critically contextualizes “Cowboy Ronnie’s” iconographic status 
as the bedrock of contemporary American conservatism, hardly enamored of doubt. We 
should therefore not be surprised by the venom Dutch incites, yet its last moment 
valorizes its subject with a striking absence of critical heft. 
Because Morris participates in the performance, this biography’s foundation is 
doubly dialectic: document and story struggle toward synthesis, and biographer and 




record of a Valentine’s Day Dinner in 1983 at Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield’s home, 
attended by the Reagans and a number of presidential scholars. Over the course of the 
evening, we are told, each guest is taken under the sway of Reagan’s need to win over 
everyone in his audience, including even Princeton Professor Arthur Link, editor of The 
Papers of Woodrow Wilson, whose “detestation of the Gipper was legendary in academe” 
(xxiii). The Senator asks each dinner guest to send a written summary of the evening, 
under the pretense of selecting an official presidential historian, a sort of in-house scribe. 
Morris’ submitted narrative includes the thesis included above: “[p]residents, whatever 
their political symbolism, represent the national character of their era, and if we do not 
understand our leaders as people, we can never understand ourselves as Americans” 
(xxvi). Here, Edmund Morris names and affirms his identity as an American biographer 
of American presidents. Such an unproblematic subscription to the register of “leaders as 
people” betrays Morris’ foundations. Vidal’s Lincoln, couched in the novel, is a character 
finally safe from the “objective” standards of biography. Morris creates a polyvocal form 
that cannot escape the notion of a discernible, single voice by which Reagan authors 
himself and influences a national identity. It will later be revealed that the White House 
had long since selected him as its “chronicler.” He declines for a number of years, citing 
the pressing need for work on the second volume of his Theodore Roosevelt biography, 
but he eventually accepts the bargain and immediately begins the subtextual tease toward 
the rescue-scene revelation: “Ironia ironiarum, that I of all people should be charged with 
rescuing the old Lifeguard from the chill current of history!” (xxvi-xxvii). Morris’ figure 
of adolescent rescue narrativizes his tie to the biographical subject, yet there is ultimately 




entirely regular dialectic between writer and subject. Dutch recognizes that common 
purpose and admits it into the project’s surface, enabling a metanarrative to address the 
conditions in which all life-writers find themselves. 
As it happens, Dutch is only one of at least three works that complicate the 
relationship between the writer and the “real” Reagan:  
The only book he ever wanted to write was his middle-aged memoir, Where’s the 
Rest of Me? (1965). Even that text, eloquent and frank to begin with, shows signs 
of creeping collaboration (he co-wrote it with Richard G. Hubler), and its overall 
didactic tone both cloys and annoys. An American Life (1990) is a ghostwritten 
work, undertaken at the behest of Mrs. Reagan, and may safely be described as 
the most boring book of its kind since Herbert Hoover’s Challenge to Liberty. 92 
Morris couches his own work as an appropriate heir and response to those in which his 
subject is supposed to have been speaking with his own voice. Life writing’s Ronald 
Reagan, predictably, is always already an uneasy collaboration between subject and 
biographer. Under the “dread title of Authorized Biographer” (xxix) Morris, the 
storyteller locked in mutual determination with his storied subject, aspires to the sort of 
life writing that accepts those twin pressures. His prologue teaches the reader that this 
memoir will attempt to take on the biographer’s version of the autobiographical act. Here, 
a life writer, institutionally tied to his subject by his White House authorization, thus an 
inevitably complicit agent, takes on the task of making a life, making his own self, and 
making biography. Dutch makes literature of the tie. Fictionalizing aspects of the author’s 
life, hardly an abuse of some fantastically transparent, knowable history in this case, 




responsibility taken on by the writer. Morris may wistfully connect Reagan the lifeguard 
to the “rescue” of a nation, but that scene births the impulse that will ultimately make a 
text out of Reagan. The narrative of Dutch’s production becomes a sort of fable, a causal 
chain beginning with the rescue and ending with the book’s publication. 
The coupling of Morris and Reagan finds several expressions besides the 
lifeguard’s rescue of his future biographer. While Reagan fears flying, Morris makes 
himself a pilot. Reagan the actor will read copy composed by Morris the script doctor and 
advertising writer. Reagan’s nearly vagabond family moves about north-central Illinois 
prairie land while Morris and his fairly wealthy parents live on Lake Shore Drive—
Morris wonders whether they ever crossed paths on family drives. Perhaps most 
significant, Reagan’s absentee-parenting of his son, Ron, offers agonizing antithesis to 
Morris’ fictional son’s disappearance underground following Governor Reagan’s 
shocking response to the 1967 Berkeley student political uprising. 
The very young Reagan, “imprisoned inside the crumpled roof” of a crashed auto, 
develops claustrophobia, which prefigures a longtime fear of flying (18). A quarter-
century later, “[t]ossed about the sky in a seaplane the next day [on his way to a Warner 
Brothers screen test], Dutch doubted he would live long enough to reach Avalon. He had 
never flown before, and childhood claustrophobia, combined with the sight of whitecaps 
rising and sinking beneath him, made him regret that he had invested in a return ticket” 
(130). A few years later, traveling on a Hollywood publicity tour with Jane Wyman, “he 
vowed never to fly again after a snowstorm tossed them about on a descent into Chicago. 
It was his claustrophobic experience in the amphibian to Santa Catalina repeated, but 




for the next twenty-five years” (164). “Edmund Morris,” who learns to fly and works as a 
pilot, deploys the vertical opposition of that depth model as a narrative device when he 
fantasizes, “[w]here, I wonder now, was Ronald Reagan on June 27, 1925? What if (the 
passage of seventy-four years allows a certain measure of daft speculation) I had hijacked 
a dirigible and floated westward while time stood still? What bird’s-eye view might I 
have gotten of Dutch’s little world, under that same June sun?” (49). He imagines a 
flyover and even includes a sketched map of “Ronald Reagan’s World, 1911-1933.” Like 
all maps, this one fantasizes tidiness in the messiness of space. As he passes above his 
subject’s childhood haunts, Morris enacts the biographer’s control over the life described, 
here, a “scrawny figure running along the sidewalk, desperately looking up at me? … 
Even as I stare down, the boy leaps and makes a convulsive contraction of his whole 
body, as though something has socked him in the stomach. Then he lands, straightens, 
and mimes a casual throw. A football fantasy!” (51). Morris’ authority is teased with 
subservience and shirked off in favor of an adolescent’s earthbound attentions. As the 
narrator speculates about his subject’s mind below, he begins to recognize and identify 
both the antagonism between himself and his subject and the agency of the latter: “Or 
perhaps he is a Warlord of Mars, and is about to deploy that planet’s Strategic Defense 
Initiative against my dirigible” (52). As a pilot for a company whose task was to maintain 
navigational ground beacons for mail-carrying flights, he again reflects on Reagan’s life 
below. “A few times we flew over Dixon, its pinprick lights stippling the frozen bend of 
the Rock River. Even the grimmest of cities looks magical at night. I would rather not 




Reagan, who has played a pilot on screen, will of course fly again, submitting to 
the demands of American political life, but his travel at thirty-five thousand feet never 
affords the perspective Morris enjoys. On Air Force One, he asks Morris,  
“Why aren’t you writing?” ... It was his standard joke whenever he saw me 
without a pen in my hand. “I’m contemplating your murky origins, Mr. 
President.” I drew an imaginary arc in the distance, on a course roughly parallel to 
our own. “Somewhere out there in that haze are all the towns you lived in as a 
boy. Monmouth, Galesburg, Tampico. Dixon—” He leaned past me, giving off a 
whiff of Royal Briar cologne, and peered down at the green-gold checkerboard, 
shaking his glossy head. “Darned if I know where we are.” (24)  
“Edmund Morris” the pilot narrates from above this story of his Reagan below, and 
Reagan, unable to read the mundane signs of a miniature landscape, makes clear his need 
for an interpreter. Morris the pilot will have to write his life. The art of reading landscape 
from far above had brought Reagan and Morris together in 1944, as the actor providing 
voice-over narration and as an aviation consultant for a top-secret Army motion picture 
project in which a detailed miniature model of Japan is constructed in order to make a 
training film for bomber pilots. In this case, Reagan’s skill is of course fastened to his 
performed reading of lines—on a studio set, script in hand, he commands the ability to 
interpret space (212-214). As soon as his script is taken away, he will be resigned to 







The Deadbeat President and the Childless Father 
The dialectic of a subject afraid to fly and a professional pilot biographer neatly 
models the tension and resolution native to third-person life-writing. Morris’ treatment of 
fatherhood, by way of his imagined son’s tragedy and by way of his vexed interaction 
with Ronald Reagan, Jr., poses a more perplexing relationship, though. In this coupling, 
the muddiness between biographer and subject offers no clear paradigm of responsibility, 
objectivity, or cooperation and shutters Morris’ ambivalence. If anything, the balance is 
upset, and Morris condemns his reproachable subject.  
Whatever biographer’s affection he has for Reagan shatters most profoundly at 
the end of “Reagan Country,”10 an account of Governor Reagan’s National Guard action 
at the University of California. Gavin, Morris’ invented son, serves as the memoir’s 
gadfly, Reagan’s perennial critic, and his filial correspondence is regularly included as a 
deferred savaging of Dutch’s subject. Having heard a tape of Reagan’s 1958 speech to 
The California Fertilizer Association, which Morris composed, Gavin writes, “Dear 
Dad—Thanks for the tape, I think. 5 mins. about as much as I could stand. Persuasion my 
ass. That’s Big Bully Business talking” (311). He calls his father’s Reagan, “your Yahoo 
classmate, higher education’s worst enemy” (338). His most clear anti-Reagan manifesto:  
Dad, this is urgent. I just can’t spare the time to come over [to England] & see 
you all, not thru the election anyway. Reagan has got to be stopped. Men who 
speak of morality but really mean thought control, who talk in parables that sound 
comforting but actually subtly reinforce prejudice, who allow buzz phrases like 
“our city streets are jungle paths after dark” to transmit a subliminal image of 
                                                 
10 This is Tom Wolfe’s term for “the suburban, homogenous communities” of “positive and trusting” 




African savages, are using rhetoric to spread lies, & only words, hard words in 
black & white, will throw the lies back at them. (340) 
Morris’ discomfort with Gavin’s connections to SDS, the Free Speech Movement, and 
the Black Panthers, as well as with his reading in Frantz Fanon for a Ph.D. on Camus and 
revolution mitigates the critique. And yet Morris’ defensive response to Gavin’s 
interpretation of Reagan collapses when he travels to Berkeley and fails to locate his son 
amid the conflagration. Gavin disappears. 
Gavin cannot have been the only Weatherman to ‘drop out’—awful phrase—as 
the Sixties became history. Hundreds of other old men, I’m sure, nurture 
querulous hopes that one day their graying sons will come back home from 
Sweden or Vancouver. But Gavin won’t. Child of the south, beach boy, desert 
lover, he never took to northern light. Going underground, where there was no 
light at all, meant the same to him as to any ancient Greek. 
And it was you, Dutch, who sent him there. (365) 
It is not surprising that Joan Didion calls Gavin “in many ways the most interesting and 
realized figure in the book” (5). An otherwise inscrutable subject authors all-too-
discernible trouble at Sproul Plaza. The fictional son and his loss personify not only the 
horror of Reagan in Berkeley but the inescapable—sometimes devastating—antagonism 
between biographer and subject. Reagan most certainly does harm to his biographer. 
Morris’ form tempts the reader to forget that some of Dutch never happened, and the 
pathos of his loss sounds the work’s depth. At this point, the pressure of history, the 
documentary need to tell what happened, is swept away amid the loss of a representative 




grounded indictment. The memoirist dedicated to unsettling biographical practice and 
interrogating the foundations of nonfiction cannot abide the sins of its subject. Morris’ 
record of the Berkeley madness overwhelms the text’s reluctance—he creates a character, 
a representative figure, one of the “graying sons” and daughters who will carry the 
meaning of the moment. Here, the fiction conveys the actual. Morris is obliged to 
catalogue his subject’s act, and the life writer ignores the direction to maintain distance 
and resists the urge to withhold judgment of his subject.  
A halting palliative to Morris’ loss—and a correlative indictment of his subject—
occurs at Reagan’s Geneva summit. Morris spends time in the company of Ron Reagan, 
and the two of them—father without son and son without father—observe the president:  
Before the second plenary started at two-thirty-five, I stood in the grand salon 
chatting with Ron Reagan. His tall athleticism reminded me of the young Dutch, 
but his soft handshake and his eyes were Nancy’s. We became so engrossed in 
our conversation that we did not notice that the President had entered through the 
far door. 
“The literary set!” Dutch called out, pointing at us and laughing. His 
entourage smiled primly. 
“Uh-oh,” I murmured to Ron, “I’m in danger of losing my objectivity 
here.” 
“That can happen. He represents good things.” 
“Like what?” 
“Kindness. Honesty. Decency.” 




“He’s my father?” 
“And President of the United States.” 
He shook his head, and held up a finger and thumb, millimeters apart. “I 
love my dad, but our relationship is about this deep.” (563) 
Morris and the younger Reagan spend the next few hours watching the summit from a 
distance, peeking through half-closed doors and listening for dialogue. The scene 
illuminates the impossibility of patrimony in this biography. Reagan’s legacy is the 
abandonment of his own sons and daughters and the end of another’s. Morris’ time with 
Ron, removed from but able to observe his subject, figures the rupture of both families as 
well as the conflicted tie between author and subject. Morris’ Reagan may be born of the 
mutability of shooting scripts, expert at adopting grandly moral roles, yet Dutch clarifies 
the local result of Reagan’s apparent investment in surfaces, and it cannot evade its 
obligations to comprehend its subject’s works. Morris at least momentarily contends that 
the absentee father, committed to depthlessness, makes orphans and childless parents of a 
nation. Consequently, the memoir’s concluding announcement of Morris’ imaginary debt 
to Reagan is unsatisfactory. 
 
Realpolitic 
Morris’ relationship with his subject is, of course, not merely a literary adventure 
in a vacuum. Dutch faces the wide community of readers who bring determined 
preconception, expectation, and ideology to their reading—in this case, much of that 




Morris’ unconventional willingness to write about life writing as he writes about Ronald 
Reagan incites a sort of warfare.  
What is sometimes Morris’ hagiography finds little welcome in the responses of 
self-described “idol worshipping” Reaganphiles who expend quite a lot of energy 
trashing the author and his project. The structural weirdness of the biography may be an 
apt metaphor for the culture warrior Actor-President, but to suggest a mutable and 
tentative record for this legend clearly unsettles his admirers. Mickey Craig’s 
hyperpatriotic review, “Edmund Morris’ Contempt for Ronald Reagan and America” is 
representative: 
The only thing for which Morris has more contempt than Reagan seems to be 
America, or at least that part of America which hasn’t read post-modern 
philosophers such as Sartre, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. Edmund Morris is a 
modern intellectual who can’t believe that anyone could possibly believe what 
Ronald Reagan so genuinely and simply believed: that America is “a shining city 
on the hill” and that he, Reagan, could carefully say what he believed to the 
American people, trusting them as Abraham Lincoln did before him, assuring 
them that America’s future is bright so long as America remains true to her 
principles and her Constitution. Reagan was no mere actor, even though he 
actively sought the consent of the American people to address the problems 
America faced. Morris can only say that the more he studied Reagan, the less he 
understood him. (http://www.ashbrook.org/publicat/onprin/v7n6/craig.html) 
The intensity of vituperation and the romanticism of adoration (couched in the archaic 




narrator’s suspicion that his subject may be an “airhead.” Morris’ sin, in the minds of 
many readers, is manifest in the following confessional moment: “Yet the magic of [the] 
Geneva [summit with Mikhail Gorbachev] had faded. Dutch remained a mystery to me, 
and worse still—dare I entertain such heresy, in the hushed and reverent precincts of his 
office?—an apparent airhead” (579). This observation is of course counterintuitive. Its 
simplicity neglects the complexity that Dutch makes. Even if it is a fair assessment, and it 
may very well be (Morris goes on to describe Reagan’s troubling over-reliance on note 
cards and a frustrated staff), its meaning is undercut by the text’s multivalence. Der Reine 
Tor returns. Morris will remain conscious of Reagan’s “apparent” lack of intellectual 
vigor as his second term progresses.  
His “heresy” ignited a furor indeed. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the 
contemporary American political narrative of reductive halves—abbreviated by the 
unforgivably meaningless red/blue—easily half of Amazon.com’s customer reviews of 
Dutch are indignant. Reader Joshua Steans forgives the biographer for his “largely 
inconsequential use of a fictional first-person narrator,” but Chris Moore rails, “[t]he 
writing style of the author is thoroughly annoying and obscures the substance of the 
Reagan presidency.” The latter is not alone. V. Ryan complains, “I didn’t want an 
autobiography of Edmund Morris, but that’s what I got. And in it, I learned about the 
hoity toity fuddy-duddy old fart who hates the fact that he never got to know Ronald 
Reagan. Perhaps Reagan sensed that this weirdo couldn’t be trusted.” Brendan Cheeves 
apprises us of his tastes: “I love Presidential biographies and can read/listen to them for 
days, but this book is bad! I mean really bad … if you like traditional bio[graphie]s, you 




but as the central character to a pretentious, convoluted student film.” In a fit of rage, 
Chari Krishnan: “…a bad novel, and a major disappointment to all the Reagan idol 
worshippers like me who expected so much after all the advance publicity about 
DUTCH, which should have been subtitled, THE PRESIDENT’S BIOGRAPHY IS 
MISSING!!!” The frustration of these readers gets its most cogent literary-historical 
theorization from Earl Holt, whose response not only catalogues conventional generic 
expectations for readers of biography but also addresses the ways those conventions are 
aggressively violated by Morris. His review is worth including at length. 
The biographer’s task is to compile the facts, utterances, and experiences of a 
lifetime and, after thoughtful sifting and weighing of their importance, to draw 
conclusions and offer insights about that life. By these and many other criteria, 
DUTCH, the only authorized biography of former President Ronald Reagan, is a 
strangely flawed and disappointing book. There is no clear delineation between 
fact and fiction … his use of the fictitious young Edmund Morris character is 
intrusive, and grants the author equal billing with Reagan when recounting their 
early years … this former ad-writer nearly strains himself trying to impress his 
literary peers with his erudition … making even the careless reader only too 
aware of the biographer’s intrusive presence … Morris’ worst failing, however, is 
the fact that his attitude toward his subject is primarily one of contempt, and he 
reveals an even greater contempt for small-town America, whose values and 
culture nurtured and shaped the character of Ronald Reagan. … A plausible 




“elite” or liberal “intelligentsia,” whose validation and awards Morris craves, but 
whose envy and hatred of Reagan are legendary. 
Holt’s criticism provides a foundation for reactions like George R. O’Connor’s less 
patient response, “the thinnest excuse for biography since the average 3rd grade book 
report … fiction is too kind a term.” 
These reviews are noteworthy not for their insight as literary criticism (Holt’s 
analysis is particularly difficult to corroborate with the text), but because they are a 
measure of the role popular nonfiction plays in contemporary political America. Holt 
offers all the familiar criteria: biographers should remain in the background; admiration 
for one’s subject is imperative; literary play only obscures history. These responses 
indicate just how reverent the American reader can be about overtly ideological public 
figures on the pages of literature. It is no great news that postmodernism and the 
unsettling of the subject are not warmly met outside of the university’s reading society, 
but Morris positions his life writing in a particularly dangerous orientation to its 
readership. V. Ryan deploys the jargon when he guesses that Reagan might have thought 
of Morris as a “weirdo,” one of Holt’s “liberal ‘intelligentsia’.”  
Not much about the antagonistic readers’ reactions is surprising. Morris 
understands early on that his method could not possibly satisfy a reader looking for a 
mythic straight story, but his work does not bother to account for its missed opportunity. 
There is reticence over eschewing conventional biography but instead notice that, since 
the disproportionate “asteroids” of his and Reagan’s lives have nearly collided, he “must 
allow these floating fragments of myself…to sparkle in his waning light” (xxx). These 




experimentalism yet neglect his compulsion to ground that bricolage with Reagan’s 
fatherly neglect and his domestic military intervention. Morris’ attempt to articulate his 
and a nation’s debt by way of an invented water rescue is, paradoxically, the problem. 
 
 
Conclusion: Representative Costs 
 As the germ of this chapter was conceived, our national media’s short attention 
spans narrated the California gubernatorial candidacy of Arnold Schwarzenegger, 
wistfully turning another actor into another Reagan by ushering structures of affinity 
between the two. While those efforts miss much about each subject (the now-governor of 
California’s abysmal polling and failure to see his ballot initiatives succeed comes to 
mind), they do reaffirm the performativity of the American politician. Reagan, as Morris 
understands, is something like Josiah Bartlett, the fictional president of the fictional 
television series, The West Wing, whose popularity rivals that of any historical U.S. 
president. Democratic candidate Howard Dean’s website, Dean for America, 
conveniently echoed the television president’s campaign motto, “Bartlett for America.” 
As this chapter was completed, The West Wing leapt into the dubious territory of live 
“reality” television; its Democratic and Republican candidates to succeed Martin Sheen’s 
Bartlett took part in a live debate. The day after, in cross-promotional fluff, MSNBC 
anchors interviewed expert guests, earnestly suggesting that the devices of the fictional 
debate (both characters agree to abandon agreed-upon rules) might someday take place 
“in the real world.” Zogby even polled for preferences between the two candidates after 




or his character, and many are more likely to retain the symbolic economies of Reagan’s 
jellybeans, the elder Bush’s undiplomatic vomit, the Clinton impeachment carnival 
(particularly his televised denial of “sexual relations with that woman”), and, now, the 
younger Bush’s aircraft carrier landing. In a Village Voice review of Showtime’s DC 
9/11: Time of Crisis, J. Hoberman suggests that the sway of the presidential script only 
grows: “DC 9/11 is ... the spectacle of Reagan in reverse: Rather than being a 
professional actor who entered politics, Bush is a politician who has been reconfigured, 
packaged, and sold as a media star—dialogue included.”  As Vidal’s Lincoln reminds us, 
this hardly began with the Nixon-Kennedy debate. And it has hardly been resolved—the 
Reagan state funeral enacted the performance of ritual and the ritual of performance and 
was executed with such dense choreography its status as a national show was 
inescapable. 
Dutch, like Oliver Stone’s Nixon, understands the concert of multiple selves all 
presidents contain. Its imagination of form is symptomatic of the office, a role that not 
subject to much simplification, even when its performers seem to thrive on their own 
simplification of things. Dutch, as a treatise on life writing—built into a treatise on 
Reagan’s life—opens up several means to accommodate those challenges and, doing so, 
becomes an accidental manifesto. Its force is lessened by the overt turn to easy morality 
on the final page. That effort to tidy things up, to resolve his “debt” to his subject, cannot 
adequately situate biography within neat boundaries. His book’s subject and his book’s 





Chapter 3:  “Things that fiction can’t solve must be worked out in life”: 
Maxine Hong Kingston’s Obliged Nonfiction 
 
When I write most deeply, fly the highest, reach the furthest, I write like a 
diarist—that is, my audience is myself. I dare to write anything because I can burn 
my papers at any moment. I do not begin with the thought of an audience peering 
over my shoulder, nor do I find my being understood a common occurrence 
anyway—a miracle when it happens. My fantasy is that this self-indulgence will 
be good enough for the great American novel. 
Maxine Hong Kingston, "Cultural Mis-readings by American Reviewers" 
(1982). 
 
You know, what I wish that people could appreciate, they could see that what I’m 
doing is riding that border between fiction and nonfiction. You know, we have a 
land of fiction and there is a land of nonfiction; there’s a border in the middle. 
Well, what I’m doing is making that border very wide, and I am taking into 
consideration I am writing about real people and these real people have powerful 
imaginations. They have minds that make up fictions constantly, and so if I was 
going to write a true biography or an autobiography I would have to take into 
consideration the stories that people tell. I tell the dreams that they have and then 
when I do that, that border becomes so wide that it contains fiction and nonfiction 
and both going toward truth.  
Laura E. Skandera-Trombley, “A Conversation with Maxine Hong 
Kingston” (1998). 
 
Life—the life that precedes and flows into mine—has been one long war, forever, 
that I have to sort out. I’m still trying to figure out which refugees ran from which 
world war. 
Maxine Hong Kingston, The Fifth Book of Peace (2003). 
 
Maxine Hong Kingston, leading a group of war—and antiwar—veterans in a 
series of writing workshops, confesses a recuperative wish for those who have known 
battle: “Each one of the veterans has had a moment when life blew apart. […] If he or she 
could write the explosion, its every smithereens, and narrate what led to it and came from 
it, the self and the world would become whole. They only need an ethos, a simple set of 
positive ethics as ground and base” (The Fifth Book of Peace 336). This measure of 




insistence that memoir ought to accomplish more than recounting. Her major nonfictions 
The Woman Warrior and China Men write among and against ways of knowing 
experience and history, and both contend that the stakes of the reportorial are high and 
that contributing to the record means recognizing and being mindful of the chance to 
make things better. And yet the business of activist nonfiction never works simply in 
Kingston’s books, which argue against easy representation and rarely if ever abide 
either/or resolutions. Thus, a clearly articulated longing for mechanically restorative 
writing—that veterans of battle might write toward repaired selves—as well as its 
unmistakable faith in wholeness, signals a break with almost all of Kingston’s writing11. 
This therapeutic paradigm articulates a rhetorical move away from her foundational sense 
of contingency and contradiction, as well as from the comfort her works have taken in 
that open-endedness. Until the restorative writing heals, selves remain smithereens, war 
fragments awaiting discrete guidelines for reconstructing themselves with narrative. 
Kingston’s hope that her writer-veterans are re-gathered follows The Fifth Book of 
Peace’s founding “set of positive ethics”: the author, long engaged in her own traditions 
of rebellious life writing, finds herself compelled, even chosen to become a writing 
teacher for veterans and to construct a book against war.  
The Fifth Book of Peace sustains Kingston’s characteristically experimental 
nonfiction. Its five parts are generically divergent; it engages in deconstructive critique; 
                                                 
11 Kingston’s catalogue of published works includes a number of candidates that inform this discussion, but 
my emphasis will be on China Men and The Fifth Book of Peace for reasons made clear below. The Woman 
Warrior, To Be the Poet (a meditation on becoming a poet and finishing the practice of writing 
“longbooks”), Tripmaster Monkey: His Fake Book (a novel, and probably Kingston’s most conventional 
work, though it echoes and is echoed by scenes in her nonfictions), and Hawai’i One Summer (a collection 
of short essays, most published as columns in The New York Times, and many of which relate experiences 
that will reappear in The Fifth Book of Peace) all reflect the author’s innovations and her attention to the 
subtle crossings between fiction and nonfiction. A longer study would take into account Kingston’s 




its fictions and nonfictions are not entirely distinct; it invests in simulacra and 
performativity. However, a discernible turn from the epistemology of her early nonfiction 
raises questions. The Fifth Book of Peace betrays a sort of panic much less apparent in 
either The Woman Warrior or China Men. After postmodernism—perhaps at least the 
postmodernism signaled by what Jameson identifies as the waning of affect—The Fifth 
Book of Peace signals both the possibilities and limitations of an activist nonfiction in the 
midst of war.  Simply, Kingston’s book of peace attests to the proscriptions of praxis in 
life writing. Kingston’s other history, China Men, figures an auto/biographical success 
unavailable to The Fifth Book of Peace. China Men operates knowingly under Kingston’s 
resistance to the straight story, while the latter adopts—and is bound by—the faiths of 
what Kingston identifies as a morally obligated rhetoric. China Men’s justice cooperates 
with its multiplicity—there is, in fact, an ethics co-constitutive with its form—while the 
threat of war and the devastation of fire appear to preclude that epistemological openness 
in the latter work. The Fifth Book of Peace’s objective abandons the rigorous theorization 
that makes the more sophisticated China Men its own politically effective work.  
Kingston’s instructive nonfictions fashion a contingent and fragmented order. The 
Woman Warrior, China Men, and The Fifth Book of Peace interrogate the disciplining 
work of nonfiction in general and life writing in particular. Against tendencies to clarify 
and simplify with memoir and biography, they suggest varying means of representing 
lives. Each warns against the straight story and suggests that readers should deploy 
skepticism when encountering claims to authoritative best versions. In her review of 
China Men, Linda Kauffman aligns Kingston with an unlikely, but apt predecessor: “Like 




reconstructing the past with factual accuracy; instead she portrays the movement of the 
heart and the mind from memory to imagination” (223). Looking back through the 
contradictions of memory and family anecdote, she dismisses what we might fairly call 
conventional biographical authority. She instead asserts her case for multivalent 
nonfiction best conveyed by a super-generic work without the weight of the either/or. 
This study identifies her works China Men and The Fifth Book of Peace for analysis 
because, more than Kingston’s other texts, they operate as group memoir, even if 
reluctant representatives of any distinct genre. Both follow and convey the experiences of 
their subjects, arguing for an historical place on behalf of a family’s men, war veterans, 
and the author herself. 
Laura E. Skandera-Trombley, in her valuable collection, Critical Essays on 
Maxine Hong Kingston, catalogues Kingston’s generic mix: “contemporized myth, 
autobiography, memoir, history, fiction, magic realism, fact, and biography” (1). Her 
Kingston “continually conflates, deconstructs, and problematizes standard conceptions of 
genre categories” (5). The effect of that play, according to Debra Shostak, is to 
“complicate our understanding of what constitutes memory, how memory can document 
the past, and how the past itself is plural” (51). Kingston’s generic experimentations, that 
is, interrogate meaning making, as well as the subjective locus of experience. Her critical 
status as an antifoundational life writer and historian is evident in discussions of 
postmodern American life writing. Kingston’s work has stimulated a significant body of 
criticism, including substantial attention to its feminisms, its place in the catalogue of 
U.S. immigrant literature, its resistance to literary convention, and its distrust of 




literature department syllabi than any other text, securing Kingston a not inconsiderable 
place in the canons university-educated readers read (Skandera-Trombley 2). Her 
nonfictions have earned the attention of the most prominent (and varied) contemporary 
students of life writing: Sidonie Smith, James Olney, Julia Watson, Paul John Eakin, and 
G. Thomas Couser have each responded to her texts. In fact, most extended analyses of 
women’s life writing, of life writing and fiction, of “ethnic” life writing pay attention to 
Kingston. This is symptomatic not of her representativeness as an ideal spokes-memoirist 
but of her generic inventiveness and idiosyncrasy. In the wake of Frank Chin’s insistence 
that Kingston’s autobiographical approach commits an assimilationist sin and breaks with 
Chinese lore, some critics have struggled with whether or not Kingston’s work is 
“authentic,” though questions of authenticity seem at odds with Kingston’s works, given 
their overt dismissal of the singular, proper, and corrective story. These texts rarely, if 
ever, concede to an epistemological togetherness that overrides and explains difference, 
contradictory memory, and national identity. Instead of laying a corrective master 
narrative, she contends that a series of tentative narratives posits a truer approach to 
engaged nonfiction, and this is an argument of the largest order. Her works are in every 
sense pedagogic guides to life writing. 
In one of Kingston’s many forthright interviews, she laments, “[f]rom the very 
beginning, of course, [critics] wanted to figure out how to categorize [my work]. And so 
there were lots of reviews and papers just figuring out what genre it was, and that kept 
them from looking inside the book for a long time […] Yeah, and no review looked at 
anything else but genre” (Skandera-Trombley 34). In the same interview, Kingston 




change criticism and not critics trying to cut my work up in order to fit their critical 
theories” (33). The author of The Woman Warrior and China Men, two works of 
nonfiction that resist the stodginess of classification, is never reticent about her books’ 
hope for outsider status. Kingston may very well aspire to be life writing’s bad girl12. 
This notion that any text can supersede informed critical discussion bespeaks Kingston’s 
trouble with orthodoxy. Her wish to transcend “critical theories” seems not to 
acknowledge much of the poststructuralist critique of genre, which, after Barthes and 
Derrida anyway, embraces precisely the sort of text Kingston would produce. Many of 
the critics noted above submit readings very much consistent with her stated hopes. 
Kingston’s dismissal of criticism perhaps neglects the efforts of critics to identify her as 
an outsider, yet it is in keeping with a general dismissal of literary institutions. My point 
here is not that Kingston actually transcends the work of literary criticism, but that her 
work argues for an approach to reading and writing consistent with a critical theory that 
is also suspicious of generic conventions. 
 
Paper Sons amid the Daughter’s Paper Authority 
China Men refuses the collection of personal histories into boundaried narratives. 
Its stories constitute what might be thought of as a paradoxical attempt at uncollected 
history; they convey varying understandings of the past, but decline to operate as the 
parts of a whole. China Men is Kingston’s approach to public history by way of private 
                                                 
12 Discussions of Kingston’s extra-textual persona are, strictly speaking, beyond the reach of this 
discussion. In fact, efforts to “understand” a prior author’s motivations and characteristics seems entirely 
inconsistent with Kingston’s nonfiction, except perhaps to assert that her life writing suggests this 
memoirist/historian’s resistance to straightforward representations of self. And yet the tone of her 
interviews, particularly the example cited here, certainly contributes to a sense of the outsider author with 




story. It collects the lives of her great-grandfather, who travels from China to Hawai’i and 
labors on a sugarcane plantation; her grandfather, who blasts tunnels and lays tracks for 
the transcontinental railroad before disappearing in the 1906 San Francisco earthquake 
and fire; her father, who immigrates from China to California to manage a gambling 
house and own a laundry; and her brother, a high school teacher who enlists in the Navy 
during the Vietnam war. Kingston submits her family history in a generic soup of ersatz 
Chinese myths, recollected fragments, legal history, and immigrant legend. Bound 
together tenuously, the parts register against a whole story, yet they lead from the 
experiential residue of one family to the representative work of that family’s men as 
several of an undocumented class of Americans. 
Kingston has said that the work’s aim is to claim America for the Chinese 
immigrant men who contributed to its development. China Men asserts a disruptive role 
for itself among a larger class of U.S. histories; the book’s title figures the relationship 
between Kingston’s family memories and a nation’s. The racist slur “Chinaman” operates 
sous rature, as a palimpsest underneath “China Men,” which names distinct and discrete 
subjects from China and, in complicated ways, of China. As ever, Kingston’s language 
does not accommodate the either/or: her subjects both illuminate and lament U.S. racism, 
and they get beyond efforts to contain them semiotically. Representing a group uneasily, 
she resists assertions about the homogeny and representability of ethnic groups, and she 
disrupts sustained oral traditions in which core narratives are repeated with minor 
variation. Donald C. Goellnicht has demonstrated that Kingston hardly makes 




...[Linda Ching] Sledge and [Alfred S.] Wang have fallen victim, I believe, to 
thinking in binary oppositions: if Hong Kingston lambasts—as she does—the 
white racists for their behavior and attitudes, then, in her sympathy for the hero-
victims, she must be supportive of the traditional family structures that have come 
under fire. This kind of thinking is anathema to Hong Kingston's feminist 
argument, which critiques all systems that establish social relationships as 
hierarchies of power and which is perfectly capable of a both/and approach 
instead of an either/or one. (194)  
Claiming America means for Kingston an article of ambivalence, not hagiography. 
Rachel Lee adds that “[w]hile rectifying a warped historical record and underscoring 
Chinese Americans’ legitimate place in U.S. labor history, Kingston complicates her own 
endeavor by adopting a contradictory attitude toward male heroism as defined through 
violent, civilizing acts” (150). The narrating daughter affects an uneasy reckoning 
between her father’s experiences and her stories about those experiences. China Men 
writes against the histories that left these men out or made them cartoons. In doing so, it 
posits a paradox very likely more consistent with experience than either the cartoon or the 
heroic version. Goellnicht illustrates Kingston’s ambivalence about her father, BaBa:  
the symbolic order of Confucian patriarchy inscribes for women these positions of 
inferiority, degradation, nonbeing, and BaBa’s self-hatred stems from seeing his 
position in racist America mirrored in the subjection of women in traditional 
Chinese culture. To be fair, Hong Kingston does not always present the father as 
morose and abusive in America. In a temporal reversal that may constitute a 




presents earlier, more attractive memories of the father in the second half of the 
text. (202)  
No Kingston characters, possibly not even the overtly fictional ones, and certainly not the 
living ones, are refined to an either/or. All are subject to the multivalent text in which 
they operate. An eminently sophisticated response to a whitewashed history of the U.S., 
the book suggests several narrative approaches to the available histories of China Men in 
California, Hawai’i, and Alaska in the 19th and 20th centuries. 
“The Father from China,” the book’s first extended biographical section, 
introduces dialogism to Kingston’s project by way of its occasional address to her father: 
“Father, I have seen you lighthearted” (11). As both apostrophe and history, the text 
intimates a voice for BaBa while it introduces accounts of his experiences as a young 
man in China, as an immigrant traveler, and as a patriarch-businessman in Stockton. The 
narrating daughter invites her father to contribute to the telling, but the gesture can only 
be that—only the daughter authors, here. The chapter’s address to “you” concretizes the 
father rhetorically; it figures a dialogue between two subjects, but it cannot actually enact 
that conversation. We will learn much later in The Fifth Book of Peace that BaBa writes 
back to her in the margins of The Woman Warrior, that his lost poetry returns, and a 
dialogue between father and daughter is possible (256). Her address and the challenge to 
“speak up with the real stories if I’ve got you wrong” operates dually as the daughter’s 
authority to tell without her father’s sanction and as an unsettling of the text as the truest 
version of things. A confident narrator proceeds with her records of history, embracing 
their constructedness and assured by having offered BaBa his right to correct things if 




Kingston attempts to give her father is polyphonous fabulation as a powerful form of 
shared rebuttal to the monological voice of dominant white history, which has attempted 
to erase Asian American experience” (206). While gesturing an invitation to participate 
in the “polyphonous fabulation” sustains the book’s work against the monological, 
welcoming “the real stories” names the book’s seriousness—it takes on more than 
recreational memoir and argues for a fuller revision of U.S. history. Kingston knows 
better than to write a univocal story of her father and situate that among the conventional 
authorities of historical discourse, yet her work draws on and reifies weighted experience. 
As purposeful argument, China Men contends on behalf of its subjects, men known 
privately, that versions of their lives ought to have been heard and that even if those men 
did not engage in lasting autobiographical production of their own, this daughter is well 
suited to writing for their lives.  
China Men tentatively maps a site on the border of known history, distanced 
experience, and withheld memory. Its narrator tells as much as she is able, and she admits 
other ways of telling and knowing what precedes and what does not precede her book. 
The book’s origins are silences and the apocryphal: a father who will not speak and 
fragments of legends about uncles, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers. In the tradition 
of public testimony for quiet and quieted subjects, Kingston’s history of Chinese men in 
the U.S. writes amidst and from the trouble of knowing what was withheld and what was 
never certain. She explains in an interview, “I wrote the characters so that the women 
have memories and the men don’t have memories. They don’t remember anything. The 
character of my father, for example, has no memory. He has no stories of the past … He 




from the past” (qtd. in Goellnicht 202). This poverty of stories necessitates supplement, 
imagination, and, finally, the narrator’s invitation to the father to amend. The book 
produces from fragment and aphoria. Goellnicht argues, “the father has no voice; 
therefore, it must be a pure gift, an act of restoring something he lacks” (205).  
“On Fathers,” the book’s second section, and its first autobiographical moment, 
announces BaBa’s indeterminate identity. “Waiting at the gate for our father to come 
home from work, my brothers and sisters and I saw a man come hastening around the 
corner. Father! ‘BaBa!’” (6). The arriving man is not BaBa, but the narrator’s mother 
authorizes the confusion: “No, that wasn’t your father. He did look like BaBa, though, 
didn’t he?” (7). Having introduced her China Men with “On Discovery,” the mythic story 
of Tang Ao, lost in the unmapped Women’s Land and transformed from man to woman, 
Kingston offers no confidence that life writing’s subjects are easily gotten at. “On 
Fathers” articulates much that is representative of Kingston’s work. It privileges memory; 
it stylizes a foundationally gendering narrative of a father’s daily return to wife and 
children; it establishes immediate family as a site at which meaning is made. Forever 
ambivalent, though, Kingston’s memoir interrogates what it perpetuates: the scene bears 
as much uncertainty as it does authority, and unknowingness is satisfactory. The man’s 
identity, and by extension that of the real father, are secondary to the drama of the 
homecoming, whose meaning is founded in return and paternal promise—the children 
ask their stand-in father what treats he has brought home from work. The older Kingston 
is hardly unkind to her mistaken child self and siblings and mother, all of whom 
participate in the incorrect greeting. Instead, she allows them the authority of introducing 




strong work of childhood memory. Simply, there is nothing wrong with the moment; not 
even the stranger seems particularly bothered by what could easily be read as a 
devastatingly undetermined family. 
BaBa’s proximity as a father hardly makes him well known. The introductory 
apostrophe of “The Father from China,” “Father, I have seen you lighthearted,” 
establishes the experiential authority of the narrator, but the past tense places this 
characterization at a remove (11). The nostalgic longing of her announcement identifies 
BaBa after lightheartedness, a mood consigned to memory. What follows the narrator’s 
invocation is an idyllic childhood scene, in which father and children lasso a series of pet 
dragonflies. This is only a momentary father, though. “But usually you did not play. You 
were angry. You scared us. Every day we listened to you swear, “Dog vomit. Your 
mother’s cunt. Your mother’s smelly cunt.” You slammed the iron on the shirt…” (12). 
Furious, the father is inarticulate: “You screamed wordless male screams that jolted the 
house upright and staring in the middle of the night” (13). That absence of decipherable 
language—his series of obscenities and “wordless” noise—proves not to be the authoring 
daughter’s worst version of BaBa, though. She says, “[w]orse than the swearing and the 
nightly screams were your silences when you punished us by not talking. You rendered 
us invisible, gone” (14). Looking for the stories of her father’s life, she indicts his quiet: 
“You say with the few words and the silences: No stories. No past. No China” (14). 
BaBa’s reticence to narrate will not preclude Kingston’s dedication to claiming America 
with his few stories.  Silence of course becomes one of those stories. 
The daughter-narrator invents pasts for BaBa, confessing, “I tell everyone he 




true version of his immigration story is, at least initially, secondary to her imagined 
narrative. Immigration, one of the book’s—and her subjects’—most contested episodes, 
is for Kingston a liminal state in which identity is both under critique and capable of 
transformation. Immigration officials are “Immigration Demons” and Chinese men and 
women rehearse fictional stories to perform, in order to pass inscrutable immigration 
standards and gain entry to the U.S. She resumes her ongoing conversation with BaBa—
“I think this is the journey you don’t tell me” —with a second immigration story, and 
narrates a stowaway journey to the U.S, in which the father crosses oceans in a small 
shipping crate and under the care of a smuggler. At sea and bound by his confines, he 
imagines uninterpretable stories about his crossing as it takes place: “He heard a new 
language, which might have been English, the water’s many tongues speaking and 
speaking. Though he could not make out words, the whispers sounded personal, intimate, 
talking him over, sometimes disapproving, sometimes in praise of his bravery” (51). 
After his ordeal, BaBa, immediately American, orders a self: “The father walked off the 
ship and onto the Gold Mountain. He disciplined his legs to step confidently, as if they 
belonged where they walked” (53). Having implied, by virtue of its superseding narrative 
place, that the second, corrected version must be authoritative, she again breaks off, 
leaving her story of the father and confiding, “[o]f course, my father could not have come 
that way. He came a legal way, something like this…” (53). The following version’s 
authority as the concluding word of her father’s immigration story bears the weight of 
final correction, yet it only furthers ambiguity, because it includes one of Kingston’s 
foundational scenes, the act of constructing and performing a narrative that coalesces a 




The men spent the long days rehearsing what they would say to the Immigration 
Demon. The forgetful men fingered their risky notes. Those who came back after 
being examined told what questions they had been asked. “I had to describe all 
the streets in my village.” “They’ll ask, ‘Do you have any money?’ and ‘Do you 
have a job?’” […] “What’s the right answer?” asked the legal fathers. “Well, last 
week they liked ‘No job’ because it proves you were an aristocrat. And they liked 
‘No money’ because you showed a willingness to work. But this week, they like 
‘Yes job’ and ‘Yes money’ because you wouldn’t be taking jobs away from white 
workers.” The men groaned, “Some help.” (55) 
On the borders, at Angel Island, BaBa and his cellmates practice the autobiographical 
business of making selves from writing and investing in that performance. David Wyatt 
details the threat against which these autobiographical acts are crafted: 
Immigrants arriving at Ellis Island were asked, typically, twenty-nine questions; 
at Angel Island those seeking entry could be asked from two hundred to one 
thousand. The answers they gave had to be corroborated by witnesses. The 
Chinese kitchen staff on the island surreptitiously helped families keep their 
stories straight by ferrying messages to and from the city. By the 1920s the 
average period of detention lasted two to three weeks, although in some cases it 
could stretch into months or even years. (116) 
Creating an efficacious version of oneself, deploying autobiographical practice to 
material ends as one holds to varying stories, is the common practice of both Kingston’s 
father as an American and Kingston as an American life writer. The artifact at that 




life, fashioned to satisfy arbitrary immigration measures, which appears regularly in 
Kingston’s works. Her novel, Tripmaster Monkey, even introduces a model immigration 
village, crafted to represent a coherent fictional history. The exigencies of authoring a 
version of oneself from imagination prefigures Kingston’s experiments with life writing, 
in which life stories evade the authority that would contain them with consistency. The 
significance, here, comes not from the ability to perform for an audience of officials with 
arbitrary and racist criteria; the authority of immigration officials to sanction a version of 
a life is secondary to the constructive work of the autobiographical act. A China Man able 
to author an effective story wins a small victory. This by no means indicates that men in 
this community put racist immigration codes behind them or that they author a 
naturalizing version of self capable of settling subjective ambiguity, but that they are at 
times able to trick the Immigration Demons by their own life writing, undercutting the 
xenophobia that keeps them bound to Angel Island. China Men participates in that 
testimony as it echoes it. Kingston guesses at explanations as she asserts his mastery of 
immigration: “He had passed the American examination; he had won America. He was 
not sure on what basis they let him in—his diploma, his American lineage (which may 
have turned out to be good after all), his ability to withstand jailing, his honesty, or the 
skill of his deceits” (60). This uncertainty is consistent with the variable migration 
narratives that precede it, yet the success of his narration overrides searches for a 
determinate cause. Kingston enfolds that uncertainty in her claim that “he had won 
America.” 




In 1903 my father was born in San Francisco, where my grandmother had come 
disguised as a man. Or, Chinese women once magical, she gave birth at a 
distance, she in China, my grandfather and father in San Francisco. She was good 
at sending. Or the men of those days had the power to have babies. If my 
grandparents did no such wonders, my father nevertheless turned up in San 
Francisco an American citizen. (237) 
“Or” may well be Kingston’s foundational word, and “some say” her richest phrase. This 
passage’s multiple explanations address the means by which BaBa appears in San 
Francisco in 1903, and not whether or not he was, in fact, there; as important, it unsettles 
origins and undercuts the authority of openings. Kingston’s speculative introduction to 
BaBa’s origins is doubly suggestive: not only do its repeated substitutive explanations 
work against a stabilizing narrative; they also interrogate place (the ubiquitous 
grandmother who magically “sends”) and gender (fathers who give birth) (a 
grandmother’s cross-dressing disguise). The resignation of the last sentence’s conditional 
phrase does not override the playfulness of the preceding stories. “Nevertheless,” sounds 
an ironic turn for the passage. Kingston’s multiple speculations seem to have less to do 
with the possibility of magic and the physiology of birth than with the knowing 
insufficiency of “turned up in San Francisco an American citizen.”  
Having tentatively offered the father’s experience in China as a miserable school 
teacher—his students are frighteningly uncooperative and even violent, “[t]here came to 
be small difference between his day life and the nightmares” (39)—and his first years on 
Gold Mountain (the Chinese immigrant name for California), Kingston moves backward 




lives, neither of whom the narrator meets in the text. The story of Ah Goong, “The 
Grandfather of the Sierra Nevada Mountains,” figures the experiences of Chinese 
American men in the western U.S. during the mid- and late-19th century. The grandfather 
dynamites tunnels and lays tracks for the transcontinental railroad. He labors among the 
Chinese American immigrants who alternately construct the railroad and suffer “Driving 
Outs” during which entire immigrant communities are forcibly removed.  While the 
cartooned China Man persisted as a racist stereotype in the popular imagination13, the 
Grandfather of the Sierra Nevada’s life story in the American west had been left in 
silence. 
The narrator’s introduction to her grandfather situates him in a shared family story 
that cuts against the railroad’s conventional semiotics: “Once in a while an adult said, 
‘Your grandfather built the railroad.’ (Or ‘Your grandfathers built the railroad.’ Plural 
and singular are by context.)” (126). The narrator reads the work of constructing the 
railroad as a meaningful effort to communicate: “Grandfather left a railroad for his 
message: We had to go somewhere difficult. Ride a train. Go somewhere important. In 
case of danger, the train was to be ready for us” (126). The intercontinental railroad, very 
much the capital of an American mythos to which white U.S. identity, as well as the 
notion of American progress, is bound, takes the form of Maxine Hong Kingston’s 
grandfather’s local message to his descendants, a voiced material artifact. No longer the 
signal for Manifest Destiny, it offers refuge for grandchildren, who “believed that it was 
that very railroad, those trains, those tracks running past our house; our own giant 
grandfather had set those very logs into the ground, poured the iron for those very spikes 
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with the big heads and pounded them until the heads spread like that, mere nails to him. 
He had built the railroad so that trains would thunder over us, on a street that inclined 
toward us” (126). This fantastic revision outgrows a child’s misunderstanding, and 
contributes to Kingston’s claiming on behalf of her China Men as well as to history’s 
susceptibility to critique; family legend reads against and across a national narrative. 
The intersection of the public (i.e., the railroad’s historical weight) and the private 
(i.e., the family message) arrests and collects the mythic with the remembered. Kingston 
perhaps risks sentimentality here, but her recasting of the railroad asserts her 
grandfather’s claim to it. LeiLani Nishime notes the tendency of Kingston’s men to 
supersede a single subject position and the resultant dispersal of private memoir across 
public understanding:  
China Men at first appears to be a private family history populated by the 
narrator's grandfathers, but soon it becomes clear that she has more than is 
biologically possible. While the “Grandfathers” are individual people with their 
own personalities and personal histories, they also are a type or a generic 
forefather whose story is representative of many Chinese-American immigrants. 
(2) 
That slippage between family history and shared history maps the scope of the work at 
hand. Kingston begins with the reportorial and applies her grandfather to China Man 
Grandfathers in general. She takes a public myth, makes it private, and then opens it to a 
reading community. We might recall that the grandfather of the railroad, who as a young 
man masturbates as he hangs over cliffs to dynamite tunnels, declaring “I am fucking the 




(bayoneted in the head by Japanese soldiers) exposes himself at the family dinner table 
(10-11), also resists boundaries between public and private acts. In order to claim 
America, this life writing participates in that traversal between specific and general, 
personal and public. Ah Goong’s sexual and bodily exposure operates alongside the 
narrator’s exposure and similarly dismantles staid propriety. 
The ethical work of China Men as a testimonial document is articulated most 
clearly by Kingston’s reintroduction of the Chinese American authors of the 
transcontinental railroad nearly a century and a half after history literally removed them 
from the picture: 
“Only Americans could have done it,” they said, which is true. Even if Ah Goong 
had not spent half his gold on Citizenship Papers, he was an American for having 
built the railroad. A white demon in top hat tap-tapped on the gold spike, and 
pulled it back out. Then one China Man held the real spike, the steel one, and 
another hammered it in. While the demons posed for photographs, the China Men 
dispersed. It was dangerous to stay. The Driving Out had begun. Ah Goong does 
not appear in the railroad photographs. (145)  
Kingston puts her grandfather back into the record. Clearly, the prominence of the golden 
spike photograph in U.S. iconography makes it particularly vulnerable to critique14.  
Merely noting the absence of Chinese Americans in the photograph would limit Kingston 
                                                 
14 General Electric, in its problematic “Ecomagination” series of television ads, has recreated the scene to 
introduce its “Evolution” locomotive. The commercial, which approximates the period’s film stock and 
dramatizes the photograph, relies on exclusively white actors. Of course, it is worth noting that in the same 
series, another ad, “Model Miners,” is a tableau of sweaty supermodel coal miners, posing in a mine with 
axes and shovels. The ad’s soundtrack is the vastly inappropriate “Sixteen Tons,” whose narrator “owe[s] 
[his] soul to the company store.” While an extended discussion would be peripheral to this study, one might 
fairly ask about the distinction between Kingston’s multiple representations of history and General 
Electric’s. The latter, it seems safe to contend, is an effort to simplify the material conditions of coal mining 
with beauty—an energy industry wish fulfillment, certainly—while the former works to illuminate the 




to an either/or, present/absent response to the record (there were people at the scene who 
are not in the photograph). Instead, she notes the fiction of the photographic document 
and supplants it with family memory and local anecdote to surround the narrative that 
absented China Men in the first place; she interrogates the very business of keeping 
records. That is, Ah Goong’s granddaughter talks back to the photograph that left him 
out. Ah Goong is not a narrative analogue to the photograph, but instead a typically 
indeterminate Kingston subject, not sufficiently bounded by any one history. 
Ah Goong’s identity percolates through the concluding notes of “The Grandfather 
of the Sierra Nevada Mountains”: “Some say he died falling into the cracking earth” of 
the great earthquake (150). In the resultant fire, “[t]he Hall of Records burned 
completely…Any paper a China Man could not produce had been ‘burned up in the Fire 
of 1906.’ Every China Man was reborn out of that fire a citizen” (150). The otherwise 
destructive fire actually produces subjects able to author an identity without authorizing 
immigration documents. After the burning of records, Ah Goong’s life is occluded. 
Perhaps he had died in the fire, but “[s]ome say the family went into debt to send for Ah 
Goong, who was not making money…” (150). This vague family legend is immediately 
undermined by Kingston’s cherished “maybe,” here suggestively implying the sort of 
transcendence available to China Men freed not only from immigration-scroll versions of 
themselves but from the very category of citizen. The narrator wonders, “[m]aybe he 
hadn’t died in San Francisco, it was just his papers that burned; it was just that his 
existence was outlawed by Chinese Exclusion Acts” (151).  Finally, Kingston closes her 
catalogue of fragments: “[h]e had also been seen carrying a child out of the fire, a child of 




not have an American child out of longing?” (151). This question, the closing line of Ah 
Goong’s chapter, makes an American place for Kingston’s family. The existence of the 
apocryphal American child finally matters less than the right claimed by the American 
granddaughter. Kingston’s grandfather at once exceeds the closures of subjecthood and 
articulates at least five trajectories of a self: death by earthquake, death by fire, poverty, 
paper-son indeterminacy, marriage, and fatherhood. The private and partial stories of 
each, connected by “some say” and “maybe,” are collected in Kingston’s efforts toward 
unfinishable and tentative life writing. 
Traveling west, “to compare China, a country I made up, with what country is 
really out there,” Kingston has “gone east, that is, west, as far as Hawai’i, where I have 
stood alongside the highway at the edge of the sugarcane and listened for the voices of 
the great grandfathers” (87-88). Hawai’i is a liminal space, an interstitial stopping-off 
between China and America, contested, registered inadequately by U.S. paradisiacal 
fantasy15. Kingston’s great-grandfather, Bak Goong, learns the progress of geography 
from an agent of the Royal Hawaiian Agricultural Society: as a contract laborer, “[y]ou 
get free passage as far as the Sandalwood Mountains, where you can stay as long as you 
want, and you invest a little of your profits in passage to California. You’ll get there 
before the Gold Rush is over. Why, in Hawai’i, you’re already halfway there” (92). 
China Men’s Hawai’i is a sugarcane plantation labor camp where her Great Grandfather 
of the Sandalwood Mountains cannot commit the autobiographical act of speaking: “The 
men who had come earlier also said that the plantation had a rule that they not talk at 
                                                 
15 In the preface to her collection of reprinted essays, Hawai’i One Summer, Kingston observes that during 
her family’s seventeen years on the islands, “Hawai’i was a good place for writing about California and 
China, and not for writing about Hawai’i” (xii) and that “In 1980, I was recognized as a living treasure of 
Hawai’i” (xiii). I will return to Kingston’s Hawai’i below, but any discussion of “The Great-Grandfather of 




work, but this rule was so absurd, he thought he must have misheard tones” (99-100). 
This is among the clearest cases of silencing in Kingston’s histories, rivaled perhaps only 
by The Woman Warrior’s No Name Woman. Unlike BaBa, Bak Goong wants to talk 
story. “He suddenly had all kinds of things to say. He wanted to tell the men who worked 
beside him about the rewards to look forward to, for example, chewing cane for 
breakfast… And one day—he could not help it—he sang about the black mountains 
reddening and how mighty was the sun that shone on him in this enchanted forest and on 
his family in China” (100). He is punished for violating the enforced silence, but finds 
ways to speak, including coughing in Cantonese “‘Take—that—white—demon. Take—
that. Fall—to—the—ground—demon. Cut—you—into—pieces…’ His sentences 
shortened, angry pellets that shot out of him” (114). There is activism in his language 
play. Collapsing words into coughs shares with Kingston the work of making language 
cut against those who ostensibly order (and prohibit) it. Muting translates to sickness: 
“Uncles and Brothers. I have diagnosed our illness. It is a congestion from not talking. 
What we have to do is talk and talk” (155). Bak Goong’s remedy is mythic. He tells the 
story of a king who hides the secret of his son’s cat ears by shouting it into a hole and 
burying his words. When grass returns, the secret is announced. The men of the sugar 
plantation adopt the folktale’s paradigm and dig a hole into which they talk to their 
families. “They had dug an ear into the world, and were telling the earth their secrets” 
(117). The hole becomes a receptacle not only for communication to distant family but 
for all talk, now hidden from white masters.  
Shouting into the earth preserves stories for listening heirs, yet it can only secure 




takes an interlocutory function, retrieving and communicating them to another audience. 
Yet finding and reporting the great grandfather’s messages is difficult and must abide 
uncertainty. Listening to the Hawaiian ground, she admits, “the cane is merely green in 
the sunlight; the tassels waving in the wind make no blurry fuzzy outlines that I can 
construe as a message” (88). But later, “I have heard the land sing. I have seen the bright 
blue streaks of spirits walking through the air. I again search for my American ancestors 
by listening in the cane” (90). “Great Grandfather of the Sandalwood Mountains” 
suggests the agency of life writing as a remedy for institutional silencing. Kingston’s 
mediating work collects Bak Goong’s experiences among others’ as she harvests 
deposited stories, almost literally, though to read the planting and harvesting as a single 
process of storage and retrieval would neglect the uncertainty and tentativeness that 
inheres in Kingston’s work. Shouted into the ground, messages mutate. They 
communicate across temporal and spatial distance after seasons of growth, and they bear 
the residue of the folkloric—after all, a supernatural story about a prince with cat ears 
founds the trope of gathering secret words from the ground.  
“The Great Grandfather of the Sandalwood Mountains” testifies on behalf of 
muted historical subjects, but perhaps the most indicting of Kingston’s China Men stories 
are her Alaskan “China Joes,” whose interchangeable archetypal narrative signifies the 
emptying mutability of Chinese men in American history. Legendary China Joe’s ability 
to provide food to white workers in bad winters purchases his exemption from the annual 
Driving Outs, during which Chinese workers are set adrift from Juneau into the Gulf of 
Alaska. This character is a type, a loyal subaltern persona whose local performer may 




baker who “had saved the miners in the Cassiar District from starvation in bad winters by 
giving bread away” (161), and the second, “who owned a laundry and a big garden. He 
had provided vegetables during the bad winters” (162). The short chapter ends, “As 
French Pete was probably the name of more than one man, as were Dutch John and 
Missouri Frank and Arkansas Jim and French Charley, Dago Joe and Indian Joe—one of 
the Citizenship Judges himself was named French Pete—perhaps any China Man was 
China Joe” (162). This ironic note—two discrete China Joes have been identified—
overdetermines China Joe and affords Kingston sustenance of the figure as she undercuts 
its patronizing work. The bottomed-out subjectivity of China Joe conveys an absence in 
U.S. history and operates as a flat scapegoat, whose ability to evade exile only sets 
Driving Outs in clearer relief. Kingston’s account demystifies China Joe and, against a 
sentimental reading of the typified character, indicts the two-dimensional portraiture by 
which Chinese American men came out of the 19th century American west. 
“Alaska China Men” suggests the possibility that stories ostensibly of the 
individual are capable of leaving that individual behind; it also reminds us that the import 
of Kingston’s life writing has something fundamental to do with its how it treats lived 
experience in material conditions. As she plays with means of representing lives, she 
illuminates what is at stake in doing so. This is a signature characteristic of Kingston’s 
life writing: stories vary and suggest skepticism, but the conditions that foster them and 
the memories that convey them matter. “China Joe” stories simultaneously overlook the 
conditions of the China Men driven out and sustain a version of race in 19th-century 
Alaska. China Men and The Woman Warrior do not abandon the notion that actual lives 




that one story works best. In other words, Kingston’s life writing imagines that she can 
leave behind the conventions of historical narrative (i.e., a single, thorough version of 
events can be conveyed by measuring evidence and marshalling details in support of that 
version) while sustaining the business of political representation. If she cannot, then her 
books will have let down their subjects and their histories. If she is able, she will have 
crafted subjects while remaining obliged to the meaningfulness of their experiences. 
China Men articulates life stories that have always been extant and accomplishes identity 
work on behalf of those selves. “Making Americans”—doubly accomplished by self-
authoring predecessors and by Kingston’s writing—and claiming America are 
inextricable tasks for China Men. In both cases, more than an historical record is 
conveyed. Kingston’s writing becomes a functional biographical act, and the resultant 
selves begin to win a sort of authority in an American narrative. In this case, life writing 
does much toward the work of re-claiming America for her subjects. David Leiwei Li 
argues, “[f]or Kingston, writing itself is none other than a performance of discovery: it is 
the taking up of the abandoned claims her Chinese forefathers made in the American 
mining West and the establishment of their ethnic American identity” (486). The 
constructive practice of life writing—in Kingston’s works at once a postmodern and a 
Romantic humanist move, in which discourse opens up the mutability of the self and an 
autonomous subject plays in that discourse—operates in her men’s experiences and in the 
text itself. The biographer’s control of those stories as representations of experience is 
uncertain, but her ability (and her subjects’ ability) to suggest a varying self by way of 





The Authorities of Form 
Exclusionary codification of Americanness and its xenophobic threat is constant 
in China Men, but Kingston typifies and critiques the measurement of institutional 
American identity at least twice in especially jarring ways. First, “The Laws” catalogues 
anti-Chinese law and legislation beginning in the mid-19th century and through 
immigration quota revisions in 1978. In this chapter, the record of a government’s racism 
marks China Men as decidedly subaltern, and the force of language announces 
institutional control over what “Chinese American” would and would not mean. “The 
Laws” is a sort of legislative book of days. Its clinical entries, arranged and identified by 
years, are set against the larger work’s play with history. While Kingston accepts the 
essential unknowability of “China Joe,” rehearses his stories as performance, suggests 
alternative explanations for her father’s immigration narrative, and contextualizes the 
entire work with a formally mythic opening section, this survey of immigration laws 
enlists the curt tones of a juridical history, illustrated by these representative excerpts: 
1878: California held a Constitutional Convention to settle ‘the Chinese problem.’ 
Of the 152 delegates, 35 were not American citizens but Europeans. The resulting 
constitution, voted into existence by a majority party of Working Men and 
Grangers, prohibited Chinese from entering California. New state laws 
empowered cities and counties to confine them within specified areas or to throw 
them out completely. (153)  
1917: Congress voted that immigrants over sixteen years of age be required to 




The timeline situates China Men’s stories in material conditions and precludes 
ahistoricity. Amid an otherwise polyphonous, even tentative prose, the form of “The 
Laws” renders the insidious work of official racisms all the more relentlessly. Kingston 
says, “I put the information in the middle of the book, so people have to go through it” 
(Jaggi). Goellnicht notes Kingston’s mimicry of legal idiom and characterizes the effect: 
“…the section carries an ironic undertone: by imitating the monological voice of 
authorizing History—the history imposed by the dominant culture that made the laws—
this section uncovers both the dullness of this voice and the deafness to other, competing 
voices.” (196). Goellnicht identifies the rift between the form of “The Laws” and the 
“variegated/multivalent/polyphonous narrative” of the rest of China Men and concludes 
that “[p]aradoxicaly, the imagined/fictional history proves more truthful than the official 
version” (196).16 
A juridical measure for identifying Americans as such returns to Kingston’s 
family during the Vietnam War. “The Brother in Vietnam,” Kingston’s account of her 
brother’s work as a high school teacher and as an enlisted Navy sailor completes the 
series of family memoirs and, turning to the most thorough, deeply institutional sanctions 
of Americanness levies a critique of war as identity. The unnamed brother undergoes the 
Q Clearance review necessary for a promotion, a process that delivers legal resolution for 
Kingston’s family: “The government was certifying that the family was really American, 
not precariously American but super-American, extraordinarily secure—Q Clearance 
                                                 
16 Brook Thomas, in his instructive “China Men, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, and the Question of 
Citizenship,” identifies at least two minor liberties Kingston takes with this straightest history: “ she lists 
the victory of Yick Wo v. Hopkins as 1896 instead of 1886, and her account of this case and of the 1879 
constitution is a bit misleading” (417. n.4.). Thomas argues convincingly that Kingston’s imaginative 
treatment of citizenship and identity ought to be read by way of an informed legal history and that her 
China Men and U.S. law are co-constructive of their status as American citizens, not that citizenship is a 




Americans. The Navy or the FBI had checked his mother and father and not deported 
them” (299). The brother declines the post because he recognizes that it will require 
interrogating Vietnamese prisoners of war. A “cleared” identity operates perilously close 
to alliance with the worst of this war—too close for the brother, who has rationalized an 
acceptable complicity in which almost any exchange of goods, services, or money 
indirectly contributes to war: “In a country that operates on a war economy, there isn’t 
much difference between being in the Navy and being a civilian” (284). Kingston’s 
account of his experience in the classroom, in Vietnam, and home again articulates a 
means to selfhood that relegates Q Clearance to the secondary. The brother succeeds and 
the family passes, authorized, but the suggestive rendering of his experience as an 
enlisted sailor conveys Kingston’s critique of war’s work: “While his services were 
needed for the undeclared American-Vietnam war, the family was safe” (299). At war, 
his identity remains diffuse. Family nostalgia drives him to seek out an apocryphal 
relative’s home in Hong Kong, but the homecoming gesture disappoints: “Perhaps they 
did live in one of the shacks upon the hill and had put a fake address for their relatives 
not to worry […] It was just as well he hadn’t found them” (303). Each scene’s 
contribution to the brother’s, and the family’s, American identity is interrogated by a 
suspicious sister. Kingston makes a history of her brother’s experiences without indicting 
him, instead fashioning biographical fragments that illustrate the futility of relying on 
those experiences (military service, travel to southeast Asia) for a resolute story—the 
brother gets his clearance, makes peace with enlistment, sees Asia, even rides along on a 
bombing run. Kingston narrates a brother of several conflicted experiences. The brother’s 




the Brother: “Where you from?” “It was a racial slur, all right, as though he were saying, 
‘Remember you’re not from Vietnam. Remember which side you’re on. You’re no gook 
from Vietnam.’ That’s right, he wasn’t” (286). The Chief’s racist sadism, familiar enough 
synecdoche for military discourse, signifies handily the Brother’s trouble in the U.S. One 
hundred years after codified Americanness is withheld from Kingston’s family, her 
brother earns it in a vexed procedure. Kingston critiques Q Clearance because it is 
superfluous; her family has been making America all along. Her life writing, which 
claims America, dismisses the written language of The Laws and Q Clearance, which 
closes off the possibility of alternative Americas. 
Before turning to the epistemic change marked by The Fifth Book of Peace, I 
would like to address the generic play of China Men. After opening, “Once upon a time,” 
much of “On Discovery,” that first piece of the book, follows a folkloric form (3). 
Kingston, in an interview, explains that “[a]ll the mythology in China Men is from what 
the Chinese call the small tradition, not the greatest literary traditions, but those of lower 
class people” (Islas 12). Kingston’s traditional mode has affinity with “talk story,” a form 
approximated in all her nonfiction, described by Linda Ching Sledge as “a conservative, 
communal folk art by and for the common people, performed in the various dialects of 
diverse ethnic enclaves and never intended for the ears of non-Chinese” (143). Talk story, 
a practice of both of Kingston’s parents, operates like folktale and legend, not necessarily 
bound to believability, but generally more complex than easily read morality tales. 
Echoing talk story in her written work allows Kingston variation, play, and, even irony 
(she ends “The Ghostmate,” a legendary narrative of a young man lost in a storm and 




cheek: “Fancy lovers never last” (81)). Founding China Men in folk tones, enlisting 
nothing like nonfiction’s authoritative mannerisms, Kingston indicates that her 
representation of the past will continue the nonfiction paradigm of The Woman Warrior. 
She claims to be “treating seriously myths of the old world I'd never seen,” distancing 
herself from experiential authority but approaching a literary tradition as an object of 
respect (Jaggi). David Leiwei Li explains that “On Discovery,” however, “is actually a 
creative adaptation of one of the most famous episodes of the eighteenth-century Chinese 
classic, Mirror Flower Affair” (486). China Men begins between folklore and discrete 
literary artifact: “Once upon a time” invokes the anonymity that inheres in folklore but 
the tale turns to an authored text (albeit one most likely unfamiliar to most U.S. readers). 
Readers must immediately come to terms with already upended genre—is this myth, 
history, parody?—and all that follows is informed by that introductory phrase. Li’s 
reading of the book’s form registers its multiplicity: “China Men starts out to subvert this 
genre of monolithic history through its discovery of a collective mode; its stories are 
episodic and pluralistic in the pure sense of the words. History, as this talk story mode 
implies, is a discovery of many equal stories, not a solo appearance but a choral 
performance” (497). “On Discovery” concludes its two-page legend of Tang Ao, the 
explorer lost in the Women’s Land, with speculative uncertainty in keeping with folk 
forms: “Some scholars say that country was discovered during the reign of Empress Wu 
(A.D. 694-705), and some say earlier than that, A.D. 441, and it was in North America” 
(5). “Some say” names the book’s rhetoric and throughout provides Kingston’s best 




China Men’s twelve intertexts do not simply metaphorize biographical nonfiction; 
their contextual operation haunts those episodes. Resistant even to their own generic 
types, they take more than one form, each fragment furthering the multivalence of the 
work. “On Discovery,” “The Ghostmate,” “On Mortality,” “On Mortality Again,” “The 
Adventures of Lo Bun Sun,” and “The Li Sao: An Elegy” follow the conventions of the 
legendary, and sometimes the supernatural. “On Fathers,” and “On Listening,” are 
autobiographical fragments. “The Laws,” “Alaska China Men,” “The Wild Man of the 
Green Swamp,” and “The Hundred-Year-Old Man” are largely historical or documentary 
fragments. This exercise in classification very likely flies in the face of Kingston’s efforts 
to dispose with the disciplines of genre, and each of the twelve certainly overrides the 
laws of its parent form, but my catalogue should indicate some resistance to cohesion. 
Situating each alongside the other in a manner even more radical than that of The Woman 
Warrior (which similarly blended conventions) posits an unsettled life writing, resistant 
to the collecting strategies of nonfiction. Sledge argues, “[i]n short, the legends are more 
than heroic analogues to the chapters on family history: they are paradigms of the 
storyteller’s art, sanctioned and enriched by repetition within an immigrant community 
and family, and giving order, purpose, and historical authority to the roughly drawn 
biographies of family patriarchs” (147). Mareen Sabine argues for the familial work of 
the quasi-Chinese interchapters of China Men, efforts toward a homecoming for BaBa: 
The daughter narrator fears that her own father is a “dead man walking”—a man 
who has lost his soul in America—and is equally concerned to devise some means 
of calling him back to life. In her narrative of “The Father from China,” she tries 




delineate his psychic affiliation with this figurative world, even if he never 
returned physically to his homeland. (189)  
Yet these fragments cannot be read as unproblematically Chinese. Sledge notes their 
resistance to easy forms: “Kingston creates […] a gallery of diverse heroes from different 
periods and literary or historical contexts. The structure of the narrative is serial, for one 
scene or story leads to another, without logical transitions or narrative bridges” (151). My 
sense is that the authority of several intertexts comes from their antagonism to the settling 
forms of chronological biography—these moments interrupt and critique the practice 
with which they are complicit, family memoir. Admittedly, they may suggest the gravity 
of the legendary, but their overt detachment from ostensible experience unmoors them 
from any illusions about the authority of the first person and the reportorial. 
 The book’s most representative moment is its last, which enacts the argument of 
the entire text, that these stories remain open and contested. China Men closes in resigned 
and peaceful observation. At a party, the narrator listens to young Chinese American men 
and a Filipino scholar tell apocryphal stories of Chinese exploration for gold in the 
Philippines, in the U.S., in Mexico. These last pages are those of a comforted historian, 
watching her subjects listen to stories the preceding work is not obliged to contain. No 
master narrative summarizes, and no correct version of experiences commands history. 
Instead, the text accepts, with satisfaction, the sustenance of contradictory stories. The 
book’s activism survives—thrives on—its ambivalence. “On Listening” matters so 
fundamentally to China Men because it infinitely sustains the epistemology that founds 
the entire work. Kingston’s last note, “Good. Now I could watch the young men who 




that an inevitable material conclusion offers some end to what precedes it. Goellnicht: 
“...one suspects that she now listens for the next generation of young men to respond with 
their own dialogical voices, to lay claim to their America” (206). China Men, consistent 
with its faith in the openness of biography, history, memory, and experience, abandons its 
voice and becomes an observing agent, secondary to the auditory participants who take in 
the varying China Men histories offered at a casual party.  
 
Life Writing After the Fire 
  The Fifth Book of Peace, less a restorative history than a pacifist act, offers no 
such irresolute ending. Its closing chapter insists that Kingston’s writing workshop 
communities have “stopped wars years hence. We made myriads of nonwars. We have 
ended wars a hundred years from now. The war against Iraq, which began the same year 
as the Oakland-Berkeley fire [in which Kingston loses her home and book-in-progress], 
is still occurring. But the peace we make also continues, and fans, and lives on and on” 
(398). The hopefulness of that account is followed by an epilogue, a survey of her 
community’s responses to the September 11 attacks and an appeal to readers: “The 
images of peace are ephemeral. The language of peace is subtle. The reasons for peace, 
the definitions of peace, the very idea of peace have to be invented, and invented again. 
Children, everybody, here’s what to do during war: In a time of destruction, create 
something” (402). The first three of these four sentences, definitions of peace, maintain 
Kingston’s thoughtful sense of ambivalence and change and her embrace of the 
indeterminate. The closing sentence, however, articulates the suggestion of order, of 




writing to a discrete purpose, and multivalence becomes subordinate to the specificity of 
that purpose. China Men, most certainly engaged in social justice, makes its arguments—
that the U.S. has erased Chinese American men from its Histories and replaced them with 
cartoons, that the stories of parents and grandparents are subject to the effects of fiction, 
that translation obscures, that myth is mutable—by way of contingent narratives and 
multigeneric fragments. It makes no clear plea to its readers but instead tells stories that 
answer silence. The Fifth Book of Peace, a response to fire and to war, requests with 
clarity. Its stories are obliged to a preventative purpose; even as they push against the 
boundaries of life writing, they are means to an end.  
That change is significant. While Kingston’s contemporary work holds to her 
bricoleur’s style, with its varying genres and figurative connections between parts, all 
fragments coalesce in the book’s mission against war. The open end of China Men is, in 
other words, impossible under the determinate argument of The Fifth Book of Peace. That 
turn in Kingston’s work is indicative of the rigors of praxis and symptomatic of 
activism’s effect on life writing.  Kingston’s discernible anxiety, regularly evident 
throughout The Fifth Book of Peace, does not oblige her to conventional life writing, but 
it does begin to arrest the sort of openness, and perhaps even the sort of work 
accomplished by China Men.  
A newspaper feature reports Kingston’s wish to be in a community of writers 
after losing her house and manuscript in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley urban wildfire; she 
seeks “people who'd been hurt in wars. I was testing my faith that the art of writing could 




peace” (Jaggi). Discussing her work in progress toward the Book of Peace, she contrasts 
its obligations and China Men’s:  
The sense of mission in China Men is that I was responsible for history. China 
Men was written in order to give us a history and to educate everyone as to our 
Chinese American history. And I saw my mission that I needed to educate a very 
ignorant America. Creating the self also means to create oneself as a good citizen, 
a citizen of America and a citizen of the world. There's a social and political 
responsibility. I think I express it in China Men and in Tripmaster Monkey. 
(Simmons 164) 
Here, responsibility and citizenship make China Men’s work. The histories produced in 
that book are bound only by Kingston’s pedagogical tenet: teach people about her China 
Men by telling them the stories they need to hear. She continues, 
And that same sense of mission is now global. I think that the only way I can 
integrate East and West is thinking about global politics or a global peace-making 
mission, and so what I'm working on now has to do with: How do you make 
peace in the world? How do you stop war? How do you write a book of peace? 
And of course this brings up all kinds of literary problems. I think a lot about 
Aristotle writing about action, and that dramatic action comes from conflict. So 
does conflict have to be violent? Does conflict have to be war? I see myself 
writing counterpoint to The Odyssey, which is about a human consciousness that 
finds its heroism in war. So how do I write about woman warriors, peace 




The “responsib[ility] for history” is satisfied by China Men’s narrative work, but the 
weight of “mak[ing] peace in the world,” among veterans and amid “people who’d been 
hurt in wars” founds the latter effort. The questions she raises have to be answered, and 
that condition means a notably more vexed project. The educational history of China Men 
gathers its authority from its unsettled narratives. Looking forward, unsettled 
ambivalence will not wholly suffice. 
The Fifth Book of Peace situates itself with a table of contents announcing several 
voices. The annotated ordering commits the following text to distinctions between truth, 
fiction, and nonfiction:  
Fire 
 
The author tells about herself running through the Oakland-Berkeley hills, which 









A re-creation of the burned book. A fiction set in Hawai’i, where Wittman Ah 




A nonfiction during which the author and her husband live in temporary homes 
while their new house is being built. She sends out a call to war veterans to help 




The first notes of “Fire,” the narrator’s search for home in an urban wildfire, are 
disorienting; A survey of the peace book tradition in China, “Paper” adheres to the 




readers: “Supposedly”); “Water” is a fictionalized echo of Kingston’s family’s 
experience in Hawai’i and a coda to Tripmaster Monkey. As “Earth,” the story of her 
writers’ workshops, progresses, it becomes clear that the author has taken on a moral 
obligation to her subjects and it conveys wariness about that responsibility. By the end of 
the section, and well into the Epilogue, Kingston’s familiar multivalence seems unable to 
survive panic over not only the condition of her writing community, but the threats of a 
contemporary world at war. At the very least, the comfort offered by China Men’s last 
scene is now absent. 
In a survey of her writing sangha17 after 9/11, she insists, “Peace leads us. Moral 
principles do not change. A moral principle is neither relative nor conditional; it does not 
depend on the time, circumstance, or situation” (399). This concretization gains no hold 
in China Men and The Woman Warrior. Even though the former claims America and the 
latter works toward a translatable voice between women and between generations, neither 
announces a singular axiom. Fixed principles—unconditional principles—found the 
source of this book’s anxiety. Subject to the demands of fostering that global peace, this 
nonfiction writer worries. This Book of Peace prescribes a specific palliative to specific 
people who have specific experiences, and Kingston’s objective, as she leads writing 
workshops for veterans, is to heal. Writing for Kingston is now recuperative not in its 
multivalence, but in its ability to make whole from fragments: “You are now ready to 
gather the smithereens, and narrate them into story” (260). “Meditation and writing, and 
silence, are ways to gather the self together again” (261). That obligation structures the 
bricolage of her most recent text, not least because it pleads a discrete response of its 
readers. She prescribes, “[i]n a time of destruction, create something. A poem. A parade. 





A friendship. A community. A place that is the commons. A school. A vow. A moral 
principle. One peaceful moment” (402). The urgency of that appeal—the wars that open 
and close the book, both U.S. interventions in the Middle East, are deadly—is echoed in 
the worry persistent throughout the work.  
Kingston rarely strays into the colloquially political. Her writing has always been 
too knowing for the overwrought jeremiad, and so her activism is interrogative and 
suggestive, not coercive. In The Fifth Book…, she explains “[a]bstract terms such as 
‘nation’ put me into despair” (390), and “[i]deology is what got us in trouble in the first 
place” (330). Yet there are inescapably political stakes throughout her works. Amy Tan 
identifies the object of Kingston’s purposeful books: “Maxine infuses her work with a 
strong morality; it's art that moves people to think in a different way” (Jaggi). The 
recuperative efforts of the nonfictions turn to sustaining indeterminacy: warrior Fa Mu 
Lan is a blend of parody and mythic-heroic forms, and no fundamental history of 
Kingston’s men orders things. Kingston’s winning epistemology, almost literally under 
the gun at the turn of the century, has to accommodate war’s damage and its threats. The 
Fifth Book of Peace, tasked with more than “mov[ing] people to think in a different 
way,” focuses, refines, and gathers its subjects into the cohesion her other works forfeit.  
In a symptomatic moment, Kingston tells us that Tang Ao, left indefinitely in the 
Women’s Land at the end of China Men’s “On Discovery,” “was gone for so long that 
his daughter, Little Jug, incarnation of Fairy of a Hundred Flowers, went in search of 
him. She searched twenty-nine fabulous lands—island paradises, mountain paradises, 
cave paradises. In each place, she heard that he had come and gone. She found him, a 




book of conclusions, answers, resolutions. Welcome resignation to an unclosed text has 
been overridden by the requirements of specific praxis. The Fifth Book of Peace is best 
approached as an obliged text, bound by the demands of its relatively narrow end and 
anxious that the end will be satisfied. Obligated to healing (even if the narrating Kingston 
paradoxically shies from “that New Age word. It implies that something’s wrong, that 
they’re unwell, and need fixing” (265)), the new book cannot abide the fragmentation of 
selves in need of restorative gathering.  
 Both China Men and The Fifth Book of Peace respond to destruction, loss, and 
absence. The former’s fragmentary stories make a contingent history of Chinese 
American men. In China Men, the 1906 fire unbinds Paper Sons, China Men identified 
by mutable immigration scrolls and Immigration documents, from their obligation to a 
documentary record—they win a sort of agency by that fire. The fires of The Fifth Book 
of Peace, however, require remedy. Houses and books burn. Soldiers napalm and are 
firebombed. Kingston turns fires into stories—she does not invent those episodes to 
dramatize known lives. This matters, because the temptation to abandon all experiential 
precedent is always at the edges of her life writing. None of these conflagrations are 
metaphors, though. Papers, homes, and bodies actually burn; her nonfiction responds to 
the breaking point brought by each fire—each produces and destroys, but none submits to 
an easy literary register. Multiply understood burnings operate along different valences, 
nonetheless, when Kingston looks back to her family’s history than when she looks 
forward to the prevention of ongoing war. 
False comfort fails Kingston during the first moments of the book. Her travelogue 




grand descriptions, she lists facts: “A firestorm blew over the Oakland-Berkeley hills in 
October of 1991, and took my house, things, neighborhood, and other neighborhoods, 
and forests. And the lives of twenty-five people” (3). Instead of the rhythm of 
overflowing panic, “I was driving home from funeral ceremonies for my father. I have 
lost my father. He’s gone less than a month; we were having the full-month ceremony 
early, Sunday day off” (3). The economy of the reportorial persists in her description of 
trying to get around police roadblocks, of finding a lone fireman stationed at a street 
corner. Clipped sentences—“It was the middle of the afternoon, about two o’clock. Too 
late. Too late. The sky was black. The sun was red. Leaves of burned black paper wafted 
high and low among the buildings. Ashes from a forest fire were falling and blowing in 
downtown Oakland” (4-5)—are the register for sense making in a scene of catastrophe. 
“Anyway, only now, as I write, am I coming up with the words for things that were 
making wild appearances and disappearances” (6). 
The contemporary Kingston writes against not some conceptual, recollected 
warring but a material conflict whose dire threat menaces her world at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century. Her Book of Peace begins aphoristically: “If a woman is going 
to write a Book of Peace, it is given her to know devastation” (3). A friend phones,  
her wonder-filled voice talking to me about loss. “Maxine, please don’t think of 
this as if it were Pollyanna speaking, but I think that if you’re going to write the 
Book of Peace, you have to have lost absolutely everything. Everything.” I’ve got 
to hang up and write that down. Goodbye, Phyllis. I stood at my little patio table, 




what she said: If a woman is going to write a Book of Peace, it’s given her to 
know destruction. (40)  
This principle orders a chronology and a progression for The Fifth Book of Peace, its 
genesis in loss.  
The memoirist initially reads the fire as both a sign from her recently-deceased 
father, dissatisfied with her family’s premature funeral rites, and a reckoning for the 1991 
U.S. Gulf War. The search to identify a metaphysical cause for the destruction signals a 
subject who hopes for determinate stories. The Oakland-Berkeley fire’s meaning is 
finally unknowable, something the narrator acknowledges, but only after suggesting a 
discernible causality. Reflecting on other public disasters, Kingston insists that “our fire 
is not as bad, not tragic, because not evil; fire is morally neutral, an accident, a storm of 
nature” (19-20). Yet her initial drive to ascribe meaning and agency to destruction codes 
the other meaning-making function at work: veterans writing their memoirs toward 
thoroughgoing peace. “These ideas—that the fire is to make us know Iraq, and that my 
father caused the fire—came to me when I stood still in the center of devastation. For 360 
degrees, everything was flattened except chimneys, columns of chimneys two and three 
stories high. Each burned-away house had left its tomb stone” (17). Having made her way 
to the site of her lost home and having found “a black, negative dimension, where things 
disappeared, and I might disappear” (10), interpretability is hard to come by. The 
narrator’s sense making is founded in negative comprehension: “I did not have a sudden 
moment of knowing that my house and all that was in it were no more. I stood there 




my house was. I was laying eyes on it without registering which piece of blackened land 
amidst all this blackened land was exactly my piece” (12).  
Years later, moving away from a threatening Los Angeles fire, she asserts that 
“[f]ire is not apocalyptic. Los Angeles is burning, but the fire is not the Fire Next Time. 
It’s not the Day of the Locust. Earthquake, fire—it’s just weather” (313). Whatever fire’s 
interpretability as a source of destruction, what it leaves behind demands physical and 
psychic repair. Kingston’s home is rebuilt, her manuscript is rewritten, her community re-
gathered. Fire comes to mean destructive force generally, and its wages are writerly—
making stories from fire and from war is both therapeutic and preventative work.  
My recurring dream from smallkidtime is that bombers and missiles fill the sky, 
steadily moving, like words on a page; I can prevent the bombing by finding the 
Three Lost Books of Peace. Three Books of Peace came into existence, it’s said, 
when Chinese civilization began, and were somehow lost. We must find them. 
We need them. Now. (38)  
As the architect of a timely Book of Peace, Kingston no longer needs to isolate the 
Oakland-Berkeley fire’s meaning. She locates purpose-giving Idea amid the destruction 
and orders her new book in its wake. 
Much of the contemporary book’s work (as well as its anxiety) is in keeping with, 
and perhaps in a representative relationship with, the memoirist’s subjectivity. As soon as 
she realizes that the fire has destroyed the fourth book of peace, she “felt coming into 
me—oh, but here all along inside chest and stomach and all around me and out of the 
smoking ground—Idea. Idea has weight and life; I can feel it” (13). Without a home and 




a guide, an authorizing and ultimately authoring presence. As her writers craft their 
stories of the Vietnam War and the experiences of the antiwar community, she seeks to 
order their work, enacting a literary determinacy as she worries about the workshops’ 
schedules and execution, anxious about the needs and temperaments of her writers, 
unsure of their willingness to take meditative practice seriously. Kingston’s mother, who 
dies between the fire and the publication of The Fifth Book of Peace¸ visits in dreams and 
asks, “What have you been doing to educate America? What have you done to educate 
the world? Have you taught everybody yet?” (241). Kingston explains, “[t]hat is my 
charge from my mother. My calling and vocation” (242). The fire orients her purpose and 
self. 
As important to the project are the veterans who answer her search for the peace 
book tradition. “Because I asked everywhere for Books of Peace, and I told everyone that 
I had lost the one I was writing, veterans of war began sending me their stories” (242). 
Communication between war veterans and the aspirant peace-book author begins to 
cohere her place as a recuperating force, as strangers begin to correspond: “Local 
veterans I don’t know are writing me letters of sympathy and apology. They are sorry that 
they did not come to my rescue during the fire” (243). Fire’s force compels that letter 
writing, and fire operates as the filament between the writer and the veterans: “Fires, past 
and current, set the veterans to writing me. They have flashbacks, and they recall 
bombings, but also moments and islands of peace. Paul Woodruff […] came back from 
Viet Nam feeling ‘like a fire had burned my past life’” (244). The dependence that 
structures an activist writer’s relationship with veterans of war follows the clearest 




men in prison hear their mothers talking to them” (242). In times of peril, then, men and 
women talk across distances; in the case of Kingston’s brother in Vietnam, his mother 
“scolded him not to get hurt” (242). But men talk from war, too:  
Among the letters, one Anonymous Veteran wrote explaining to me why veterans 
need to report to women. Yes, women are sanctuary; women bring soldiers home. 
But also women need to hear the war stories. “Native Americans consider war an 
altered state for which warriors were prepared with ceremony, and from which 
warriors were welcomed back with ceremony. In this way the entire community 
(women, children, old people, the ill and handicapped) participated in the war. 
They shared the risk and responsibility, the suffering and loss, the victory or 
defeat, and then went ‘home’ together. I have met many men for whom women 
were the way home.” (248) 
The Book of Peace, of course, follows that tradition, if uneasily. The obligations of that 
ritual work, taken on by Kingston, who ultimately becomes a “way-shower” to veterans, 
are tremendous: “How should I reply to all these people? In person. I have to look in their 
eyes and faces, and tell them, You are home. Thank you. I have to give them something, 
reciprocate gifts. And happy-end the wars. (248) (emphasis mine). Writing workshops are 
to serve as the site of those happy ends. Kingston makes herself responsible for righting 
the losses—and preventing more loss—suffered by her writing veterans. She accepts a 
contract: “Now that I have entered their lives with promises, I better stay. I can’t be 
another one who abandons them. I feel a vow coming on—that I will be the writing 
teacher of the veterans for my whole life. I will help them write until the stories full of 




group of people, structures the memoirist’s subjectivity. Kingston has fastened herself to 
a raison-d’ être.  
The book’s most unsettling fire at once informs all other fires and sets in relief the 
disciplining work of storytelling to make sense of a scene that should, one imagines, not 
be part of human experience, private or shared. A writing veteran, Roman “Hopper” 
Martinez, conveys the horror story of smelling burning human flesh during the Vietnam 
War. Kingston tells us that Roman “composes by speaking to his wife, Miriam, and she 
types in all caps on his Purple Heart stationery” (328). The narrative, read aloud to the 
group, is here at a remove, dictated from the typed iteration of the oral, composed in 
clinical all-caps, set against the clean regalia of the Purple Heart. These narrative markers 
should signify the sterility of a story separated from its antecedent experience, yet its gore 
works to undermine any effort to domesticate Hopper’s experience with narrative order. 
“I WAS OVERWHELMED TO FIND OUT THAT THE SMELLS THAT HAD ME 
SALIVATING WERE COMING FROM MY COOKED BUDDIES. THERE WAS A 
PILE OF ASHES WITH 3 LUMPS IN IT; THE LUMPS WERE THE AIR CREW. … 
THEY WERE COOKED JUST RIGHT; ROASTED IN A MAGNESIUM FIRE.” The 
author of “Hopper’s Last B.B.Q,” concludes the short narrative, crafted from a report 
with which he had appealed for V.A. support to treat his PTSD, “THE 
REMEMBERANCE OF THIS OCCASION BRINGS ON A DEPRESSION, AND 
SOMETIMES A RAGE. THE SMELL OF HOT METAL (SUCH AS A HOT SKILLET) 
OR BURNED BARBEQUE MEAT, BRINGS BACK ALL THE EMOTIONS…” (328-
329). In shock, the writing group remains silent. “We are all of us in horror, disgust, 




until a happy ending” (329) (emphasis mine). And this is precisely The Fifth Book of 
Peace’s mission, to take the uncontrollable and the devastating and submit them both to a 
cleansing and preventative narrative. The Book of Peace will not undo or explain the fires 
that bring it about, but its reactive work looks to limit imminent conflagration. 
The surrender to story at the end of China Men and that book’s treatment of 
history does not survive the Oakland-Berkeley fire. Of course, neither does the book of 
peace in progress in 1991. The fire not only takes that manuscript away, it supplies new 
purpose and new focus to the work. What had been a short fiction in which the antihero 
of Tripmaster Monkey and his wife, Taña, and child, Mario, exile themselves to Hawai’i 
to evade the draft and the U.S. war in Vietnam becomes a multipart, multigenre amalgam 
and, Kingston clearly hopes, a fuller antiwar act. 
Kingston’s description of what she finds in place of her lost book is archetypal 
border-writing—the manuscript is between several states, and this artifact signifies what 
is for Kingston something like a synthesis of idea’s thesis and matter’s antithesis. The 
manuscript’s remains are physical but too light to be constant. Parts of the book are 
electronic, their materiality melted in two destroyed computers, and “you had to be an 
expert to guess which mangled piece of machinery was a computer, which the television 
set, the small TV, the radio, the nonworking Victrola, the other radio, the tape deck, the 
lawnmower motor” (34). Objects are burned of their difference. The book’s remains are 
measurable, but not containable:  
The ashes of my Book of Peace were purely white, paper and words gone entirely 
white. The temperature here in the middle of the alcove had been hotter than by 




white eyelashes. Each vane fanned out into infinitely tinier vanes. Paper had 
returned to woodgrain. I touched the lines. And they smeared into powder. I 
placed my palm on this ghost of my book, and my hand sank through it. Feathers 
floated into the air, became air, airy nothing. (34) 
This is the remembered residue of a book, discernible but not at all determinate. Its 
interstitial status between matter and memory shapes the present text’s uncertain handling 
of the relationship between things and ideas.  
As she surveys the fire’s remains, charred of their reference, “I’d forgotten to 
keep noticing Idea. Yes, it’s here, I can feel it, a solidity at the center. But would it exist 
if I were killed? What if ‘Idea” were just my life, me feeling my life? […] I’m the only 
one who knows about and works on the Books of Peace. Its idea depends on me—small, 
slow, forgetful. Things gone, Idea remains” (21). Kingston’s mother will insist that 
“[t]hings don’t matter. Don’t hun things” (23). Yet Kingston makes homecoming 
pilgrimages and collects remaining objects.  
No sooner did I imagine my jade heart than it appeared, green and gold on a 
cushion of ashes. I held it flat between my palms, wanting to heal it against my 
skin. It was hurt; green veins had grayed, and there was a black burn in its setting, 
the very middle of the gold flower. I willed a life force—the pain in my hands, 
pent-up chi energy—from out of my hands into the jade. (32)  
This is no ordinary object: “When mother gave each of us our jade, she told us about the 
symbiosis between true jade and human flesh. ‘Wear it on your chest. It breathes with 
you, and beats with your heart” (32). Reclaiming the jade heart, “a sign of being 




(32). She suffers fire below her feet—a friend’s feet actually bleed as he looks for her lost 
book—for things: “the ground itself was burning and breathing. The soles of my boots 
heated up, and burned my feet” (33). 
Her brother George collects detritus from her burned house and creates art 
objects. He “took melted glass, and phoned for me to save him some more. He liked the 
interesting forms and colors. I hadn’t wanted glass until George did; then I collected 
glass. I got hoardy, didn’t want to give him the best pieces, though he’s the one who 
knew to see them as beautiful” (35). And the urge to collect grows: “Each time I returned, 
I hoarded more things” (35) and “I quit collecting stuff when I realized that I could end 
up carrying all of it, the entire contents of the lot, all of the ashes, even the burned dirt…” 
(36). Attending a conference after the fire, Kingston takes comfort in the things her 
friends give to her (42).  
 Thought and matter achieve a sort of reconciliation at the site of language. 
Kingston posits a grand unifying theory of peace, language, and body:  
Peace begins in thought. Thoughts enworded go from mind to mind, and mind 
makes the world. Peace, illusive, abstract, negative Yin, dream, would take a long 
writing-out to make real. Its book has to be longer than war books—longer than 
bumper sticker, longer than a sound bite. As we read, neuropeptides in the brain 
grow longer, longer than in nonreaders. Thought becomes body. Sudden fast 
change is a method of war. The logic of peace has to be spoken out at length. (54) 
Here, the matter of language becomes a processional strategy for the book. No longer at 
war with one another, thought and body progress toward informed peace. This is perhaps 




gathering minds and bodies in Utopian resolution. As she wanders her burned 
neighborhood, she tells a bicyclist that her book has been lost. “He tapped me on the 
forehead and said, ‘You’re alive, and it’s up here.’ I decided to take this touch of a human 
finger to be a blessing upon me, and his words to be a testimony.” She corrects his 
assertion, but holds on to his line between idea and matter, even beyond her own 
corporeality: “It’s not up here in my head; I feel Idea at center, heart, stomach. And it’s 
all around and underfoot” (19). After the openness, the irresolution of an earlier project in 
which language and body and peace are hardly co-conspirators toward a happy telos, this 
moment signals a changed Kingston. 
Kingston places books and fires in a long tradition. “Book-burnings go on to this 
day and age–the Cultural Revolution, the destruction of six thousand temples in Tibet—
six thousand libraries” (45). She explains that “[s]upposedly, a long time ago in China, 
there existed Books of Peace. They were Three Lost Books of Peace, lost in deliberate 
fires” and, more specifically,  
A Thousand years ago, on the Silk Road in Western China, the mayor of 
Dunhuang ordered books burned to keep them out of the hands of the invading 
Xianxian tribe. Heroic readers saved twenty horseloads of books […] And I have 
heard that it is possible that a Lost Book of Peace was among the books taken 
away on horseback. A Book of Peace, existed, then, until the eleventh century, in 
the Sung period. Diana T. Wu, professor in the business school at St. Mary’s 
College in Moraga, pooled these facts at a dinner party. […] I am not the only one 




However, Kingston’s requests that peers and students and friends search for traces of the 
Lost Books of Peace seem not to yield results18. In China herself, she asks after the books 
and finds “turtle books,” is told about “oracle bones” and “sky books.” She explains to 
“Two learned men” that The Books of Peace “must have been in my mother’s talkstory—
in her war stories—but then I would hear ‘Three Lost Books of Peace’ in her voice, in 
Chinese” (51). One of the men, Wang Meng, ex-minister of culture for China, “gave his 
voluminous smile, and tapped himself on the head. My father used to do that, and the 
man at the fire had tapped my head. ‘You yourself imagined Books of Peace. And since 
you made them up, you are free to write whatever you like. You write them yourself” 
(52). Wang Meng offers significant authority, here. Kingston can pilot the Peace Book 
tradition. 
Other book burnings are significant to The Fifth Book of Peace. In the 1991 fire, 
she loses her family’s immigration scroll, surreptitiously taken from Brave Orchid to be 
photocopied. I have discussed the signal role of this artifact above, but its loss here 
deserves attention, because it follows Kingston’s conversations with her mother over the 
family’s authoritative “genealogy book—the real lineage, not the fake info for 
Immigration” (57). She says, “the book is the size of a ream of typing paper. The last 
time I asked my mother for the Hong genealogy book, she handed me a thin booklet. 
She’d deleted ‘all the bad people,’ keeping the teachers and poets, and recent generations, 
relatives she knew personally. Immigration scroll and genealogy book—gone” (58). But 
Kingston tries to recover the book: “she helps me remake my lost book. She tells me 
what to write and what not to write. ‘Your father told you not to harm anyone in your 
                                                 
18 Kingston introduces Books of Peace in Tripmaster Monkey, too: “There used to be three peace books, 




writing. Don’t tell our Benefactor’s name, or anything that would hurt his reputation. 
Don’t tell about the gambling house.’ Too late” (58). Then, “MaMa also tells me her real 
ancestry, not the fake genealogy on the scroll […] She’s not making this up, it is 
documented: My father wrote it in her funeral eulogy” (58-59). The willfully fictional 
scroll burns. Kingston asserts a single, “documented” family history.  
She learns from her mother that BaBa had written and lost six books of poetry, 
carelessly burned by a nephew in China who “coveted the book box. He dumped the 
poems, and took the box. Your father wrote to me to send him the six books, and I had to 
tell him that his mother burned them.” The daughter’s understated response fashions the 
line between BaBa’s work and her project: “‘Oh.’ My father had six books burn, 
unpublished” (28). Her lost fourth book of peace joins her father’s burned works, the 
intentionally burned first three books of peace, as well as  
T.E. Lawrence, Aldous Huxley (a California fire), Hemingway (a fictional fire), 
Ken Kesey, Gogol, Kafka, Goethe, Lao She, Gerard Manley Hopkins, St.-John 
Perse, Louisa May Alcott (maybe fictional), William Carlos Williams, Ralph 
Ellison, Bharati, Mukherjee and Clark Blaise, Al Young, Toni Morrison, Rita 
Dove, Robert Nichols. Josephine Miles told about a Berkeley fire in which every 
poet in town claimed to have lost a masterpiece. Five years later—ta-da—the 
Berkeley Renaissance. (277-278) 
The history of burned and lost books satisfies at least two ends: the enduring identity of 
the familiar authors she lists and the futility of writing for permanence.  
At least one book burning destabilizes the register of fire as destruction and 




fire, we arrived at the Grand Canyon and saw that its little library had burned down the 
previous night but hours before we got there. For years, burned pages blew about and 
landed in the forests of the high desert. I identified charred paragraphs from The Mill and 
the Floss [sic]” (286). Though the burned fragments are spread across a desolate space, 
they are there to be gathered, sewn but not destroyed. The Fifth Book of Peace affects its 
own gathering of burned and spread papers. Just as Kingston collects and identifies the 
Grand Canyon fire’s burned fragments, she recalls the burned fourth book, the narrative 
remains of soldier’s wars, and the history of the Books of Peace.  
Yet the promise of the Book of Peace follows fundamental loss. Baba has died, 
and his absence is significant for the daughter, engaged in a writing relationship with 
him. He lost his poetry in a fire and lost his poet self upon coming to the U.S. She writes 
to him in China Men, and he writes back in her margins (256). The narrator’s ascription 
of the fire to her father is a lament: “My father is trying to kill me, to take me with him. 
At this morning’s funeral fires, we burned gifts and provisions for him, but it was not 
enough, and he’s angry. He wants more—my book, all my books, my house, and 
neighborhood—and is taking more—my cities, Berkeley, where I teach, Oakland, where 
I live” (14). She describes his medical treatments regretfully and confesses, “we 
shouldn’t have let them push him screaming into the MRI machine … we should have 
declined the loud respirator, which pumped air into him. How to breathe like the Buddha 
when the machines are forcing you? They tied his wrists and ankles with strips of cloth to 
the bed rails” (16). Her despair over BaBa’s last days “came to me when I stood still in 
the center of devastation” (17), and she ultimately decides “it was a mistake to have the 




shouldn’t have hurried our father” (18). Kingston loses father, home, and book. Her 
Mother dies “in the writing of this Book of Peace” (397).  
Brave Orchid’s death is accompanied by natural phenomena—“The days and 
nights of her dying, the San Joaquin flooded”—and follows one of the book’s only 
satisfactory closures: Kingston was able to tell her that a sangha had been created among 
her writers, and she celebrates the heavenly reunion of Baba and Brave Orchid. She 
announces, “I had been able to tell Mother that I built a sangha. I pronounced it Soo 
Hong, the name of the community house she wanted” (397). The community, necessary 
part of the program toward peace, signals the work’s best achievement and “[i]f the 
world, time and space, and cause-and-effect accord with my mother’s teachings—her 
Tao—then we have stopped wars years hence” (397-398). The ongoing sustenance of that 
community, necessitated and guaranteed, the Epilogue documents, by the September 11th 
attacks, indicates an at least partially satisfied objective, and its promise of “end[ing] 
wars a hundred years from now” names Kingston’s best hope. Yet it is a hope bound in 
worry and ultimately a limit on Kingston’s nonfiction model.  
Kingston, never reluctant to supplement her primary life writing in interviews, 
offers the following satisfying approach to writing:  
When I write most deeply, fly the highest, reach the furthest, I write like a 
diarist—that is, my audience is myself. I dare to write anything because I can burn 
my papers at any moment. I do not begin with the thought of an audience peering 




anyway—a miracle when it happens.19 My fantasy is that this self-indulgence will 
be good enough for the great American novel. "Cultural Mis-readings..." (102) 
Here, an idealized author retreats into the romantic personal and creates for herself. The 
cultural work, reception and reaction and perhaps even public praxis are secondary, 
serendipitous. The Great American Novel might be borne of literary turning-inward, but 
that prospect is—perhaps rightly—treated as happy coincidence. Kingston is self-
effacing, here, pointing to “self-indulgence” only comprehended by way of the 
miraculous. Even still, what she identifies as her deepest, highest, furthest writing can be 
gotten only without a community of readers. In the middle of The Fifth Book of Peace, 
that aloneness is indicted and sworn off at the work’s most striking moment: 
After the fire, I could not re-enter fiction. Writing had become a treat for my own 
personal self, as it was when I was a kid and it first came to me, for nobody to 
read but me. Say any manner of thing. For my own benefit. Retreat into the Yin 
mother darkness. Oh, the necessity and comfort of writing “I…I…I…I…I…,” the 
selfish first person, author, narrator, protagonist, one. Freedom—to write 
diarylike, okay to be formless, no art, no good English. 
 
Fiction cares for others; it is compassion, and gives others voice. It time travels 
the past and the future, and pulls the not-now, not-yet into existence.  
 
                                                 
19 This preemptive defense against readers has had no measurable effect on the quantity of efforts to 




The garret where I wrote, which was just my height, burned. A sign. I do not want 
the aloneness of the writer’s life. No more solitary. I need a community of like 
minds. The Book of Peace, to be reconstructed, needs community. (61-62) 
Banishing diaries coincides with a mandate for social justice that certainly structures The 
Woman Warrior and China Men but here follows a more transparent rhetoric. The Fifth 
Book of Peace names its object, peace, and aligns its various genres, fragments, and 
assertions on a trajectory toward that communal end. The privacy of an ideal diary that 
might someday transform into Great Literature seems not to fit in the formula of the Fifth 
Book of Peace. The playfulness and the experiments of early Kingston have here been 
cast off for the seriousness of her chosen obligation. The record of losing her home and 
book to fire, the history of the books of peace, the adventures of the Ah Sings in Hawai’i, 
the account of extended writers’ workshops, and the concluding clarion call for making 
peaceful things, committing peaceful gestures, and documenting that making seem all 
contingent on Kingston’s condition at the beginning of the twenty-first century in the 
U.S. Now at war and having lost father, book, and home, The Fifth Book of Peace 
operates—paradoxically, in Kingston’s conventions—as an appeal for control, singular 
agency, and even for order. The fear of war, the remains of destruction, and an obligation 
to veterans all make the comfort of “diary-like” “self-indulgence” anathema. The strains 
of each populate this text. 
Several telling moments from the workshops deserve attention. Generally anxious 
about the business of her writers returning to the Vietnam War and its contexts, and about 
the relative importance of orderliness itself to her Buddhist-meditative workshops, she 




faculty club, she confides, “I am so excited—the meeting of veterans is beginning—that I 
don’t hear [one of the veterans introducing himself]. I can’t retain what he’s saying” 
(261). A few minutes later, the workshop is troubled: 
Tom greedily talks story; the sentences are so complex, poetic, trippy, I can’t 
retain them. Sherdyl doesn’t try to curb him, so I interrupt: Please give time to 
everybody else. We’re just having introductions now; there’ll be more time for 
stories... They’re impressionable. I have to be careful what I say. Quit suggesting 
sensational things—that it’s possible to forget being in war, then wake up decades 
later. (262) 
When a participant writer tells the group “I am writing myself back to health…Poetry 
writing and journal writing are instruments in my healing,” Kingston confesses her 
unease: “Healing. I avoid that New Age word. It implies that something’s wrong, that 
they’re unwell, and need fixing” (264-5). Later, defensive, “I give instruction on how to 
meditate. I mustn’t confuse it with praying or worshipping. And nobody’s trying to 
convert or save anybody or any soul. The Community of Mindful Living is not a mind 
cult” (265). After offering elementary instruction in meditation, the worry begins to 
overwhelm: 
We are on time, but how to keep up? Everybody else also has a handout sheet 
with the schedule in front of him or her. But they aren’t motivated to help move it 
along. I am crazy over time. Time drives me crazy. I can’t wait until this day is 
done. Rush, get it over with, so I’ll know how things turn out. I forgot to tell them 
to enjoy the peace and quiet we’re making. (266)  




I hope they’re not embarrassed doing this weird, slow, silent walk amid the 
public. No, they’re tough veterans; they can take social embarrassment. But it’s 
the Berkeley public they’re walking through; many people fear and dislike 
Berkeley, hold things against Berkeley, formerly the other enemy. I continue my 
worrying. Worrying is my basic state of mind. (269) (emphasis mine)  
In preparation for silent eating, “I am trying to tell them of a profound Buddhist practice. 
They don’t know how much planning went into deciding on those fifteen minutes of 
silent eating” (270). The ethical obligations of a workshop leader with participants who 
are turned toward their wars rears suddenly, when “[t]oday, for the first time, I think 
about PTSD—post-traumatic stress disorder,” and though she pushes herself—“I should 
quit worrying”—the panic continues (274). Tom again needs controlling, so “I have to 
interrupt this waterfall of consciousness” (274-275). And, finally, near the first 
workshop’s conclusion, Hong Kingston’s self-critique is full-blown. As a friend leaves a 
workshop  
I say, “George.” He looks up, expectant. But I don’t have a wise enough thing to 
say to him. “You say you haven’t reconciled yet. Reconciliation isn’t something 
you do once and for all. You have a lifetime to do it in.” Then I think, What a 
dumb thing to say. That he has to struggle forever. I feel bad, putting George 
through meeting Viet Nam vets, who must have been young brutes to him, 
gooked by White GIs and Black GIs. (279-280) 
After he leaves, “I say, again inadequately, ‘Asian Americans have special pain over Viet 
Nam, Asians against Asians.” And the next day she insists to her psychotherapist, “I’ve 




(283). The writing community itself is hardly always cooperative. When poet Ted 
Sexauer reflects, “I wonder what our counterparts, the writer veterans in Viet Nam, are 
thinking?” The question meets with rage: “Clarence jumps down his throat. ‘What do you 
think they think? Invaders out of nowhere bombing them, tearing their country apart, 
killing their family and friends and neighbors…” (279). When “Eager Tom” reads his 
letter to Kingston to the workshop, “I want to reel Tom in. I’d rather hear about his 
down-to-earthly life in the streets” (293).  
 Perhaps the most difficult, even angst-ridden episode takes place when Kingston 
invites Grace Paley to participate in a workshop. “The room is tense, upset. Ted is angry 
at Grace. Who is she anyway? Is Maxine trying to foist Jane Fonda off on us?” (345). 
Given Kingston’s approach to the workshops and their development, even in light of the 
anxiousness they produce, it is surprising to read that “Woman Vet lets loose wrath at 
Grace and ‘hippies from Berserkeley’” (345). And during this workshop, a participant 
even suggests that Kingston’s project exceeds possibility: 
Kim Redeemer, Buddhist from Thailand, addresses me. She questions my 
incessant push for the happy ending. ‘Maxine, you’ve told the group that writers 
have a responsibility to inspire hope.’ In her soft, determined voice, she quotes 
me: ‘Too many veterans have killed themselves and too many have written 
suicide endings. Today, let’s write a happy ending. (347) 
Redeemer shares the story of a friend, a “competent therapist, who was able to help her 
suicidal clients choose life,” who “took a handful of her sleeping pills and then walked 
into the ice waters of the Bay.” She says, “I want to believe that happy endings will 




happy ending for Jean’s story” (347, 348). Kingston does not reply and waits for Paley, 
who talks about local activism. It is prototypically Kingston’s nonfiction to introduce a 
contradictory note like Redeemer’s, yet this critique is thoroughgoing. One could leave 
the scene understanding that while the local happy ending, appended to each story, is not 
tenable, a larger ending—specifically, to war—might be. And yet Redeemer’s question, 
and Kingston’s silence, particularly as part of a troubled meeting, testifies to the worry 
inherent in her task’s demands.   
 At an early workshop, Kingston discovers her most well-known fictional 
character: “Mike Wong same-same Wittman Ah Sing. I made him up, and he’s appeared. 
He’s real, only Mike went to Canada, not Hawai’i. He has hardly aged, hair yet black, 
thin black mustache, tall and skinny in jeans and plaid shirt. I can feel him listen to me. 
He looks to me for cues on what to do next. May he still be idealistic.” This real Wittman 
is “Chinese American brother writer, the loudest, liveliest voice in the room. Loud and 
proud, a man on the margin functions in many countries at once, soldier and hippie” 
(297). Identification across what for Kingston has always been the permeable line 
between fiction and nonfiction testifies to the agency of both Wittman and Mike. They 
only reassert one another. Yet that willingness to pass between fiction and nonfiction 
does not survive the work Kingston takes on. This same narrator has insisted “things that 
fiction can’t solve must be worked out in life” (241), and so during what would have 
been the last workshop, were it not for September 11th, we read, “I confessed that I’d kept 
seeing him as Wittman Ah Sing, but now know that he is not a jumpy monkey. ‘You’re a 
solid citizen, using statistics and logic and evidence to substantiate peace. Your peace and 




most amazing full life, better than any imagined character’s. You’ve done it all” (396) 
(emphasis mine). Kingston’s confession, and her sense that Wong, as a friend, supercedes 
a fictional character, seems the right thing to do, of course, and while it may diminish Ah 
Sing as an “imagined character,” were there a shared standard of measurement between 
truly fictional characters and known people, its primary work recognizes the comparative 
complexity of the latter.  
 Nonetheless, in this book, the articulated tension between the fictional Ah Sings 
and the real people of Kingston’s memoir of fire and writing illuminates anxious 
questions that Kingston’s prior works would very likely leave satisfactorily unanswered. I 
would like to conclude this study with an analysis of The Fifth Book of Peace’s fictional 
core, “Water,” the rewritten Fourth Book of Peace, in which the Ah Sings establish 
sanctuary in Hawai’i. This section conveys notes that echo and write against the context 
in which it appears, and with the possible exception of “Fire”’s opening survey, it is the 
book’s most compelling aspect. The Oakland-Berkeley fire, the Book of Peace histories, 
the writing workshops, and the epilogue each prize nonfiction and writing in community. 
“Water,” properly a novella, is a fiction, though its rough parallels of Kingston’s family’s 
experience in the war years ward against easy application of that term. 
 In the 1998 preface to the paperback edition of her essay collection, Hawai’i One 
Summer, Kingston says “[f]or me, Hawai’i was a good place for writing about California 
and China, and not for writing about Hawai’i” (xii). While living on the islands, she 
worries about appropriateness and ownership of Hawaiian stories: “My great 
grandfathers, one on my mother’s side, one on my father’s side, and my paternal 




I am not kama‘aina” (xii). Kingston left Berkeley and traveled to Hawai’i with her 
husband and son in 1967. Her short essay, “War,” one of several originally published in 
the New York Times in 1978 and collected in Hawai’i One Summer, provides an 
autobiographical antecedent to “Water.” Her reading of the war economy sounds not 
unlike the rationalizations of The Brother in Vietnam: “We did not look for new jobs in 
Hawai’i. It was the duty of the pacifist in a war economy not to work. When you used 
plastic wrap or made a phone call or drank grape juice or washed your clothes or drove a 
car, you ran the assembly lines that delivered bombs to Vietnam” (15). Wittman and 
Taña, on the airplane from California to Hawai’i, determine that, in order to survive, one 
will have to earn money while the other paints (Taña) or writes (Wittman), but Wittman’s 
job will be “trudging to the Unemployment office” (72). The Kingstons contribute to the 
creation and sustenance of a sanctuary for AWOL soldiers at the Church of the 
Crossroads, and Kingston describes an experience with one, who answers her question 
about shooting model cars he’d assembled: “‘It felt good—like when I was a door gunner 
on the chopper in Nam. Thousands of bullets streaming out of my gun.’ Silence. Don’t 
tell me about the gooks you shot, I thought. Don’t tell me about the hootches you 
torched” (18-19). Uncomfortable proximity to killing shapes the fictional characters’ 
experiences, too. Wittman and Taña will, like Maxine and Earll, learn that they “had not, 
of course, escaped from the war, but had put ourselves in the very midst of it, as close as 
you could get and remain in the United States” (16). 
 Near the conclusion of “Paper,” Kingston explains that the Fourth Book of 
Peace—what has become “Water”—“had to be fiction, because Peace has to be 




compassion, and gives others voice” (61, 62). This story of the story leads into “Water” 
in a graceful collapse of autobiography and fiction: “Letterature D’America mentions a 
writer named Maxine Hong Fiction—must mean me. I should be able to write again 
about the time during war when Earll and I took our son, Joseph, and left to live in 
Hawai’i…” (62). The Fifth Book of Peace’s core, its fictional heart, really, accomplishes 
what its vexed memoir seems unable to do. It accepts a fictional account of the historical, 
investing in contradiction, and deploying those fictional analogues to convey the 
successes and disappointments of a life’s episode. Taña, Wittman, and Mario are an exile 
into fiction and imaginative metonymy for Kingston’s own exile from the mainland U.S. 
Their experiences, like those of BaBa and Kingston’s grandfathers in China Men, engage 
in a dialogic relationship with the conventions of nonfiction. The strengths of the section 
as a meditation on failing to leave behind war, on developing a sanctuary from war, and 
on making home in a strange place are almost wholly undercut when at “Earth”’s 
beginning Kingston tell us she “found no happy ending” and that “[f]iction won’t tell me 
what’s happened to […] people Earll and I knew in our real Hawai’i years” (241). 
Announcing, “[t]hings that fiction can’t solve must be worked out in life” draws the sort 
of border that would seem to have no purchase in China Men. Destruction, fire, and war 
arrest the fiction.  
In Hawai’i, Mario Ah Sing determines, “[m]y name be ‘Ehukai. Now call me 
‘Ehukai” (140). He explains: 
“‘Ehukai—that’s me. Da kine—the kind people—my hanai family—found me 
and I found them today. They hanai me. ‘Ehukai is my real true name. I am 




father to look at him. “See this red? Like the kind rooster comb. And like the top 
of the wave when the red sun comb it. That’s why I be ‘Ehukai. ‘Ehukai goes with 
how I am.” There are Hawaiians called ‘ehu people. They have reddish-brown 
skin; their hair is black at the roots and shades out to red at the tips. Wittman 
noticed that his son’s Chinese black hair had turned brownish, with a hint of red 
[…] He got straight with his offspring’s outgrowing the name he’d given him. 
(140) 
Mario/‘Ehukai asserts the agency of language as an identifier, as clearly as Paper Sons 
did. A child undercuts the stability of documentary language and opts to become 
someone else; he even adopts the local dialect. His father attempts to make his place as 
Hawaiian, as well. He tells a passenger on the flight over, an attorney decidedly frustrated 
with the Ah Sings’ plan to be unemployed in her Hawai’i, that he is “‘almost a Hawaiian 
person myself, you know.’ He could work up a case for Hawaiian ancestry; his apocry-
full PoPo came from or through Hawai’i. Free-choose your ethnicity” (77) (emphasis 
mine). Here is the episteme of China Men, in which the storyteller plays and names 
selves freely. 
 Kingston’s fiction is decidedly not the inadequate fantasy for happy endings. Its 
disappointments make a clear case that fiction conveys the complexity that informs her 
otherwise contradictory writing. Hawai’i disappoints the Ah Sing family. They meet 
fellow Californians Gabriel (minister to the Ah Sing’s wedding ceremony) and Lena, 
who operate The Shooting Gallery, a venue for safe drug use. These mainlanders, who 
“thought of themselves as generous, rudely and antisocially shut themselves off” at 




get off this rock. I’ve got rock fever. Something’s wrong with the place” (172). Wittman, 
circumnavigating the island comes across a “haole madman and his shack sharp against 
the sky,” who actually opens fire on Wittman as he approaches, seeking idyllic talk story 
(123-4). Earlier, Wittman finds himself on an artillery range. When ‘Ehukai reports 
having seen a Menehune, a sort of frightening spirit, the parents wonder, “[m]aybe they 
shouldn’t have left Berkeley, where Mario would have grown up to be an intellectual, 
where he was indigenous, fourth-, fifth-generation Californian. Uprooted from the 
mainland, their child was lured by spirit-soft Hawai’i. The price of war-evading was 
reality-evading. Their child was paying the price” (148). Hawaiian neighbors steal from 
the Ah Sings, an inscrutable act that leaves them confused, uncertain about how much 
they can afford to give, unhappy that they are unable to determine the motives of those 
who take from their few possessions (157-159). Their housewarming party is markedly 
uncomfortable; other parties are planned for the same evening, guests are unsure of their 
responsibilities, and so the Ah Sings worry over what sort of food and drink to offer. A 
neighbor, Big Eustace, whose personality leads Wittman to “fill and refill [his] plate, 
keeping the vet’s mouth full, keeping his war stories stuffed up. So he wouldn’t say 
‘hootch’ and ‘gook,” laments the loss of color in Hawai’i, having fought in Vietnam 
(177). The Ah Sing family learns a traditional chant for the party, but “[n]obody joined 
in. Nobody sang along. The Hawaiians had been through lots of cultural revolutions and 
gotten rid of this stuff” (178). During the party, guests hear nearby Samoan families sing 
“on and on, something epic without a break. We were returned to the time when language 
was one long word […] all-holding music. Impossible glory was coming from the 




constantly threatened with cries, “Junyah! Gonna kill you Junyah! I kill you!” (179). The 
narrator wonders, “[h]ow odd to be raised like that—giants yelling to kill him, and then 
surrounding him with that music” (179). One of the Ah Sings’ most disturbing findings is 
the brutal racism that drives Sheraton and Clifton, black VISTA volunteers, out of town 
during the night of rioting that follows the party. They overhear reports of “Black haoles. 
Bad enough White haoles—we get black haoles.” And “Fuckeeng black, those Popolos.” 
“Out of town on a rail.” “Lucky for them, not get killed” (188). Moments of respite from 
war, moments of familial safety, and moments of community are not unknown to the Ah 
Sings in Hawai’i, but their fiction conveys the thoroughgoing disappointments that would 
not be part of an imagined naïve exile from warring. 
Wittman, Kingston’s poet-playwright, shares her work’s objective: “And he had 
something to write—the poem, the play that would stop war” (72). Wittman’s own Book 
of Peace evades him, though. “Poems and plays were not coming to Wittman. No speech 
that he could hear came out of this ground” (145). His literary intervention, like his 
author’s, is predicated on war veterans’ experiences. At the worst of their Hawaiian 
dystopia, after the night of riots, the troubled party, after the racist banishment of 
Sheraton and Clifton, a group of AWOL soldiers open a sanctuary at the Church of the 
Crossroads. Wittman’s place echoes Kingston’s own attempts to hear veterans tell stories. 
Taking part in the sanctuary, “Wittman listened to the AWOL GIs go back over their 
lives, figuring out how they got to be who they were and how they came to be here, in 
this present place. Reviewing their paths, they saw where they’d lost their way” (216). 
Wittman chooses to produce “Viet Rock (A Folk War Movie) by Megan Terry, a blueprint 




changes, and the aesthetic consistency with both Kingston’s nonfiction and Wittman’s 
plays in Tripmaster Monkey sustains the unsettling business of storytelling.  
“Water” ends with Mario’s rejection of “[g]irl graduates [who] were talking the 
guys into joining them in the volunteer Army/Navy/Air Force/Marines” (237). This is the 
sort of locally satisfactory victory available in the fiction and so, “Wittman and Taña 
hugged each other for joy” (237). The AWOLs hosted by the Ah Sings’ home sanctuary 
have given up and returned to base, reminding Wittman to collect his reward for driving 
them back. On his way home, “[h]e walked to Kahalu’u, which is not a town, or any kind 
of official place. It’s nowhere, a place for fugitives and refugees to keep coming” (236). 
The nowhere of fiction might very well be the site of Kingston’s best arguments against 
war. By articulating a measurable difference between fiction and nonfiction and insisting 
on the primacy of the latter, Mario’s choice winds up subsumed by the panic of keeping 
nonfiction—that is, real—children out of war. It seems perhaps clear that this task cannot 
be accomplished by either fiction or nonfiction, yet by closing off the agency of one for 
the other, Kingston leaves behind her richest contribution to nonfiction, as well as some 
of nonfiction’s richest contributions to U.S. literature.  
In her recent meditation, To Be the Poet, published one year before The Fifth 
Book of Peace, Kingston addresses the obligations of her work:  
I have almost finished my longbook. Let my life as Poet begin. I want the life of 
the Poet. I have labored for over twelve years, one thousand pages of prose. Now 
I want the easiness of poetry. The brevity of the poem. Poets are always happy. I 
want to be always happy. No plotting any more plots. For the longbook (about the 




grown and gone, and my husband and family and friends, who should have been 
loved more. The longbook has got to be done soon, and I’ll be free to live. I won’t 
be a workhorse anymore; I’ll be a skylark. Free of obligations. (3) 
When the book is complete, “I will be selfish. There’s a wonderful moment I have on the 
verge of sleep—I have nothing to do but feel my feelings, look at the pictures behind my 
eyes, and go to sleep. Consider no one but myself. Rest from the social responsibility of 
prose. Don’t care about people’s antics anymore. I will be socially irresponsible. I will be 
a Poet” (11). The responsibilities to leading the veterans home to cohesive selves, to 
participating in—to enlivening—the Peace Book tradition, to remembering and rewriting 
the Fourth Book of Peace, to “stopping wars hence” could only be overwhelming. The 
labor and sacrifice that constitutes The Fifth Book of Peace is inseparable from its 
responsibilities, and, nearing its completion, Kingston shares her desire to return to the 
sort of writerly aloneness that might produce a Great American Novel—or Great 
American Poem—if only by coincidence. Her alliance between irresponsibility and the 
short form of poetry cries against the weight of making “one thousand pages of prose” in 
order to limit war, even if no shortage of poets might share a contradictory sense of their 
art’s demands. This wish to indulge a writer’s life, leisurely in its detachment, makes 
clear the strain of The Fifth Book of Peace and contributes to this reading of its panic. 
Kingston the “workhorse” pleads for concluding release from the demands she adopts 
when her manuscript burns, when BaBa dies, when her mother tells her to educate the 
world, when she begins looking for origins of the Books of Peace, when she assigns 




The Epilogue’s penultimate scene includes the confiscation of cameras of 
reporters covering Code Pink antiwar protests before the current war began. A Pacifica 
Radio correspondent observes, “‘If an event—an arrest—is not witnessed and 
photographed by the media, it did not happen.’ The police lines that blocked off 
Pennsylvania Avenue turned away journalists from The Washington Post, the New York 
Times, and ABC television” (402). Representation begets existence in this 
phenomenological formula, yet it is significant that Kingston cuts through that model and 
observes that a handful of participants did witness the scene and are therefore obliged to 
report it. The Post and the Times and ABC make events and arrests consumable for an 
external world of detached, uninterested, often suspicious Americans. Kingston clearly 
hopes to change the world in which that audience might not elect to seek out news of an 
antiwar protest. The Fifth Book of Peace seeks to accomplish the sort of ends the Code 
Pink activists cannot achieve without an activist communication; it operates against war 
and against an uncritical discourse. As an intervention to recuperate veterans of war and 
to sustain a tradition of literary antiwar acts, it remains bound to the responsibilities of 
both objectives and therefore can afford neither the satisfaction of China Men’s 










Conclusion: Life Writing Against Loss 
Nonfiction’s weird place alongside fiction and poetry unsettles and resists 
literary-critical explanation in messy ways. Invested in and faithful to language as a 
meaningful mediation between a life and a readership, those who purport to write about 
what happened offer texts that push against efforts to dismiss their aspiration to be 
products—and measures—of experience. Joan Scott’s critique of experience as an 
essential category certainly wards against naturalizing a series of antecedent phenomena 
that author an unproblematically referential text; and yet we should be careful to avoid 
implying that life writing is not, at least in some ways, the effect of having had a life. The 
easy naivety of the biographical fallacy and the temptation to read all literature as 
autobiographical residue help out very little. This is not a matter of intent—what the 
memoirist hopes to communicate is, for our purposes, secondary to what she has 
written—but of function. Inevitably, these texts take on the varying weight of lived lives. 
They are both archaeological and constructive practices; they lay claim to something 
other than invention alone. Biography, memoir, autobiography, auto/biography, 
periautography, autogynography, biomythography, biographical novels, autobiographical 
essays, and the rest of the more than three hundred entries that constitute Donald J. 
Winslow’s Life-Writing: A Glossary of Terms in Biography, Autobiography, and Related 
Forms, persist in their insistence that lives and fiction, while co-constructive, are distinct 
phenomena. Attempts to map the border between the two, as I hope the preceding 
analysis shows, are futile enterprises, but writing off nonfiction’s dependence on a sense 
of material conditions seems no more promising. This is life writing’s obligation: it is a 




self, these texts are untenable without their lives. The six texts surveyed above register 
that dependence between experience (no matter how subservient to memory, language, 
and fiction) and their texts. 
Six cases cannot bear the weight of all life writing, and I do not intend to suggest 
otherwise. McCarthy, Vidal, and 1980’s Kingston can only illustrate so much of their 
moment’s approach to life writing; Eggers, Morris, and 2003’s Kingston are similarly 
specific instances. Nevertheless, these works are collectively symptomatic of the 
instability of efforts to craft lives and narrate experiences. They follow postmodernism’s 
antifoundational suspicions of historical narratives. Nevertheless, in certain respects, 
most recognize Jameson’s critique of “the fashionable conclusion that because history is 
a text, the ‘referent’ does not exist.” Their thoroughgoing attention to biographical 
practice uneasily frets over his consequential claim that “history is not a text, not a 
narrative, master or otherwise, but that, as an absent cause, it is inaccessible to us except 
in textual form, and that our approach to it and to the Real itself necessarily passes 
through its prior textualization, its narrativization in the political unconscious” (The 
Political Unconscious 35). Making stories of historical lives means for this study’s 
examples recognition that that this making may as well be part of the story. Above, I 
suggest in passing the unwieldy term, “metanonfiction.” Recognition and 
acknowledgment of the constructive work in which these efforts engage—in overt 
discussion of nonfiction’s limits, in clear fictionalization, in literary self-deprecation—
bolsters their sophistication and, significantly, fills in their efforts to be, for lack of a 
more nuanced notion, honest. As knowing and informed cases for the mode, their 




report. Aphoristically, undomesticated and multivalent lives beget undomesticated and 
multivalent life writing. 
What happens, then, when these texts attempt to reconcile their critical 
interventions with their commitments to an ending or solution? As McCarthy, Vidal, and 
Kingston thoughtfully illustrate, it is possible to supersede the limits of nonfiction’s 
conventions and suggest ways to write a life. Yet there is something pained, even broken, 
in the contemporary texts above, and that condition, while illustrated by only limited 
evidence in this study, may show us something about the struggle of an activist practice 
in postmodern life writing. I hope to avoid the bad teleological impulse—life writing at 
the turn of the twenty-first century is not somehow closer to transcendent biographical 
practice than earlier texts. The way anxiety negotiates deconstructive turns does however 
indicate the trouble of nonfiction that bears the poststructuralist critique. Kingston loses 
her father, her mother, her home, and her book, and she worries that her veterans’ stories 
will not do their recuperative work and that war will come. Eggers loses his parents and 
worries that his stories will not be believed, that other friends and family will die, that his 
response to death has been inappropriate, that loving and local community fades. Morris 
invents a son in order to lose him and worries over judging an imminently subject-to-
judgment Reagan. Given the damage from which these three tell their stories, it is 
breathtaking that Kingston resists “Healing … that New Age word. It implies that 
something’s wrong” (265). These three works are bound to their anxieties over meeting 
their obligations; all three express a longing for nonfiction practice with material agency 




for an instance of life writing that acknowledges its contingency to accomplish its 
recuperative work? 
It would be reckless to insist that three disruptive memoirs represent general 
movement in contemporary U.S. life writing—certainly not all instances from the past 
decade are pained over the ways they will be faithful to a story as they signal familiarity 
with postmodern literary playfulness. Their struggle between experimentalism and 
nonfiction is nevertheless telling. These works, in their pressure against the edges of their 
conventions, begin to suggest lessons for our approach to that larger catalogue of 
memoir, autobiography, biography, and other representations of self. The opening of 
discourses to Derridean, Foucauldian, and Barthesian structuralist and poststructuralist 
critiques promises critical theory’s primary shared operation, insofar as its adherents can 
be said to share: a sort of pulling back the skin from the machinery. After those exacting 
analyses, life writers must determine a means to purchase their objective. I do not mean 
that postmodernism and life writing are incompatible—Kingston demonstrates easily 
enough the ways they are able to contribute to each other. Eggers’ impatience with those 
who regard his work as “pomo garbage” hardly precludes its postmodernisms. His 
resistance to any critical apparatus seems only to articulate the strains of postmodern life 
writing against the limits of postmodernism. If anything, these works mark a fuller 
postmodern effort in which the polyvalence of discourse shakes up the commitment to 
what precedes the text, which in turn limits the free-float that follows the most radical 
break with authority. 
Eggers seems able to argue for a community—and by all accounts his celebrity 




which he operates—and his frantic memoir relates an affecting story with considerable 
devotion to both uncertainty and a tangible community of friends and family. Kingston’s 
appeal against war has significant work ahead, given the prognosis of contemporary 
international relations, though the convictions of its last moments compel against war—
its insistence that peace should follow a changing path by changing means guarantees its 
freedom from the constrictions of an either/or Kingston has always avoided. Morris 
indicts his subject for his sins as he implies that Reagan’s story is a performative 
operation, bound primarily to its allegiance to varying roles in varying media. He does 
finally suggest a subject as unstable as his text, though. And yet each mitigates its work 
with worries that are at odds with their experimentalist approaches. What we are able to 
take from these vexed cases is a critical conundrum for contemporary life writing. It is 
not that one must commit to either poststructuralist dismantling or nonfiction’s 
authorizing structures. Rather, informed life writing with obligations to praxis, no matter 
how local, is subject to its own critiques. Eggers, Morris, and Kingston, while attentive to 
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